Mali’s military junta has booted out the French ambassador, Joël Meyer, for criticising its decision to postpone national elections indefinitely. The regional Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) had previously imposed sanctions on the country. Paris advocated for them at the UN Security Council, with Russia and China blocking the move.

Malian soldiers, led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, have been in power following two coups, the first in August 2020 against the democratically-elected government and another against the interim government in May 2021. Mali’s coup plotters, who arguably currently enjoy strong support among the capital’s population, accuse France of having failed in the fight against the jihadists. Malian Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maiga, recently stated that the French intended to divide the country. There were also voices in Mali’s ousted civilian government blaming France for the rampant violence and insecurity.

Anti-French demonstrations have been taking place in Bamako for months. The demonstrators demand the withdrawal of approximately 5,000 French soldiers stationed in the Sahel who are fighting the jihadists as part of Operation Barkhane alongside others from G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad). In addition, about 13,000 soldiers from the UN mission MINUSMA have been in the country since 2013, including about 1,000 Bundeswehr soldiers (German Armed Forces), who are supposed to ensure peace and security in Mali. In response to the barely improved security situation, a few weeks ago Mali’s new military rulers commissioned the Wagner Group, Russian mercenaries, to help fight the jihadists. About 300 mercenaries are said to be already fighting in the centre of the country.[1] Does replacing one fighting force with another represent a turning point?

Violence and displacement

French soldiers have been in the country since 2013. At that time, the Malian transitional government, which also came to power following a coup, asked Paris for military aid against Tuareg rebels and jihadists. Paris justified the military intervention as a way to prevent the jihadists from conquering Bamako, but many observers however, questioned this.[2] When the French army liberated Timbuktu from the jihadists, many Malians cheered French President Hollande during his state visit to Mali shortly after the French drove the jihadists back to the north. Nine years later, not much has remained of the jubilation in the country. Although the situation has calmed down somewhat in the north of Mali, in the areas controlled by the Tuaregs, violence and displacement prevail in the centre of the country. In recent years, violence has spread to the neighbouring countries of Burkina Faso and Niger.

West African states are characterised by great differences between the metropolitan regions and the neglected peripheries, which in many places lead to conflicts between the neglected population groups and the elites in the country’s capitals. Since Mali’s independence, for example, there have been repeated uprisings of Tuaregs demanding more autonomy from Bamako. Bamako’s corrupt elite paid little attention to the rest of the country, where economic and social conditions have been deteriorating for many years, not least because of the devastating effects of climate change. Something similar can be said about the political class in Burkina Faso, where the long-time ruler, Blaise Compaoré, was toppled in 2014. Compaoré was also considered a kleptocratic ruler who enriched himself and even weakened the national army.[3] The elites in Bamako and Ouagadougou could always count on France’s support in the past. Compaoré was brought to safety from the coup plotters by the former “colonial and protective force”.

The spiral of violence and displacement is not only caused by corrupt elites; in the eyes of many people, local rulers have also lost legitimacy. Many young people, in particular, are angry. They accuse local politicians, judges and traditional authorities of depriving them of their future. Religious reform movements have been gaining strength for many years. Jihadist leaders, such as Amadou Kouffa leader of the Katiba Macina terrorist group, started as Salafist preachers and youth leaders. Today, the line between jihadists, rebels, religious and political leaders and bandits is blurred.[4]

Macron the villain

Anger against the French is growing not only in Mali but also in neighbouring Burkina Faso. In November 2021, an angry crowd stopped a French military convoy carrying supplies. The protesters accused the French soldiers of supplying weapons to the Islamist terrorists so that they could continue exploiting mineral resources undisturbed amid the spreading chaos. Conspiracy theories abound on social media and thrive in the hysteria[5] fuelled by violence and insecurity. France accuses Russia of being behind the spread of fake news.

The jihadists must be laughing up their sleeves at the attacks on the French. Their goal of ridding the region of their strongest opponent draws closer. Mali’s military junta also finds France’s predicament convenient. They want to divert attention from their own failures because the Malian military is deeply involved in the conflict. Large parts of the population outside Bamako do not trust the Malian armed forces, considering them responsible for violent attacks on civilians.[6] Malian soldiers systematically sell military material to gangs and organised crime syndicates that dominate smuggling in the Sahel.[7]

France had every good intention to stabilise the situation in the Sahel but it is not viewed as the villain without reason. To counter accusations of neocolonial interference, France sought to involve the West African states early on – a strategy that failed because the spiral of violence and insecurity quickly caused the regimes in the region to lose support among the population. Now, as always, France finds itself aiding and abetting a hated African elite, losing even this ally in Mali following the coup.

In the past Macron tried to distance himself from Africa’s old elites. In 2017, he promoted this in his speech at the university in Ouagadougou and, together with Achille Mbembe, pushed through the alternative format of the Africa-France Summit, excluding the continent’s heads of state and government. However, this attempt to reorient African policy remains fragmented. In Chad, France continues to support the regime even after the death of the dictator Idriss Déby. Macron even travelled to N’Djamena for the funeral service, thereby sanctioning the coup d’état. A military council unceremoniously appointed, Mahamat Idriss Déby, son of Idriss Déby, as his successor.

Further north, without regard for democratic principles or human rights, Macron supports the Egyptian regime of military ruler Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi. In May 2021, Egypt ordered 30 French Rafale fighter jets worth €4 billion. Human Rights Watch sharply criticised France’s decision to support the unjust regime on the Nile. Macron has also set his sights on the Arabian Peninsula with a delivery of 80 Rafale and 12 military helicopters to the United Arab Emirates worth €16 billion. The French president was also the first Western leader to pay his respects to the Saudi crown prince who, according to the CIA, is responsible for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, considering France’s foreign policy ruthlessness, the warning to the Malian government not to get involved with the Wagner Group went unheeded.

Putin – a winner

Because of Macron’s damaging, worthless and counterproductive Africa policy, it is hardly surprising that Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to be succeeding in driving the West out of Africa as well. At least the Russian Wagner Group has had some success on the continent. In a short time, they were “called to help” in several African countries, including the Central African Republic, Libya and Mozambique, and in many cases were able to weaken France’s influence. Putin officially denies any links to the Wagner group, whose leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is a friend of the Russian president.[8]

But the Wagner Group also had to contend with initial difficulties in Africa. This was true both in Libya, where they failed to conquer Tripoli with General Haftar and in Mozambique, where they had to seek safety from the approaching jihadists. In the Central African Republic, where up to 1,000 Russian mercenaries are running interference in the mining business, the Wagner Group is said to be sitting on unpaid Bangui government bills. They have not been left unscathed in Mali either, with the group suffering its first casualties in the fighting. The Tuareg rebels of the CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad), who declared a ceasefire in Bamako in 2015, have already announced that they will fight the Russian mercenaries if they advance into their territory. During his visit to the Kremlin, Macron accepted Putin’s word that at least there are no official Russian military trainers in Mali, which would hardly have reassured him.

[1] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/01/06/au-mali-les-mercenaires-wagner-progressent-au-centre-du-pays_6108476_3210.html

[2] De Montclos (2020): Une guerre perdue. La France au Sahel. Paris.

[3] Rahmane Idrissa (2019): Tinder to the Fire. . Burkina Faso in the conflict zone. https://rosaluxna.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/02-19.pdf

[4]Alexander Thurston (2020): Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel. Local Politics and Rebel Groups. Cambridge 2020.

[5]Crisis Group (2022): The Ouagadougou Coup: A reaction to insecurity. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/linsecurite-facteur-determinant-du-putsch-de-ouagadougou

[6] https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/08/mali-unchecked-abuses-military-operations

[7] https://www.archyde.com/mali-army-accused-of-war-crimes-armed-groups-of-crimes-against-humanity/

[8]Akram Kharief (2022): Wagner in Libya – combat and influence. https://rosaluxna.org/publications/wagner-in-libya-combat-and-influence/

Foto: picture alliance / ZUMAPRESS.com | Nicolas Remene

The content of this text does not necessarily reflect the position of RLS