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The Road to COP31 for North African Countries’ NDCs

Article by Malak ALTAEB

Between Reality & Theory – Climate Governance and Policy Implications in Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco

Background

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement at COP21 in December 2015, significant changes have taken place in the global response to climate change, an issue whose impacts are intensifying at an alarming rate. The Agreement entered into force in 2016 and was ratified by countries at different stages. North African countries including Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, were among the first countries that ratified the agreement. Countries subsequently submitted their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) outlining their commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Since then, the NDCs have been updated every five years, communicating climate actions to adapt and mitigate the rising impacts of climate change. These successive submissions provide an indication of whether global joint efforts meet the demands set under the Paris Agreement and emissions reduction goals. Regardless of the agreement’s ratification and the submission of NDCs, climate action remains an urgent priority as climate-related threats intensifies year after year.

For North Africa, a region grabbling with socio-economic challenges and geopolitical implications, including youth unemployment and political tension, the additional pressures of of climate change make climate ambitions difficult to translate into reality. Despite progress reflected in the NDCs submitted by countries like Morocco, ranked 6th among the highest performers by the Climate Change Performance Index. Unfortunately, the reality tells a different narrative for the persistent challenges for this region. As COP31 approaches, these challenges raise serious questions about the future of climate action in the region

Morocco

‎‎Morocco is experiencing severe climate change and ranks among the countries most severely affected by its impacts. The country’s heavy reliance on rainfall, particularly in the agricultural sector, leaves the country especially exposed to climate-related risks and constrains its adaptive capacity. This vulnerability is particularly significant given the central role of agriculture in the national economy. Adding to this, the country’s neoliberal policy framework which prioritises capital accumulation and access to international funding and loans, are further compound these vulnerabilities and repercussions of climate change. ‎

From a policy perspective, Morocco is raising its climate ambitions. Its latest NDC sets a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 53% by 2035, compared with the 45.5% target for 2030 under NDC 2.0, a single year target. The updated contribution also introduces, for the first time, a conditional target date of 2040 for phasing out coal, contingent on international support. It further outlines measures to expand renewable energy, particularly through investments in energy storage and grid infrastructure. On adaptation, Morocco’s latest NDC sets out a comprehensive framework comprising 80 sectoral adaptation targets for 2035, supported by 107 specific adaptation projects. ‎In terms of funding, new details on the financing required to implement both conditional and unconditional measures across several specific projects. Meeting these needs will require a combination of public funding, private investment, and international cooperation. Several ongoing initiatives illustrate how these commitments translate into concrete projects. They include the Noor-Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power Plant Project, the Ifahsa Pumped Hydropower Storage Project and PADIDZAR program, launched in in 2021. The latter focuses on rehabilitating and developing rural water infrastructure, with focus on drip irrigation. 

Nonetheless, a closer examination of existing projects and projected investments against conditions on the ground reveals a widening gap between climate-related investment priorities and the needs of local communities. This raises questions about who ultimately benefits from these investments and how their benefits and costs are distributed. One example is the expansion of desalination infrastructure.  Investment in the sector is planned to increase from $400 million in 2024 to $850 million by 2033 .  

Morocco has also expanded its desalination capacity to supply water for both irrigation and drinking water purposes,  with 17 seawater desalination plants currently operating and 9 more planned by 2030. However, the expansion of desalination also raises questions about the allocation of water resources and the sectors that benefit most from these investments. In particular, the growing emphasis on supplying export-oriented agriculture, especially fruits and vegetables production for European market, warrants closer scrutiny. Tomatoes are among Morocco’s leading agricultural exports :  the crop occupies the largest cultivated area among the country’s exported horticultural products, and Morocco has become the second largest supplier of tomatoes to the EU. Crops such as tomatoes, avocados, and oranges are highly water intensive, making their expansion difficult to reconcile with Morocco’s rising water scarcity and recurrent drought. The tensions surrounding water use are not new. In 2017, protests known as the ‘’Thirst Revolution’’ sparked in the Zagora region in southern Morocco, where residents demanded access to drinking water and called for an end to watermelon cultivation. The expansion of desalination infrastructure also faces challenges, including rising energy, operating, and maintenance costs. Moreover, small-scale farmers still cannot access desalinated water because of its high cost.

The expansion of renewable energy and, more recently, the development of green hydrogen also raise significant social and environmental concerns, especially for a country that remains dependent on coal. Although green hydrogen is presented as a key component of Morocco’s energy transition, it’s expansion depends on regulations set by the EU the major beneficiary, keeping local context at stake and no considerations of the local reality and communities. Additionally, green energy development raises concerns about land acquisition, high water requirements, and the displacement of local communities, placing a burden on rural communities already facing resource constraints.

These concerns also need to be considered in relation to Morocco’s labour market, particularly the limited employment opportunities available to young people. The youth unemployment rate among people aged 15 to 24 stood at  21.9 percent in 2025, down from from 26.8 percent in 2020. Although this represents an improvement, youth unemployment remains a significant and persistent challenge. The long-term data series covering 1991 to 2025 further shows the scale of this challenge over time. This uncovers the broader gap between the scale of investment s in in climate-related projects and the extent to which these investments generate direct benefits for the local population, particularly youth. Taken together, these trends show a repeated approach, focusing on accumulation of capital and investments heavily dependent on loans rather than an actual growth for the local population. Climate policy in Morocco should therefore go beyond increasing investments and solely attracting foreign capital; it must also consider how these investments can translate into tangible opportunities, improved public services, and more equitable access to resources. Only by addressing these dimensions can the country pursue a genuinely just transition that respects both its environment and communities most affected by climate change.  

Libya

Libya, the North African country with an oil-driven economy, has made limited progress in climate action, largely because of its complex and protracted political situation. Its situation differs markedly from that of neighbouring countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. With its political dilemma since the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, the country has been facing persistent political instability and institutional fragmentation, with rival authorities in the east and west, recurring conflict, and inflation that have severely affected the daily lives of the Libyan population. 

Over a decade after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, the country’s oil wealth has yet to translate into broad-based improvements in living conditions or sustained development. Successive governments have continued to rely on oil revenues, while public spending has often failed to deliver tangible benefits for the population. Libya therefore illustrates the dynamics of the resource curse : rather than serving as a foundation for economic diversification and public welfare, oil wealth has helped sustain a rentier system in which access to state revenues is closely tied to political power and patronage.  This dynamic has been reinforced by integration of some armed militias into state institutions and the appointment of their leaders to influential positions. Such arrangements have enabled militias to have control over the country’s revenues for their interests, while allowing successive authorities to secure their loyalty in return of controlled stability. In this context, the rentier state model in Libya has not been fundamentally transformed since 2011 ; instead, it has adapted to political fragmentation and become increasingly intertwined with the influence of armed groups.

Since signing the Paris agreement in 2016, Libya took no further formal action towards ratification until 2021, when the Agreement was finally ratified. Until then, Libya has been far away from any active and meaningful participation in international events to tackle climate change and no action has been taken on the ground. Climate change is increasingly affecting Libya’s development trajectory, with its implications for water security, livelihoods, public health, infrastructure, and economic resilience. Yet these growing risks have not been matched by an effective policy response. Combined with weak governance and limited institutional capacity to implement existing commitments, this has kept climate action low on the country’s policy agenda.

The weaknesses of Libya’s energy system illustrate this gap between climate commitments and conditions on the ground. Since 2011, the country has experienced recurrent electricity shortages, with power cuts becoming particularly frequent during extended summer heat and, at times, escalating into widespread blackouts. Most recently, power cuts returned after a period of relative stability of the network during the summer of 2026. Around 70 percent of generated electricity is sourced from natural gas, while renewables account for only 0.02% of electricity generation. This negligible share highlights the limited diversification of the power mix and the slow pace of the energy transition. Electricity shortages are no longer merely a technical problem or a seasonal inconvenience: they disrupt essential aspects of daily life, from the provision of drinking water and the safe storage of food and medicines to households’ ability to meet their basic needs. The combination of an ageing and unreliable electricity system, heavy reliance on fossil fuels, and the negligible contribution of renewable energy exposes the difficulty of translating climate commitments into changes in the country’s energy landscape. It also raises questions about the resilience of a power sector that remains closely tied to the oil and gas economy.

‎Nonetheless, on July 7, 2026, the Ministry of Environment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) adopted the requirements under the Paris Climate Agreement, in a move intended to reaffirm Libya’s commitment to advancing climate action, consolidating the principles of sustainable development, and enhancing cooperation with international partners in addressing environmental challenges.‎

‎ Libya’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), National Adaptation Plan (NAP), and First National Communication (INC) together  constitute the main national framework for climate policies in Libya under the Paris Agreement. These instruments guide national efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, strengthen resilience to climate impacts, and improve climate-related reporting.‎ The Strategic Climate Framework provides an integrated approach to address these interrelated challenges and support sustainable development and long-term economic transformation.‎

Libya’s first NDC sets out its climate priorities and targets for 2026–2035, including actions to reduce emissions intensity, expand renewable energy use and improve energy efficiency, strengthen land and water resources management, and strengthen adaptation actions in key sectors. This represents an important step towards re-establishing Libya’s engagement in regional and international climate processes.  However, the adoption of these policy commitments does not in itself ensure their implementation. In a context of divided political authority and institutional fragmentation, the absence of a unified government and functioning coordination mechanisms continues to constrain the translation of national priorities into action. Although this step enables Libya to request international support from sources such as the Climate Adaptation Fund or access to the Loss and Damage Fund, there are clear requirements to obtain such funds, and the question of a central government will be raised first, which, in turn, would have a negative impact on pushing climate action forward.

The absence of a unified governing body creates doubt and hesitation in the international arena, and decisions in the current landscape are also fragmented. This raises the question about whether the three main climate-policy instruments developed at the national level (the NDC, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), and the First National Communication (INC) will be recognised and implemented across the country. In particular, it remains uncertain to what extent the authorities based in eastern Libya, led by Osama Hammad and operating in areas under the territorial control of Khalifa Haftar, will adopt and implement these frameworks. Additionally, Libya lacks monitoring and accountability across many attempted projects and initiatives, where corruption has been normalized and has resulted in a weak, almost non-existent, monitoring apparatus and little transparent communication between authorities and the public.

Libya does not need preferential treatment because of its political dilemma; rather, it requires a differentiated approach to the design of climate-finance mechanisms, along with risk assessments that clearly considers potential armed conflict or institutional disruptions. The national climate-policy frameworks developed with the support of international partners, including UNDP and GIZ, should have given greater consideration to complementary implementation arrangements based on a bottom-up approach.  Such arrangements could strengthen the role and autonomy or power of local actors, including local NGOs and community-based initiatives with a demonstrated record of achievements on the ground. Where direct access to funding through national institutions is constrained, support could instead be channelled through qualified third-party groups or international actors, while ensuring appropriate safeguards, oversight, and accountability. Without systematic assessments of future events under the business-as-usual model, such important output may not see the light of day in real development projects and initiatives that reflect real climate action. 

Tunisia

Tunisia faces pressing challenges as a hotspot for climate change risks. It is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world, ranking 20th globally in water stress.‎‎ The country is below the water poverty line where its per capita water availability is at 360 cubic meters per year, below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters. Between 2020 and 2023, rainfall declined by 20 percent, further reducing the availability of drinking water and water reserves in dams. The rising impact of climate change is intensifying the risks facing agriculture, a key sector of the Tunisian economy. It contributes about 10.3 percent of the country’s GDP as of 2025 and employs 15 percent of the workforce.‎

‎‎Tunisia was among the early countries in the MENA region to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), setting out its initial commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement. It has placed climate change at the top of its political and economic agenda and also been recognised within the country’s constitutional framework. Following the presidential takeover in July 2021, Tunisia adopted a new constitution promulgated on August 2022. The Constitution includes two provisions directly relevant to environmental and climate policy. Article 47 guarantees the right to a healthy and balanced environment and commits the State to contributing to climate stability, while also requiring it to provide the means necessary to eliminate environmental pollution. Article 48 requires the State to ensure equal access to safe drinking water for all on an equal basis, and it shall preserve water resources for future generations.  These provisions establish a constitutional basis for environmental protection, climate action, and water security (Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, 2022; see also the UNFCCC synthesis of Tunisia’s climate commitments).

However, these constitutional commitments are not always reflected on the ground. The situation in the Gulf of Gabès in Tunisia illustrates the gap between formal environmental guarantees and the realities experienced by local communities. The activities of the chemical complex in the Gulf of Gabès have been associated with severe environmental and health pollution, with serious consequences for air quality, the local environment, and residents’ health. Thousands of people protested in October 2025 to demand stronger protection of health and the dismantling of the chemical complex.

‎ Alongside these domestic environmental challenges, Tunisia has raised its climate ambitions through the submission of its third NDC in September 2025. The updated contribution sets a target of reducing its carbon intensity by 62 percent by 2035, representing a substantial increase in ambition compared with the previous 2030 target. In energy sector, Tunisia aims to source at least 50 percent of its electricity  from solar and wind power by 2035. The NDC also provides estimates of the financial resources required to achieve its updated ambitions, distinguishing between the share to be financed domestically and the additional international support needed to implement the more ambitious measures.‎ ‎Tunisia intends to be a hub for green hydrogen production, with its hydrogen strategy setting out ambitions to export 6 million tonnes per year by 2050 with a production aim of 8 million tonnes. These ambitions, however, need to be considered against the country’s persistent energy deficit and dependence on imported energy.  The energy deficit reached ‎‎around 50 percent in 2022 compared with 53 percent in 2021‎‎. This contrast raises broader questions about how Tunisia intends to balance its domestic energy needs with its plans to develop large-scale renewable energy and green hydrogen production for export.

‎Nonetheless, instead of prioritizing domestic renewable energy investments to generate green electricity to fill this gap, the government plans to use this electricity to produce green hydrogen and export it to the EU. This approach, while central to Tunisia’s energy transition strategy, is in line with ‎‎similar initiatives in other African countries‎‎, such as Egypt, and Morocco, and South Africa.‎ In addition to the negative impacts on the environment, the economic gains for the countries of the South might be limited as they continue to import high value added technologies while exporting raw materials with less value added thereby reinforcing unequal trade relations.‎ Between commitments and challenges, Tunisia could review its climate ambitions in a more realistic sense that clearly support local reality and help enhance people’s lives with the changing climate.

Gap Between Climate Ambitions and Implementation in Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia

Following COP31, a comparison of the NDCs and climate policies of Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya reveals a persistent gap between national ambitions and the governance and institutional capacities needed to implement them. Morocco has made significant progress in expanding in expanding renewable energy boom,  expanding ambitions to triple renewable energy capacity to 15 GW by 2030, compared with an installed capacity of approximately 5 GW as of 2024. This boom stands in parallel with 58 percent coal-based electricity and around 80.9 percent fossil fuel dependence where industry and residentials are the highest electricity consumers in the country.

Tunisia, meanwhile, has faced a particularly stark tests of its climate and energy ambitions. While its updated NDC seeks to increase the contribution of solar and wind power to electricity generation, the electricity shortages experienced during the summer of 2026 exposed the fragility of the existing energy system.  During an extreme heatwave, with temperatures approaching 50°C in some parts of the country, rising electricity demand prompted rotating power cuts across several regions. These interruptions also affected water distribution : an electricity outage at the Kerker pumping station, for example, disrupted drinking-water supplies in parts of the Mahdia and Sfax governorates (Al Jazeera, 31 August 2026). The consequences extended beyond household inconvenience. Water interruptions during extreme heat increased the pressure on communities already facing structural water scarcity, while health services and emergency departments came under additional strain. The crisis exposed how weaknesses in electricity infrastructure can undermine access to other essential services, particularly water and healthcare. It also raises a fundamental question about the country’s energy transition : how can Tunisia pursue ambitious renewable-energy targets while ensuring that its electricity system is sufficiently reliable and resilient to meet basic domestic needs, especially under increasingly severe climatic conditions ?

Tunisia’s worsening economic crisis and continued dependence on international support have often been portrayed as circumstances that can be addressed through further international assistance. Yet this approach risks reinforcing, rather than resolving, the structural weaknesses that constrain the country’s development. The system itself limits economic potential, restricts competition, and enables monopolistic practices. Over time, this has created a self-reinforcing cycle in which dependence on international support delays the reforms needed to address these underlying problems, thereby increasing the need for further assistance. This continued reliance on loans and other forms of support from external actors, including the European Union, the IMF, risks perpetuating this cycle rather than creating the conditions for greater economic autonomy.

Libya, by contrast, shows a glimpse of hope by submitting its first NDC, despite the lengthy delay, which signals an effort to re-engage with the international climate process and re-establish the country’s position within it. Yet, taking this step on its own at this stage is not enough. The UNFCCC should consider how its processes can better accommodate countries whose climate-policy development has been delayed by prolonged conflict and institutional fragmentation. The country’s first NDC could provide a setting stone for bringing local actors around a common agenda, attracting the engagement of additional stakeholders, addressing existing challenges and building momentum for more coherent climate policies and action. For Libya, there remains a question mark over the implementation of its climate ambitions and the need for instruments to unlock its potential amid ongoing fragmentation.

The comparison of these three countries shows that ambitious climate goals cannot, on their own, drive or sustain meaningful climate action unless they are grounded in local realities and place the needs of communities at the centre of policy decisions. Climate policy should not be driven primarily by investment opportunities or profit-making considerations; it should be assessed above all by the benefits it delivers to people, particularly those most exposed to climate impacts. However, with COP31 it is also essential to outline the extent to which countries such as Tunisia and Morocco depend on international support to meet their climate ambitions, to reduce GHG, and effectively contribute to global efforts. The scale and nature of this support must reflect each country’s economic, social, and political circumstances, as well as the challenges that constrain implementation.

The experiences of Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia also demonstrate that climate action cannot be measured by the submission of NDCs alone. Greater attention must be paid to how these commitments are translated into policies, programmes, and measurable outcomes. The UNFCCC should therefore urge countries to provide regular updates on implementation including progress against established indicators and targets , the status of realistic challenges and limitations available during the implementation procedure. A whole- of-society and whole-of-government approach could help strengthen this process, with relevant ministries contributing interim and annual progress to ensure more systematic monitoring and accountability. Ultimately, NDCs cannot be treated as standalone technical documents, separate from the political landscape and policy requirements. but rather directly connected and can be considered a real test of each country’s climate policy and governance frameworks.

At the national level, ministries of environment in these countries could establish dedicated monitoring program through which civil society organisations CSOs can report on the progress of local climate initiatives, share their experiences, and identify the technical or financial support they need. A dedicated online platform could facilitate this process, allowing local organisations to submit regular updates through a standardised reporting form. In parallel, ministries of economy could establish dedicated units to track ing climate-related financial flows, including funding allocated to loss and damage, adaptation and mitigation, and energy transition. Introducing a specific budget classification, such as a climate budget tag, would help distinguish climate-related expenditure from other public spending and make it easier to track how resources are allocated, disbursed, and used. Greater transparency in this area would also help assess whether announced climate-finance commitments translate into actual funding and whether that funding reaches the sectors and communities for which it is intended.

Participation should also extend beyond conventional consultation processes. Farmers and agricultural unions, youth organisations, and local environmental committees, and other community-based actors should have opportunities to contribute directly to the development and monitoring of national climate commitments. These groups could develop a joint or individual reports documenting local climate impacts, implementation progress, unmet needs, and barriers to action.Such contributions could be formally as annexes to updated NDCs, giving local actors a more substantive role in shaping national climate policy and providing an additional source of evidence against which government reporting can be assessed.

 At the global level, the Global North responsibility in providing financial and technical support to Global South countries remains constrained by the conditions attached to that support and by the persistent gap between pledged resources and actual needs. Much of the financial support remains in the form of, adding to the debt burdens of countries already facing significant economic pressures and reinforcing the status quo of developing countries dependent on developed countries. In this context, the just transition is developed to benefit systems of Global North’s developed countries as its design and implementation fail to account for the distinct economic, social, and political realities of countries in the Global South. The provision of climate should therefore be understood not simply as international assistance, but as part of the response to the accumulated climate debt arising from the disproportionate contribution of developed countries to global greenhouse gas emissions. Governments in the Global North have not yet fulfilled these commitments to the required scale based on needs. Climate finance must cover adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation and phase-out of fossil fuels, and a just transition. It must also be predictable, transparent, accessible, and provided on terms that do not deepen existing debt burdens.‎ Above all, its allocation and use should be subject to public scrutiny and reflect the priorities of the communities and countries it is intended to support.

COP31 could offer an important opportunity for countries of the Global South to challenge existing approaches to climate finance and governance, and rewriting narratives of the global climate policy. These countries should not be treated merely as recipients of financial assistance or as implementers of policy models developed elsewhere. They must have an equal and meaningful role in defining priorities, setting standards, and shaping the mechanisms through which climate commitments are translated into action. Without such a shift, the annual COPs process risks becoming a recurring exercise in reaffirming existing commitments and approaches without adequately challenging the structural inequalities that continue to shape global climate governance.

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