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Conflict-Sensitive Climate Finance in North Africa after COP30

Article by Abdalftah Ali

Divided Authority, Institutional Continuity and Access to Loss and Damage Finance

COP30 turned loss and damage finance from a pledge into a queue. On the conference’s first day in Belém, the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage opened its first call for funding requests, and by June 2026 it held 176 of them, seeking USD 2.8 billion (FRLD, 2026b). The Parties also urged the Fund’s Board to avoid “disproportionate bureaucratic obstacles” to access (UNFCCC, 2026a).

The central question is whether UNFCCC climate finance mechanisms exclude conflict-affected states in North Africa, and through which channels such exclusion leads to maladaptation. Libya and Sudan provide the test cases. Neither half of the proposition withstands scrutiny. What emerges instead is a more useful finding for those seeking to reform the system: exclusion is not an accurate description of what the record shows. Both states are eligible and retain institutional standing, and both entered the first loss-and-damage funding round in 2026. Access hinges on institutional continuity, which conflict disrupts at two distinct stages: first, before a country can submit a request, and again after funding has been approved. Where authority is divided, the international community’s decision to recognise a single counterpart settles which part of the country remains connected to the funding chain. All this unfolds within a fund sustained by voluntary contributions and vastly undersized relative to demand. As for maladaptation, the evidence stops short of the threshold established by the IPCC. The findings support a diagnosis of an adaptation deficit and a discontinuity in delivery, but no stronger claim.

1. What Access Requires

A working definition of conflict-sensitive climate finance is funding designed to operate under disrupted governance without intensifying local competition for resources. Judged against that standard, the current architecture falls short, and it does so procedurally rather than by intent. Multilateral funds do not screen applicants for stability. They assess applicants against institutional and procedural requirements that stable governance systems are generally better equipped to meet. The Green Climate Fund (GCF), for instance, accredits entities against fiduciary standards and environmental and social safeguards, and requires a no-objection letter from the National Designated Authority (NDA) for each funding proposal (Green Climate Fund, 2024).

Loss and damage finance was designed to address these shortcomings. Yet the Barbados Implementation Modalities initially allocated only USD 250 million for 2025 and 2026, an amount subsequently increased to USD 342 million. At least half is earmarked for least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS), placing Sudan within the scope of this allocation floor while Libya, Egypt and Morocco fall outside it (FRLD, 2026a). Three access modalities are available. Modality A provides direct budget support through national governments. Modality B pairs this approach with the involvement of an eligible multilateral development bank. Modality C channels funding through an entity already accredited to the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility or the Green Climate Fund.

2. How the April 2026 Reform Shifted the Requirement

Direct budget support was the route that developing countries had advocated for, and the Board delivered it in two stages: first, through the process established in October 2025, and then through the operational modalities in April 2026 (Bomzan, 2026). The assessment requirement, however, remained in place. It was simply relocated. External experts now assess whether a ministry’s standards are functionally equivalent to those applied by multilateral development banks. The assessment follows one of two pathways. If the ministry has received funds from a multilateral or bilateral development financier in the past five years, reviewers rely on that financier’s existing assessments. If no such record exists, external experts conduct an ad hoc desk review of the ministry’s standards, safeguards and track record, and an on-site audit may be commissioned on a case-by-case basis (FRLD, 2026c).

The adopted text frames the ad hoc review as an exercise in identifying mitigation measures, not a pass-or-fail test, and this represents a meaningful concession. Yet its guiding elements still include a legal mandate to receive funds and an independent annual audit (FRLD, 2026c). A five-year funding record is among the first things protracted conflict interrupts. A legal mandate is what rival administrations dispute. An on-site audit, meanwhile, is among the last things that wartime conditions allow. None of this establishes a distributional effect, and the first funding cycle has yet to produce evidence of one. The direction of the risk, however, is clear enough.

Politics shaped these rules. The World Bank serves as the Fund’s interim trustee, and its requirements drive the functional-equivalency test. During the Board’s April negotiations, developed-country members pressed for assessment of institutional risk across national policies and capacities. Developing-country members held that the mandate covered only project and programme risk, and that position prevailed in the adopted text. A preambular clause reaffirming that all developing countries may access the Fund directly was proposed, opposed and ultimately dropped (Bomzan, 2026). Access rules are negotiated, and the negotiation has sides.

One requirement binds every route, and it is also the least costly to address. Funding requests must be submitted to the Fund in English, even though its application template is available in English, French and Spanish (FRLD, 2026a). No Arabic version had appeared by 20 October 2026. Public administrations across the region operate largely in Arabic, and the Green Climate Fund’s own evaluators had already identified language barriers and procedural complexity as obstacles for non-Anglophone African applicants, including those in the Maghreb (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2023). Publicly available data do not establish whether this requirement has prevented any submissions. What it plainly does, however, is shift a preparation and quality-assurance cost onto applicants.

3. Libya: The Barrier Before the Application

Libya participates formally in the climate finance architecture: it maintains a National Designated Authority and has received USD 2.1 million in approved readiness support. In July 2026, the Government of National Unity endorsed a Strategic Climate Framework comprising the country’s first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2026 to 2035, a National Adaptation Plan extending to 2045, and an Initial National Communication (Green Climate Fund, 2026a; UNDP Libya, 2026). Yet the country record shows no Libya-based direct-access entity and no approved country project.

Fragmentation operates through recognition, and recognition is a political decision. Rival administrations have governed Libya since 2014. The United Nations recognises the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, and international climate finance institutions follow suit: the designated authority, the readiness grant and the 2026 climate framework are all anchored in Tripoli. The Fund’s own pipeline shows the reach of this recognition policy: a request for Afghanistan is kept outside it because of the UNFCCC’s “non-engagement stance” (FRLD, 2026b). Derna, meanwhile, lies in eastern Libya, under the authority of an administration backed by Khalifa Haftar. A week after the dams collapsed, residents took to the streets demanding legal action against those responsible. The eastern government reportedly responded by dissolving the municipal council. Journalists were told to leave, and Amnesty International received reports of arrests (AFP, 2023; Amnesty International, 2023).

The division serves the interests of each authority in different ways. Tripoli controls access to the international channels and the institutional standing they confer. Benghazi exercises territorial control and runs reconstruction through its own fund, headed by Haftar’s son Belgacem, beyond the conditions that international climate finance would attach (Kadri, 2026). Funders retain a single interlocutor. Derna’s residents, by contrast, have none: the government recognised by international funding institutions does not exercise authority over them, while the authority that does govern them reportedly dissolved their municipal council when they protested. Yet this division is not necessarily permanent. In April 2026, rival legislatures agreed to unify public spending for the first time in more than a decade (Al Jazeera, 2026).

Derna illustrates both the consequences of this institutional gap and the limits of what it may explain. A peer-reviewed study reconstructing the event estimated that mean 24-hour rainfall across the Wadi Derna catchment reached approximately 350 millimetres during Storm Daniel in September 2023. Rainfall of this intensity would have caused severe flooding even if the dams had held, while the breaches substantially amplified the disaster (Nemnem et al., 2025). Libyan authorities held responsibility for dam maintenance, land-use regulation and emergency preparedness. International climate finance substitutes for none of those functions. Meanwhile, public information on Libya’s domestic adaptation spending remains unavailable. Nor was any rejected Libyan funding application identified. Libya therefore faces a capacity constraint before it may apply through its own institutions.

4. Sudan: The Barrier After Approval

Sudan clears every access hurdle and still struggles to translate approval into delivery. This makes it the sharper of the two cases. The Green Climate Fund lists three projects in the country, all implemented through international accredited entities, and no Sudanese direct-access entity (Green Climate Fund, 2026b).

FP139 shows the funding-to-delivery chain end to end, and its design is central to understanding what followed. In August 2020, the Board approved a grant of USD 25,645,114 to support climate-resilient food production and water access across nine states. Its intended beneficiaries are subsistence agro-pastoralists and nomadic communities in dryland areas, home to nearly 70 per cent of Sudan’s population. Work of this kind is closely tied to the agricultural calendar: water points, seed systems and extension services must be established between growing seasons, or the opportunity to do so may be lost. Two disbursements followed: USD 5,619,404 in December 2020 and USD 5,586,724 in November 2024, bringing cumulative disbursements to 43.7 per cent of the approved grant. The 2025 interim evaluation, however, reports that only USD 7.057 million had been spent by June 2025, equivalent to approximately 27.5 per cent (Green Climate Fund, 2026c; UNDP, 2025). Approval, disbursement and expenditure are three different measures. Only expenditure shows the resources actually put to use.

What filled that four-year interruption is also documented. Government instructions suspended activities in West Darfur, East Darfur, Central Darfur, South Kordofan, West Kordofan and Khartoum because of insecurity. Implementation continued only in Kassala, Northern State and Red Sea State. The evaluator concluded that the war had altered the project baseline, the distribution of its target population and the geographical feasibility of its design (UNDP, 2025). Six of nine target states stopped.

The geographical pattern of this contraction warrants closer examination. A centre-periphery reading explains part of it. Expenditure and human development data point to a longstanding pattern of state policy that disadvantaged Sudan’s southern and western regions, particularly Darfur (Cobham, 2005). Agro-pastoralists of Darfur and Kordofan were among the populations FP139 was designed to reach. Yet implementation also came to a halt in Khartoum, the seat of central government, while Kassala and Red Sea State, after decades of economic and political marginalisation, remained operational (International Crisis Group, 2013). What accounts for the pattern across all nine states is the reach of the recognised authorities. Work continued in areas where the internationally recognised authorities, then based in Port Sudan, retained the capacity to operate. Recognition is a political decision here too: the UN Security Council has rejected the parallel authority declared in areas under Rapid Support Forces control (UN Security Council, 2025). A single project cannot establish a general rule. The pattern is consistent with delivery tracking territorial control, leaving western agro-pastoralist communities doubly disadvantaged: first by a longstanding geography of neglect, and now by a front line that cuts through the same regions.

Other causes sit alongside conflict. The same evaluation identifies several other constraints: delayed recruitment, irregular Project Board meetings, turnover within the Project Management Unit, procurement bottlenecks, weak safeguards implementation and inconsistent beneficiary accounting. These are ordinary delivery problems, but each is compounded by insecurity. The evidence therefore supports a conflict-related effect, not an explanation based on conflict alone. The evaluator also could not conduct field visits, so performance data relied heavily on information provided by the Project Management Unit. One point, however, is clear from the available record: no decision was ever taken to reject or terminate the project. Implementation contracted without any formal refusal, and such a contraction cannot be appealed.

5. What the First Funding Round Shows

A first pipeline is now in place, offering an opportunity to examine both cases against the same set of access arrangements. The Fund received 198 requests by 15 June 2026. Of these, 176 had entered the formal pipeline, across 119 countries seeking USD 2.8 billion; the remaining 22 had been classified as non-compliant (FRLD, 2026b). Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Morocco account for seven of the 176 requests, as shown in Table 1. Tunisia’s sole request, by contrast, remains outside the pipeline because its agricultural investment agency was accredited by the Green Climate Fund only after the Fund had fixed its list of eligible entities. The request was not rejected; it fell outside the eligibility cut-off date.

Table 1. Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Morocco in the first funding round

CountryVulnerability (ND-GAIN, 2023)Inside LDC floorGreen Climate Fund portfolio; national direct-access entitiesFirst-round requests: modality, access entity, USD
Morocco0.368No16 projects, USD 329 million; four entitiesC, Agency for Agricultural Development (national): 18,518,519
Egypt0.411No9 projects, USD 368 million; noneA, ministry not yet named: 18,174,750 C, FAO: 20,000,000
Libya0.416NoNo projects; readiness support USD 2.1 million; noneC, UNDP: 17,674,100
Sudan0.612 (sixth most vulnerable of 187)Yes3 projects, USD 44.8 million; noneC, FAO: 20,000,000 C, UN-Habitat: 8,700,000 C, UNDP: 19,837,500

Higher ND-GAIN scores mean greater vulnerability. Green Climate Fund counts include multi-country programmes. All seven requests were at completeness check on 29 June 2026 except Sudan’s FAO request, which had received review comments. Not shown: a second Egyptian request held outside the pipeline because it named no access entity under Modality C, and two requests from Mauritania, through UNIDO and UNDP. Sources: FRLD (2026b), annexes I and II; ND-GAIN (2026); Green Climate Fund (2026a, 2026b, 2026d).

A comparison of the seven requests reveals little variation in the amounts sought by the four countries: every request falls within the USD 5 million to USD 20 million range permitted for an individual request (FRLD, 2026a). The channels through which they applied, however, differ markedly. Morocco, which has built up four direct-access accreditations since 2016, applied through its own institution. Egypt sought direct budget support while also applying through FAO. Libya and Sudan, neither of which has a direct-access entity, channelled all four of their requests through UN agencies. None of the requests was refused. Intermediation is common in itself, covering 72 per cent of all requests in the pipeline (FRLD, 2026b). What sets Libya and Sudan apart is the absence of a national alternative.

Differences in climate vulnerability do not explain those channels. According to the 2023 ND-GAIN scores, Sudan is the sixth most climate-vulnerable country out of 187, far above Libya, Egypt and Morocco, whose scores are relatively close (ND-GAIN, 2026). Libya and Egypt score almost identically but pursued different access routes; Sudan, despite being far more exposed, followed the same route as Libya. Climate-related need is reflected instead in the volume of funding requested: Sudan sought USD 48.5 million across three requests. It is also reflected in the allocation floor for least developed countries, which covers Sudan alone. No request has been decided yet, so none of this predicts which requests will ultimately receive support. What the round has sorted is the channel of access, and that channel appears to follow institutional continuity more closely than climate vulnerability.

Capacity reinforces this pattern. Morocco, the least vulnerable of the four countries, holds the most Green Climate Fund projects and the only national direct-access entities among them; Sudan has three projects, while Libya has none (Table 1). The Fund’s functional-equivalency test embeds a similar logic: development finance received in the past five years opens the less demanding assessment route. Past access to funding thus becomes evidence of capacity to secure future funding.

Direct access, however, reveals less than it might initially suggest. Morocco’s request concerns the oasis province of Tinghir and is channelled through the Agency for Agricultural Development (FRLD, 2026b). Created in 2009 under the Green Morocco Plan, the agency both courts investors in high-value agriculture and implements smallholder “solidarity” projects in fragile zones. Its climate-fund record, by its own account, sits in the second, including an Adaptation Fund project in the oases of Drâa-Tafilalet, Tinghir’s own region (Agence pour le Développement Agricole, 2016). This points toward smallholders, but the proposal itself is not publicly available. The involvement of a national entity determines who manages the funds. It does not, in itself, decide who ultimately benefits from them.

6. What Follows, and What Does Not

Exclusion from climate finance was expected to drive maladaptation, through the substitution of short-cycle humanitarian instruments for adaptation planning. The evidence supports this causal chain only in part. Two links are well established. First, fragile and conflict-affected states receive far less adaptation finance than they estimate they need: ODI reports that, in 2022, 24 such countries received USD 8.4 billion against stated annual needs of USD 35 billion (Gulati et al., 2024). Second, humanitarian instruments generally operate on annual or shorter appeal cycles, whereas adaptation requires multi-year commitments. From these it follows plausibly, though not demonstrably, that emergency instruments become the de facto channel wherever adaptation finance stalls. COP30’s call to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 names neither a baseline nor a figure, so nothing yet guarantees that the gap will narrow (UNFCCC, 2026a).

Maladaptation as the IPCC defines it, meaning action that increases vulnerability or diminishes welfare, does not follow (IPCC, 2022). No dataset tracks adaptation outcomes against access denial, and emergency assistance saves lives. A narrower formulation holds: an adaptation deficit and implementation discontinuity, with prolonged substitution plausibly creating conditions conducive to maladaptation. Sudan illustrates the risk precisely because its project was seasonal. A water point left half-finished does not wait. An extension service suspended for two years loses the households it had reached. None of that appears in a disbursement table, and it accumulates in exactly the states the project could no longer enter.

The working definition of conflict-sensitive finance performs unevenly when tested against these cases. Its first criterion, operating under conditions of disrupted governance, fails in Libya at the point of national access, and in Sudan, where implementation falters as territorial control shifts. The second criterion, avoiding the exacerbation of local competition over resources, cannot be assessed on the available evidence. FP139’s evaluation reports inconsistencies in beneficiary accounting, so the spread of benefits across contested localities is unknown (UNDP, 2025). This is precisely where the risk is highest. Competition over scarce resources has long catalysed conflict between rural groups in Sudan’s drylands (UNEP, 2007). Water points completed in some localities and abandoned in others can alter access to water, regardless of whether those changes are documented.

One consequence of the current architecture falls outside all the instruments discussed so far. As of 30 September 2026, UNHCR had registered 846,556 Sudanese refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt, while Egyptian official figures put the total number of arrivals at roughly 1.5 million. The two figures measure different things: UNHCR counts registrations, while the official figure estimates all arrivals (UNHCR Egypt, 2026). Refugees in Egypt live mainly in Greater Cairo, Alexandria and other cities of the north and east, far from the border most Sudanese crossed. Sudan cannot readily design and implement adaptation programmes for people who have left its territory. Egyptian national programmes, meanwhile, address Egyptian systems and priorities, even where displaced people rely on the same water, health and housing services. The Fund does allow multi-country funding requests, provided that every participating government endorses the proposal. Egypt and Sudan have five requests between them in the pipeline, but none is joint, and neither government has an evident incentive to file one. The December Board meeting will not address this gap. Beyond a joint route that both governments would have to choose to pursue, nothing in the architecture is built to serve a population displaced across an international border.

7. The Way Forward

Two forthcoming meetings will shape the next phase. COP31 will take place in Antalya from 9 to 20 November 2026 (UNFCCC, 2026b). Manila hosts the Fund’s tenth Board meeting from 15 to 18 December, where approvals deferred in July are expected to be considered (FRLD, 2026a). The requests admitted to the pipeline amount to roughly eleven times the original USD 250 million envelope, and around eight times its expanded allocation of USD 342 million. Rationing is therefore inevitable, and the choices involved are political before they are procedural. The decision that made the Fund operational records the Parties’ understanding that these arrangements “do not involve liability or compensation”, and invites voluntary contributions instead of assigning obligations (UNFCCC, 2024). By March 2026, 27 contributors had pledged USD 822 million (FRLD, 2026d). In July the trustee reported USD 474 million available, and developed-country members reportedly rejected a high-level pledging event for 2026 (Palmuu, 2026). Meanwhile, on 22 October the Board made the Fund’s first allocation, USD 20 million for Nepal’s recovery from the August floods, and the German and Czech members insisted that it set no precedent (Lo, 2026). Procedural criteria will determine which requests are deferred. The financing model has already decided that the resources available will fall far short of demand.

Money comes first. Pledges worth nearly USD 197 million were still unsigned in July, and a further USD 128 million had been signed but not paid (Palmuu, 2026). However, contributors could convert both at COP31 in Antalya. No other measure available before the December Board meeting could add resources on a comparable scale or within the same timeframe.

Language comes next. The Secretariat should accept funding requests in Arabic and make the application template, guidance materials and help-desk support available in Arabic before the next request window opens. At COP30, the Parties expressed appreciation for the Board’s commitment to multilingualism and its request to translate the template, subject to budget availability (UNFCCC, 2026a). The precedent exists in French and Spanish, and success is visible the moment Arabic is added to the Fund’s accepted languages.

Then the ad hoc route. The April 2026 modalities make no specific provision for situations of armed conflict or divided authority, requiring only that mitigation measures be proportionate and context-specific (FRLD, 2026c). The same decision asks the Secretariat to capture lessons from the first ad hoc assessments. Those lessons should establish what can replace an on-site audit when security conditions make one impossible, and how a review should proceed when a rival authority disputes a ministry’s mandate. December is the moment to address these questions.

Outcomes data matter as much as rules. The Board should publish aggregate first-cycle access data covering modality, processing time, eligibility outcome and reasons for withdrawal, while withholding any security-sensitive material. It should also report where money lands within divided states. FP139’s geographical footprint took nearly five years to become visible. Six of the seven requests from Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Morocco were still at the completeness check stage on 29 June 2026, while Sudan’s request submitted through FAO had already received review comments. Without publicly available outcomes, no one outside the Secretariat can establish whether the April reforms changed anything.

One measure, however, belongs to the region itself. Regional civil-society networks, working with research foundations active in North Africa, should document the first funding cycle from the applicants’ perspective and submit their findings before December. Ministries and designated authorities in Libya, Sudan and Egypt hold the correspondence, internal cost estimates and records of decisions not to apply that no fund publishes.

Those records remained beyond reach, and this is the principal limitation. No interviews were conducted, and almost every source consulted was produced by an institution party to the arrangements under examination. A single project cannot separate conflict from other causes of delay, which is why the Sudan finding is reported as a pattern instead of a rule.

In short, the answer runs narrower than the question, but firmer than the alternative. UNFCCC mechanisms do not exclude conflict-affected North African states. Rather, they convert unequal institutional continuity into unequal access, ration a fund that its contributors have kept underfunded and, in divided states, follow the territorial reach of whichever authority the international community recognises, without recording a decision anyone can contest. Reform that broadens what evidence counts as sufficient, while holding the line on fraud and safeguards, is possible before December. Reform that waits for these states to resemble institutions funders can already audit will have to wait through the next war.

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