This interview is also available in Arabic

The following Interview was conducted with the Tunisian political thinker and activist Maher Hanin to speak with him about his latest book The Society of Resistance: Post-Islamism, Post-Bourguibism, Post-Marxism published in cooperation with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation North Africa. In his book, Hanin supports the hypothesis that a society of resistance in Tunisia is breaking with traditional politics of the left. One central aim of Hanin’s book is, therefore, to provide a theoretical reflection on the current political situation in Tunisia and propose ways to deal with it.

Who is Maher Hanin?

Maher Hanin, a Tunisian political militant. My militant experience started mainly within the student movement in the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) and its Extraordinary 18^th Conference^[1]. At some point I joined the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) in the year 2000 and left it in the year 2013. At various times I was a member of El Massar (The Democratic and Social Path), the former communist party, the social democratic party, and concurrently I was active in civil society, mainly with the Social Forum. I was a founding member of the Economic Forum and the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), and engaged previously with the Tunisian Social Forum and the Maghrebi Social Forum. In general, I was involved in the movement for an alternative globalization. As well I joined the Nachaz association in 2016. Today I am more focused on theoretical research issues and engaged in civil society and politics as a non-partisan or independent activist.

How did you have the idea of writing this book and why now?

In fact, the idea of the book came mainly from tracking of the democratic transition and the difficulties of the revolutionary process from a militant perspective. As a militant myself, and as a political and civil activist, I commented on developments by publishing some articles and by participating at intellectual and political conferences organized by the civil and political society. At a certain point, following several discussions with colleagues, I decided that the revolutionary process in the field must be accompanied by theoretical and research-based work. I was convinced that the approach to society of resistance and social movements and the society below was being forgotten, or it was not classified, structured and organized, but I may not have an overview of all the contributions in this field.  The idea is to synthesize and make sense of what is going on deep within society from a critical Tunisian left perspective based in social movements.

What is the society of resistance and what are its specificities?

I’ve come up with a set of characteristics for the society of resistance I analyzed. Firstly, the society [of resistance] has existed for years, if not decades, in Tunisian civil society. It exists in various fields of social life, in the trade union movement, in the student movement, in the feminist movement, in the cultural and artistic movement, in the civil rights movement and in the blogger movement. It is not a society that was born at the dawn of the revolution; it is a society that is deeply embedded and widespread in the Tunisian social entity or the Tunisian social body. The last years of resistance, especially with the 2005-2008 turning point, provided this society [of resistance] a larger sphere of influence. In the months following the fall of tyranny in 2011 and the legal recognition of opposition and subsequent changes in civil society and public life, the society of resistance played an even more important role.

You state at the beginning of your book that the revolution of 2011 is “a victorious and successful rebellion against the political economy of the neoliberal globalization” and also you assign to it “a humanistic universal significance and a representation of a new humanism”. Can you explain these points?

I think that the Tunisian revolution is just one of several previous movements for an alternative globalization against neoliberal policies, i.e. Mexico (with the Chiapas), Italy (Genoa), U.S.A. (Atlanta and Seattle) and Brazil (Porto Alegre). There were also movements in the Region in Africa like the ‘Bread Riots’[2], Sidi Ifni (Morocco), the revolt of the mining basin (Tunisia)^[3] and in Algeria. All these stages already showed that people of the world, in the North and South, refuse the new dictates of neoliberal policies. The Tunisian revolution is proof that Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ theory no longer holds up and humans no longer accept the dictatorial nature of the market. New perspectives for humanity are being envisioned and Fukuyama’s ceiling has been broken. Uprisings hold the potential to succeed and overthrow the shackles of dictatorship.

The other important factor is what was being said about the people of the ‘Orient’, or in general about Islamic countries, is that they are countries which will forever be subjected to tyranny and authoritarian rule. The revolution discarded those hypotheses and has shown that all the people of the world, whatever their culture or their religion is, can prevail. If the revolution in its geographical dimension was a local revolution, with Tunisian elements and Tunisian mobilization and protest participation from unionists, the youth, feminists, artists, etc… with political and human rights connotations; it had a universal significance, in the sense that it rejected economic and social dictates on the state and on the country of Tunisia, dictates the former governments of Ben Ali and the old regime upheld and imposed on society and on the people. The uprising showed that the people reject these policies and their political manifestations as corruption and tyranny and authoritarianism. The revolution is a geographically local happening but with a humanitarian and liberating message, and the proof is the resonance of the slogan ‘the people want’, which spread globally, providing great potential for the gatherings, sit-ins and protests even outside the Arab region; for example, Occupy Wall Street, Madrid, and many other areas of the world. The Tunisian revolution, and later the Egyptian revolution, gave a new start to the world’s protest movements.

In your opinion, the law, with the 1959 Constitution and the Personal Status Code^[4], played a key role in modernizing the Tunisian society from above.  As opposed to this, the experience of the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia between the years 2011 and 2013 represented a “constitutional revolution”. What role has civil society played in this historical period and what are the most important contents and achievements of the 2014 Constitution?

Tunisian society or the relationship between society and the state after independence was based on urban and secular elites, especially the elites educated in European universities and with a modern education. They were leading the national movement and using the opportunity of leadership and state-building at the expense of traditional and rural elites. These new elites were civilian not military people leading the state-building process with a reformist-bonapartist project from above. They believed Tunisian society was neither culturally nor psychologically, nor even structurally, conducive to implement reforms on its own. In my estimation, this revolution, which I call a passive or negative or calm revolution, was in fact implemented from above by an elite mainly from the Bourguibist camp, or with a modernist Bourguibist background. The national elites in that period played an important role in the emancipation of women, in education reform, in the reform of the administration, in the modernization of the state structures, in the enabling of society to progress on the basis of modern structures. But gradually the tensions between society and the state started to rise and society started to demand a more liberal state with more space to express itself. This was demonstrated in the student youth movement, then in the trade union movement, and then in the political movement. Establishment conflicts with these movements led to trials, imprisonment and exiles, and sometimes even to bodily harm and death, either in direct confrontations, mass trials or specific prosecutions. This resulted in the fact that, at the moment of the revolution of 2011 and in the period of drafting a constitution from 2011 to 2013, society was greatly polarized and there were great tensions between secular modern forces on the one side and reactionary and conservative forces on the other side. This domestic conflict was harsh. It led to confrontations and to martyrs. Nevertheless, this clear division in the streets is what led to a constitution from below. The negotiation of the Constitution was difficult. I think the final document was the result of the struggle among civil society, intellectual and political struggle, and in the media, by addressing all chapters of the Constitution. The Constitution is an achievement. Despite its shortcomings and issues with its structure and application (especially of the constitutional court), it has proven to be a source of stability and righteousness. This is manifested in the peaceful transition of power after the death of the President. The constitutional mechanisms have begun to take root in the mind of the political class, and why not in the mind of large sections of society?

What are the movements you categorize as being part of the society of resistance and why did you choose those movements?

In fact, I wasn’t able to speak about all the resistance movements. I tried to focus methodically on some key examples. In the beginning I attempted to define the movements of social protest and the new social movements theoretically as a new form of social manifestation in modern societies and in Tunisian society in particular. I picked some of the movements that I thought were influential even before the revolution.

The blogger movement actually started very early and is still active. It is a bold and courageous movement because the liberalization of the virtual public space was not easy. Under Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule YouTube was forbidden and access to many websites was blocked. Bloggers were prosecuted and social networks were surveilled. The regime even tried to prohibit social networks, but young people resisted and held on to the liberalization of the virtual space with determination.

Zouhair Yahyaoui is a symbol of this movement. He courageously led the efforts to keep the virtual space liberalized and was imprisoned for his actions. He died (may he rest in peace) a few months after his release from prison, at a very young age.

The culture of rap and hip-hop is another example of resistance movement in Tunisia. The culture accompanied years of protest before, during and after the departure of Ben Ali. It’s a youth protest form across the globe and was adapted in Tunisia. Its rhythm and rhyme spread quickly through the streets. Nowadays, we observe that each popular neighborhood or youth group has its own specific rapper or group of rappers that act as a source of pride. Graffiti and other artistic expressions are an extension of this. Ultras groups are also engaged with hip hop communities. There is a relationship of exchange and interaction, a dialectic, between ultras groups and these communities. Especially stadiums are an important space of contestation.

Also, the Manich Msamah movement (I won’t forgive) was a pioneering movement. It was a direct response to the Reconciliation Law^[5] and quickly gained respect and attention in the public sphere.

An additional example, the Jemna^[6] movement, is significant in the context of a social and solidary economy. It began in isolation and then grew in credibility due to its successes. Its social practices bypassed the state to create local opportunity through non-capitalist, solidarity-driven economic policies that greatly benefited the region and its inhabitants.

Finally, the unemployed movement is a new, vast and bold movement, which gained attention in 2006 through its initial actions in the form of the Union of the Unemployed (Union des Diplomés Chômeurs: UDC) and other independent and spontaneous groups. It’s a movement that sometimes grows and sometimes fades, but it inspires and revitalizes society from below.

The movements you deal with in your book are characterized by their horizontality and their networking. What are the opportunities but also the risks stemming from these organizational forms?  

In fact this is the key problematic when dealing with protest movements: they carry optimistic notes with them, they’re an indication that the society is still producing forms of contestation, forms of refusal, and forms of rebellion and is still able to mobilize many within itself to reject policies or refuse laws or claim even partial demands. It’s possible that those movements deploy on the entire territory of the Republic and are able to reach many social groups as the youth, the feminists, etc… This phenomenon demonstrated that traditional forms, I won’t say that they don’t play a role anymore, but traditional unions and the traditional forms of the party and the traditional hierarchical ideological political organizations are in a deadlock. There are no more mass organizations and those organizations are going through real difficulties in maintaining their essential traditional role in framing the masses and mobilizing them into the streets or at least enable them with the tools of resistance.

Networking is occasional and not durable networking. There are stations where real networking happens and other stations where the networking is limited. Sometimes movements last for some weeks or some months and then they fade. These are movements which spontaneously or automatically reject politicization, meaning they pretend to not be concerned by the political process, by elections, by authority or by the ballot box. They are sometimes dominated by anarchist tendencies, or by the moment-limited tendencies, trying to act more on certain focal points. So we can say that the impetus of these movements indicates that society is alive and active.  Still, overall political life, which depends on traditional mechanisms (ballot box, election, etc…), is mostly dominated by the conservative and liberal factions of the right wing. In the current climate those are the counter-revolutionary forces sometimes tied to oligarchy and associated with corruption and tax evasion. These forces are still very much involved and successful at the ballot box. In contrast, the youthful social movements, are supposed to tackle class issues and promote alternative social and economic policies, but they are lacking a political horizon. They often encounter deadlock and organizational difficulty, which presents a real political impasse for society from below.

To answer the question “How is to be done?” you refer to the philosophical and sociological works of contemporary thinkers such as Asif Bayat, Chantal Mouffe and Nancy Fraser. How can their different intellectual windows benefit us?

My study of various intellectuals is an expression of a personal discovery. I was not aware of their writings until only a few years ago. I discovered Asif Bayat and Chantal Mouffe most recently and I discovered Nancy Fraser in relationship with the Frankfurt School and Axel Honneth. As a philosopher, maybe I have the best overview of Jaques Rancière’s writings. I believe that traditional Leninist and Maoist teachings are not sufficient to enable us to understand our modern society. They no longer offer us an effective and good understanding and organizational forms to deal with our reality. Overall, these contemporary thinkers are valuable resources as they engage with new situations and a new temporality. I placed them at the center of my book so that readers may be inspired and find other approaches of thought and why not explore novel ways to address the region’s problems in relationship to historical context? We need an open framework of references and not a single ideological framework. The only essential is that any and all approaches share the same values of freedom, social justice, gender equality, anti-colonialism and anti- jungle liberalism.

In your opinion, the Ennahdha-Movement did not succeed in its transition to the post-Islamist paradigm. What are the conditions for transition and are there personalities or fractions within the Ennahdha-Movement in favor or against this transition more than others?

In the past, we didn’t really know much about was going on inside the Ennahdha-Movement. Possibly early on, the movement was more in control of the party. What we do know was that in the seventies and early eighties there was a real controversy within the party surrounding a new political current, which later became known as Islamic progressist – this current was intellectually close to the Islamic current in Egypt spearheaded by Hassan Hanafi. There were individual split-offs within the Ennahdha, but they didn’t have ideological roots. Today there are some voices within the movement that express more liberal and clearer democratic convictions about the democratic values of the country or about the democracy within the movement itself. For the legislative elections slated for fall 2019 we are witnessing a subtle rejection of traditional party policies within the movement in the conflict over the electoral lists. Still, it’s not enough in my estimation. Since the early days of the revolution, the broader Islamic movement has greedily carved out a space for itself in the democratic transition while misjudging and/or ignoring Tunisians’ demands. By extension, Ennahda’s priorities were rather partisan. The Ennahda movement has embraced political Islam to stabilize and restore its party base and to build up relationships with other Ikhwani-Movements (as part of the international Muslim Brotherhood). It has even cozied up to Salafi groups in the region. In fact, a big wave of conservative preachers has come to Tunisia and established their presence in mosques and public squares. In my estimation, the movement was forced to discover that in the Tunisian society, there is a progressive, modernist, social, youth, and feminist core, that is not ready to give up. There are indications the movement is moving toward changing the way it acts in the society, but until now we haven’t seen any serious revision of their core tenets. Up to this point, the movement has seemingly used democracy as a mechanism for power-grabbing and has failed to acknowledge the inherent value of democracy. Though truly democratic behavior and action is a basic condition for calming tensions, soothing polarization, making peace within society and even avoiding civil war.

Since the first transitional period (2011-2013) you are observing a comeback of Bourguibism as a political and societal vision. How can we overcome what you consider “Bourguiba the Idol”?

In fact, and in first place, and that was dissimulated by Ben Ali, the Tunisians weren’t even able to assist to Bourguiba’s funeral. Bourguiba spent almost 10 years of his life as a prisoner in Monastir and only those close to him were able to visit him. Many young people who didn’t grow up with Bourguiba rediscovered his symbolic, rhetoric and way of thinking during the revolution. Even on a substantive level, his revived influence is felt in the first chapter of the Constitution and in the wider perception of the republic, societal issues, education, women, the state and international relations. Bourguiba as an idol has made a comeback, as people search longingly for a leader and savior, but neither the nature of the revolution would allow this, nor the demography of the youth is ready for this, nor the temporality the world we are living in is suitable. This is why I think the restoration and idolization of Bourguiba, as the leader who never makes mistakes, is not applicable nor useful for the present revolution. Bourguiba was an imperfect leader who at times infringed upon civil rights and limited freedom and democracy. He sometimes was an authoritarian ruler and his legacy must still be thoroughly assessed; undoubtedly his period of rule had its bright sides but some other sides must be overcome. This is why we need a post-Bourguibism. We need to inspire from this bourguibian lesson that is inherent to the state, to democracy and to modernism and we need to liberate society from entrenched forms of authoritarianism. We need a pluralistic and free society with institutions that accept difference and don’t rely solely on the teachings of one founding father.

From your perspective, traditional organizational structures of the left are in a deep crisis.  What are the causes of this crisis and what are some possible solutions? And is overcoming classical paradigms of Marxism part of the solution?

The crisis of the traditional left is quite apparent. It does not need to be proven anymore, organizationally the crisis of the Left has disseminated in the public space; the left has been unable to form a unified front nor build stable alliances with other political actors. It hasn’t been able to gain enough influence through the ballot box and its parliamentary impact has been limited. The traditional left lost many young people over the years who initially engaged with it, and it didn’t succeed at building common ground with new social movements. Its traditional frameworks are unable to assimilate new forms of thinking and contestation in the modern context. A consolidation is, that this crisis does not concern only the Tunisian left; it is more or less a global crisis of the left. I believe the core problem concerns the organizational forms of the traditional left. Noticeably, or maybe something to think about in the future is that there is a problem with the theoretical references. Today, there’s not only one Marxism, but a multiplicity of Marxisms. André Tosel argues there are thousands of Marxisms, there is not only one Marxism-Leninism, and there is no institutional Marxism, there many open Marxism’s, there are many new issues for the protest movements that didn’t exist yet in the nineteenth century. These modern issues include the decline of industrial work, the end of the mass labor unions, the reallocation of work globally and the transfer of many industries from the north to the south. They also include the growth of the service industries, unemployment, environmental problems and rising minorities everywhere. Alienated and oppressed and marginalized is not only the proletariat, in other words, traditional proletariat as defined by classical Marxism no longer exists. Starting in 1968 there was a growing sense of these changes, but I don’t think that the Tunisian left sufficiently kept pace with intellectual and theoretical transformations. In this delicate period, the Tunisian left needs to deal as fast as possible with those changes in order find pragmatic and action-oriented solutions to overcome its electoral and political crisis.

You come up with concept of “the interfering revolution”^[7], which reminds me of the concept of revolutionary realpolitik by Rosa Luxembourg. In your work, you are referring to the interference of reformist tendencies with the radical solutions. What are these tendencies and solutions today?

I think the revolution is in a constant state of decline and progress, and of failures and victories. There is no finality to a revolution. It’s not a train that leaves the station and arrives at a destination. It twists and turns by difficulties of the substantive, historical, anthropological and even geostrategic and geopolitical context of the region. The perception of the revolution only as a transitional procedural process would harm it. And so, the spirit of the Tunisian revolution must be fostered in society and its institutions. It must be in the thoughts of Tunisian citizens and touch every aspect of public life. A revolution that doesn’t take real steps toward economic, social, political and cultural reform can quickly turn into a failed revolution that stunts or even reverses progress. This is where I think the interference between the radical and the reformist approach is key so that the Tunisian revolution can progress and counter-revolution cannot win and persist in the minds. Because the counter-revolution thrives especially when the society passes by a period of frustration and feels that the revolution is a mirage and was a big historic mistake. The revolutionaries mistake when they don’t offer possible pathways for the revolution and this makes us move between the reference to Rosa Luxemburg’s revolutionary realpolitik but also Antonio Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ and ‘war of movement’. Accordingly, each little space in the political sphere can and must be liberated so that the dynamic of the revolutionary movement continues. In my opinion this is a vice of the revolutionary process in Tunisia. Exactly how to move forward is one of the biggest debates within the left movement: between the spirit of the revolution and the calls to engage in the institution-building and reformist steps within the revolution. Does the revolution need to dismantle the state entirely and bring it down or does it seek profound change from within the state?

One of your book’s aims was to open a discussion and to urge the debate of its thesis. A few months after it’s been published, do you think that the book has achieved that goal?

The release of the book roughly coincided with the book fair[8], and initially the book got some media attention by the media and through some encounters that took place to discuss it. There were also colleagues of mine writing in a similar vein who broadened the conversation. But I think that the act of writing is still necessary because the events are moving fast – five months after the book was written and published, we’re in a completely different political context. The book itself cannot provide an explanation or solution for constantly changing circumstances. The transformation of society and the political class suppose the continuity of those debates and the ideas presented in my book themselves are debatable. Least but not last reality itself is moving, not static.

The role of regional and international powers in Tunisia is lacking in your book.  What is the extent of influence of these forces on the political transition in Tunisia, and how do militants have to take into account the intervention of foreign states into the internal affairs of the country?

Yes, it’s lacking. It was a conscious choice actually. I thought that incorporating this element into my analysis would require more time and engagement with a lot more sources. It could have obfuscated the thesis of my book, so I decided not to deal with this factor. In fact, I write in the introduction that I chose to not to deal with because it is a variable that complicates my thesis.

The last election cycle was a stark reminder that progressive forces on the left must unite to stand a chance against counterrevolutionary forces. And yet, in light of fast-approaching presidential and legislative elections, the left seems more divided than ever.  What are the causes of this division?

The presidential election date is approaching and it seems like the presidential election date will be on September 15^th, before the legislative elections. And yet I don’t see any actors of the left, either an independent candidate or member of a party, who is able to unite the left in the presidential elections and I don’t see a strong partisan or citizen dynamic with a real chance. We have to accept this difficult reality, but there might be a surprise.

^[1] At its 18^th conference in the year 1971 the inner left opposition in the UGET won the election of the representatives of the student union (by 105 out of 180 representatives) and thereof defied the hegemony of the Dostourian students (students belonging to the ruling Neo-Dostour Party led by Habib Bourguiba). The Regime feared losing the grip of the student union and staged a coup against the winners of the election therefore coopting the union. After the fall of the Bourguiba-Regime in 1987, the UGET organized the Extraordinary 18^th Conference in 1988, since it didn’t recognize the outcome of the 18^th conference as valid.

[2] The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund decision to terminate state subsidies on basic foodstuffs sparked the ‘Bread Riots’ in Egypt (1977) and in Tunisia (1983-84). The countrywide clashes between the population and the regimes left many dead and injured.

^[3] In reference to the uprisings in the year 2008 in the phosphate-mining area in Gafsa in Tunisia.

^[4] The Personal Status Code was promulgated in the year 1956 and it banned polygamy, gave women the right to divorce and to approve arranged marriages, expanded women’s entitlements for child custody, set the minimum age for a girl’s marriage, and ended the male right of repudiation

^[5] The Economic and Financial Reconciliation Law was a bill proposed by the president Beji Caid Essebsi in the summer of 2015 with the aim of an amnesty for former corrupt businessmen and state officials thereby undermining the ongoing transitional justice process.

^[6] The Jemna movement expropriated during the events of the revolution and even before the fall of Ben Ali an oasis in the southern town of Jemna, since then ruling it in self-organization and providing jobs and investing a share of the incomes of the oasis in local organizations and infrastructure.

^[7] الثورة المتداخلة

[8] El Kram Book Fair is the biggest book fair in Tunisia which takes place once a year.