China’s Discreet Game in North Africa – Private Military Companies

Introduction

A closed country for many years, China experienced the explosion of its economy and the invasion of distant markets at the same time as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the establishment of a new world order, September 11, 2001, and the Arab revolutions; an acceleration of history that has propelled 10 million Chinese abroad, in more than 200 countries. Today, these overseas Chinese represent 37,000 Chinese companies and control the equivalent of $2 trillion in overseas assets and sent more than $67 billion back home in 2018[1].  The launch of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) project in 2013, which represents the largest geo-economic and geo-strategic project of the 21^st century, directly involved Beijing’s action in 70 countries, mainly in Central Asia, South Asia, East Africa, North Africa and Eastern and Central Europe, on 900 structuring projects worth $800 billion[2].

Ironically, between 2002 and 2019, 140,000 terrorist attacks affected countries in BRI regions, with 234,000 deaths caused by these incidents[3].  According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, between 2010 and 2015, 345 terrorist incidents involved Chinese or Chinese-owned companies abroad, resulting in more than 1,000 deaths[4].  During this period, Chinese authorities have evolved their external security doctrine as their economic and geostrategic ambitions have evolved. The result has been the outsourcing of Chinese economic investment security, the privatization of security at home and abroad, and sometimes the temptation to use this discreet force, which is scattered all over the world, in other ways.

History of private security in China

The first state-licensed private security company in the world was established in the late 18th century during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, by a Zhang Heiwu 张黑五 from Shanxi province, under the name of Biaoju 镖局[5]. He had 500 martial arts-trained fighters under his command, who were engaged in cash transportation and close protection of wealthy citizens of the province. The Biaoju system remained in China until the Chinese Revolution of 1948, but only marginally because of the advent of the train, which secured the transportation of goods and merchandise. Communist China reappropriated all the prerogatives of security and defense by making it under the Party’s sole monopoly. During the Mao years and then during the Deng Xiao Ping years, the State was responsible for the protection of Chinese goods and infrastructure outside its borders. Until 1984, only four Chinese companies were allowed to operate abroad. All of them were affiliated with government agencies.

In 1980, President Deng Xiao Ping initiated economic reforms and established four special economic zones on China’s southeast coast. The first test included the then small cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province. In these areas, local governments were allowed to offer tax incentives to foreign investors and develop their own infrastructure without central government approval. Due to the success of this measure, the Chinese government decided in 1984 to extend it to 14 major coastal cities including Shanghai. That same year, the first private security company was created in Shenzen in one of the branches of the Public Security Bureau.

In 1984, the first Chinese equivalent of a PSC was established in one of the branches of the Public Security Bureau in Shenzhen. In 1986, the Beijing Security Service General Company was established; this company still exists today and employs 77,000 people. Its missions are mainly focused on the Chinese domestic market. In 1994, the Shandon Huawei Security Group was created, the first Chinese security company to work abroad and to accompany Chinese companies in their exports. It is still active today, mainly in Africa through the protection of mining and oil projects and infrastructure projects.  One year later, the China Security and Protection Group was created, which later became the main protector of BRI.

In September 2009, China’s State Council issued the “Regulations on the Administration of Security Services and Guarding Services” (保安服务管理条例, Baoan Fuwu Guanli Tiaoli). This measure was the first governmental attempt to lay down a regulatory framework for the private security industry, and de facto legalized PSCs. The regulations recognize two main categories of PSCs: First, “security companies” (保安服务公司, baoan fuwu gongsi). They have missions of training, guarding, and advising on risk assessment and mitigation. Their personnel are equipped with non-lethal defensive weapons.  Secondly, “security companies providing armed escort services” (从事武装守护押运服务的保安服务公司, congshi wuzhuang shouhu yayun fuwu de baoan fuwu gongsi). Such companies are allowed to equip their certified employees with weapons of war but not with heavy military equipment or vehicles. This legal framework did not specify the nature of these companies’ overseas activities, but it has allowed the opening of hundreds of small companies and the strengthening of larger ones.

The launch of the BRI in 2013 revealed new challenges and completely shifted the Chinese external security paradigm. The number of Chinese PSCs and the number of their personnel varies from study to study. The huge turnover in small security companies contributes to blurring the lines. For Alessandro Arduino, who has written extensively on China and the Chinese security market, one should not look at the figure of four or five million people working in the local market and the 6,000 PSCs where they work, but rather at the number of PSCs that operate abroad. For Arduino, the small number of Chinese PSCs that have been able to obtain international certifications is due to several factors: the language barrier (the low level of operators more broadly), the technical difficulties and cost of obtaining a license or international certification, and the fact that in China, PSCs are in a race to the bottom in terms of costs and profitability. This trend also reflects the unwillingness of Chinese companies to pay a premium for high-level security services.

The Evolution of China’s Doctrine of Protecting Interests Abroad

China has always promoted five basic principles in its relationship with foreign countries, the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”:

– Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty

– Mutual non-aggression

– Mutual non-interference in internal affairs

– Equality between countries and mutual benefit

-Peaceful coexistence

These principles were quickly challenged by the acceleration of history and the gigantic ambition of Chinese foreign trade in its conquest of complicated markets such as those in Africa and the Middle East. Faced with this situation, the Beijing authorities first adopted a military strategy that was supposed to dissuade attacks against its nationals and contribute to peace by integrating the UN stabilization missions by sending contingents of peacekeeping troops.

The emergence of mass terrorism after 9/11 plunged the Middle East into war, rendering oil companies vulnerable. 2004, a nightmare year for Chinese abroad, marked the change in people’s perception of the duty to protect Chinese nationals overseas. The increasing number of fatal incidents highlighted the inadequacy of the emergency consular protection mechanism at the time: On February 4, 23 Chinese immigrant shell collectors drowned after being caught by the tides in Morecambe Bay[6], Great Britain; in April, seven Chinese workers were kidnapped[7] while traveling from Amman, Jordan to Baghdad, their vehicle ran into a roadblock of armed individuals in Fallujah, Iraq; in May, 11 Chinese citizens working for a road construction project in Afghanistan were killed by the Taliban near Kunduz[8]. Between May 2004 and July 2007, four attacks targeted the Chinese-controlled port of Gwadar in Pakistan[9].

This electroshock prompted the authorities to create the Department of External Security Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 1, 2004[10]. This structure in charge of consular protection will play a key role in the strategy of privatizing the external security of Chinese nationals. This department was initially established on the premise that there were four categories of host countries for Chinese nationals and companies, and that the security strategy had to be adapted to the right category so as not to affect inter-state relations or neglect the Chinese community.

(01) Countries with the will to ensure the protection of Chinese nationals and with the means to do so, (02) countries with such will but lacking the means to do so, (03) countries with the means to ensure security but where there is little will to do so and finally (04) countries with neither the will nor the means to do so.

The first category includes countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Iran and the former Soviet Republics. The second category includes countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Syria and Nigeria. The third category includes countries in conflict with the Chinese central state such as India, Thailand and Vietnam. The last category includes countries that are experiencing civil war such as Afghanistan or Libya. Although the Chinese government is willing to do its utmost to protect overseas interests, consular protection alone is insufficient and sometimes not very effective.

In 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Consular Protection Division, whose main function is to coordinate the handling of cases involving the legitimate rights of Chinese nationals abroad and Chinese enterprises. A year later, this division was transformed into the Consular Assistance and Protection Center. In September 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Emergency Call Center of Global Consular Protection and Service, operating 24/7 to respond to emergencies abroad.

At the same time, China has opened diplomatic and consular representations in most countries of the world, and yet its diplomatic coverage rate has remained very low compared to that of the US, for example. The US consular sections cover an average of 5,000 American citizens abroad, while Chinese consulates cover 200,000. This is mainly due to the number of Chinese nationals abroad. Despite its rise to prominence, China’s consular strategy has quickly shown its limitations, particularly in high-risk countries. In addition to these efforts, the Beijing authorities have also chosen the military option in accordance with its principles of non-interference and non-aggression, which greatly limit the Chinese army in its foreign operations.

Two options will be pursued, the first being the opening of a naval base in Djibouti to enable a rapid reaction force to cover Africa and the Middle East and to provide maritime protection for Chinese merchant ships or those sailing from China against piracy.

Beijing chose the 90th anniversary of the founding of the National People’s Army on August 1, 2017, to cut the tape of its African military base. Its inauguration follows the Chinese-Djiboutian agreement of May 2015. China could deploy a permanent force of 1,000 soldiers there, with a capacity to accommodate up to ten times that number. A port, helipad and small airstrip make this first overseas military base a logistics hub for emergency management in the region.

In 2021, China has announced its intention to build its first naval base on the Atlantic Ocean at Bata in Equatorial Guinea, in order to control maritime traffic in the Gulf of Guinea and fight piracy while looking after its oil and commercial interests in this vital area of Africa[11].

The second strategy adopted by Beijing is systematic participation in humanitarian and stabilization missions. The idea behind this is to have troops close to danger zones for Chinese nationals and also to help countries ensure their own security. Indeed, China became the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping in 2016[12]. In addition, China’s personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping missions are higher than the combined total of the other five permanent members of the UN Security Council. As of November 2021, China’s contribution amounted to 2,253 troops, the tenth largest contribution in the world.

One of the great Chinese successes of this UN involvement has been to give Chinese officials, diplomats and military personnel many more chances to obtain positions of responsibility in international institutions or to make China’s support essential to anyone who wants to join them. It has also allowed China to exert a positive influence on Third World countries from a multilateral perspective, but also to defend Chinese positions at the UN Security Council. At first misunderstood by the population, this commitment has become a real source of pride internally. It is also, from an intelligence gathering point of view, a formidable tool for the Chinese army and services. Nevertheless, this strategy has shown many shortcomings in the protection of Chinese nationals in Africa and in other areas of tension in the world:

– The fact that Chinese forces under the UN banner are not mandated to protect Chinese expatriates.

– The fact that these forces are under international command severely limits their choice of location in target countries, which are not always useful locations for armed “consular” coverage.

– UN missions rarely succeed in actually bringing peace, especially those that are not under Chapter VII.

– Despite the armed presence of Chinese peacekeepers, the principles of non-interference and friendship with states limit Beijing’s military interventionism through the presence of its peacekeepers.

– The UN missions do not affect all the countries concerned by the presence of the Chinese.

In view of the PRC’s policy of non-interference, the use of private military and security companies is an excellent way to protect Chinese interests abroad by circumventing the five principles of peaceful coexistence and avoiding the use of the military, either directly or through the UN. Another argument in favor of PMSCs by China is the creation of a plausible narrative regarding the state’s efforts to appropriate natural resources and investments in BRI and Africa.

China’s first military/paramilitary engagements abroad

On February 25, 2011, in the midst of the Libyan civil war, China launched an evacuation operation for its nationals in Libya. To do so, it chartered a Greek ferry and sent the frigate Xuzhou and two Il-76 cargo planes. The operation required a high level of interagency coordination, with the ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs and Public Security working closely with the Civil Aviation Administration of China and consular officials. In addition, Chinese companies operating in Libya, including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Rail Construction, as well as shippers like COSCO who helped evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya, have been coordinating closely with the above government agencies. In total, 36,000 Chinese workers were able to leave Libya in record time and without casualties[13]. Very quietly, the coordination work of Chinese security companies working for the above-mentioned multinationals was seen for the first time in an open and coordinated manner with the authorities.

In February 2012, 29 Chinese workers were kidnapped in South Kordofan, Sudan. Their rescue brought international attention to two Chinese PSCs in particular: VSS Security (伟之杰安保公司, Weizhijie Anbao Gongsi) and DeWe Security (北京德威保安服务有限公司, Beijing Dewei Baoan Fuwu Youxian Gongsi)[14][15]. In 2016 these companies participated in the evacuation of 300 Chinese workers in South Sudan. In 2018, a private security company called Dewei Overseas sent 600 men to overseas project sites, working for companies such as China Road and Bridge Corporation, which is building the Nairobi-Mombasa railroad, as well as defending CNPC in Sudan and Sinopec, the two Chinese oil giants. The security guards sent in are mostly seasoned soldiers who have served in the NPA’s special forces. Of the companies listed as partners by Dewei, nine are Chinese state-owned enterprises, while six are Chinese public companies. No foreign companies are currently listed as partners. Most of these companies are directly involved in the BRI[16].

In the fight against maritime piracy

Confronted with the phenomenon of maritime piracy in the Strait of Malacca and off the coast of East Africa, China has been militarily involved since 2008 in the fight against this phenomenon by joining the international coalition against piracy. But to protect the “Maritime Silk Road”, Chinese ship owners, encouraged by their government, have quickly resorted to a private armed force composed of Chinese military companies that embark men on their ships. So far, Hua Xin is the only Chinese private maritime security company to have been officially authorized to conduct armed escort missions abroad with the blessing of the Sri Lankan government and the Chinese embassy in Sri Lanka. It has since reportedly obtained licenses from national authorities in Djibouti and Egypt to provide the same services, with other reports noting that Hua Xin has similar “bases” in those countries. For Hua Xin, these licenses appear to be used to escort transits through the high-risk area off Somalia[17]. Because of the Chinese government’s strict weapons legislation, many Chinese security companies operating in the maritime sector use the services of “floating armories”, vessels that sail in international waters and operate on hire outside the laws of the countries[18].

What are these Chinese private military/security companies?

The footprint of Chinese security companies is very different and generally refers to the matrix we mentioned above according to the relationship between the willingness of states to protect Chinese nationals and the means they have at their disposal. Their work in the field will be more or less visible depending on the classification of the country in which they are located and on whether local legislation allows foreigners to invest in security. In Algeria, for example, where this activity is strictly reserved for nationals, Chinese security companies operate by being integrated with their clients or within the framework of consulting and logistics offices. Under the guise of managing the fleet and real estate of the Chinese company to be protected, they supervise liaison with local security authorities, escorts, convoys, protection of sensitive sites or in sensitive areas (on behalf of the end client) and they manage partners of local security and guarding[19].

For other regions in Africa, Chinese PSCs will act as follows:

• Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: Cooperation with local PSCs and government security forces for embassy protection, port and infrastructure guarding, and kidnap-for-ransom (K&R) response. Training for Chinese clients is done in mainland China beforehand. A particularity for Egypt is the presence of maritime security against pirates.
• Libya, the Sahel and South Sudan: The action of the PSCs is assimilated to that of private military companies with the use of armed agents if possible. The use of such companies is generally for the protection of mines and oil sites.

The salaries in Chinese security companies are quite low, and the level of education is below the average in China. Chinese private security companies usually offer a competitive rate. While the famous security company Academi pays out a few thousand dollars per day per employee, Chinese private security companies pay $500 to $1000 per month. According to a rough calculation, a Chinese security detail of 12 people costs only $500 per day. This is comparable to the cost of local private guards in Afghanistan and is only one tenth of the cost in Western countries[22].

FSG: a glitch in the matrix or a model for the future?

When the announcement was made to launch the BRI in 2013, one man understood that China would be projecting millions of its people, billions of dollars, thousands of companies into a hundred countries where security was not always present. A leap into the unknown that Erik Prince, founder of the American private military company Blackwater, saw as an opportunity. He had the necessary know-how, local connections and a plan to contribute militarily to the pacification of countries in crisis, by providing men and heavy equipment (armored vehicles, planes, boats, etc.) and by having a training program that could very quickly create a modern army.

So, in the same year, Prince joined forces with one of China’s largest economic groups, CITIC, which is worth a trillion dollars, to create a private military company called Frontier Services Group (FSG) (先丰服务集团, Xianfeng Fuwu Jituan). Prince served as FSG’s Chairman of the Board until 2021 (since replaced by Israel’s Ally Dorian Barak, his own financial advisor) and holds a 25% stake in the company. CITIC is a financial conglomerate owned by the Chinese state, so it is a real alliance between the Chinese state and the founder of Blackwater. FSG was directly involved in North Africa during the civil war in Libya, on the side of Khalifa Haftar. Erik Prince had provided, with Emirati funding, agricultural aircraft converted into bombers to the forces of the Libyan National Army[23]. In 2019 he had tried to set up a helicopter force and a Kill team, but had failed[24]. For its operations in North Africa, Eric Prince and FSG have chosen Malta as a logistics and command platform[25]. In China, and in collaboration with the security services, he built a training center in security and urban guerrilla warfare in Xinjiang.

According to an FSG statement, the agreement was signed at a ceremony on January 11, 2019, attended by Xinjiang officials and representatives of CITIC Guoan Construction. The agreement suggests that FSG invest $600,000 for the center, which will be capable of training 8,000 people per year. In 2017, Erik Prince’s Chinese subsidiary had opened the International Security Defense College in Beijing, which aimed to become “the largest private security training school in China” and train personnel from Chinese companies with operations in Africa and Central Asia. In 2018, sources told Arabi21 that the security firm Frontier Services Group led by Erik Prince, who previously ran the security firm Blackwater, had recently sent fighters from the Kurdish region of Iraq to Libya to fight alongside Haftar, following a secret deal[26]. In addition to its activities in North Africa, FSG protects Chinese mining and oil interests in several parts of Africa, with the company’s men and logistics in Nigeria, Mozambique and South Sudan.

Challenges and future of Chinese PMCs

Despite their rapid growth, Chinese military and security companies face many challenges. The first one is the poor quality of training of security guards, the language barrier and the lack of openness towards other nationalities. It is currently impossible (except for FSG) to find a Chinese private military company with operational capabilities such as those of Blackwater/Academi or Wagner Group. These capabilities require an increase in logistics and training, which is not yet the case for Chinese companies.

The second is related to staff salaries. Too low, these salaries do not encourage the emergence of a world-class elite and do not encourage professionals in the sector to join Chinese companies.

The third is related to Chinese legislation, which is poorly adapted to the global context of private military companies (status not recognized by law in China).  Legislation on weapons is very restrictive, even for companies with licenses (PRC Law on the Control of Firearms” (中华人民共和国枪支管理法, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiangzhi Guanli Fa) adopted in 1996 only authorizes the PLA, the police and the militia to possess weapons).

Finally, in the absence of a clear strategy, private military and security companies lack flexibility, obey only the deployment of their Chinese clients and do not enter the international security market for the benefit of other companies or interests.

Conclusions

The future seems bright for Chinese military and security companies. The lack of prospects for mass deployment of the People’s Liberation Army abroad and the continuing need for security for Chinese nationals means that the use of PSCs will be prevalent. China will also have to manage the post-retirement careers of its military elites and soldiers, who represent 57 million people to be inserted into a very dynamic economic fabric.

Strategically, Beijing will have to make a choice between the Russian model of private military companies, which is based on geopolitics, illegal work and a military approach, or a Western model, which is secure and legal but oriented above all towards generating profit. The solution could be hybrid with the adoption of both orientations with a multiplication of actors and alliances. But what is certain is that Chinese military companies will play an important geopolitical role by 2030.

[1] Bartlett, David (1997). The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization in Hungary. University of Michigan Press. p. 280. ISBN 9780472107940.

[2] Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.”

[3] https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf

[4] Yang, “Overcoming Difficulties in Protecting Overseas Interests.”

[5] https://internalmartialart.wordpress.com/2015/11/21/biaoju-%E9%95%96%E5%B1%80-security-companies/

[6]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morecambe_Bay_cockling_disaster#:~:text=The%20Morecambe%20Bay%20cockling%20disaster,cockles%20off%20the%20Lancashire%20coast.

[7] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mystery-surrounds-chinese-peasants-kidnapped-on-the-road-to-baghdad-559810.html

[8]  http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/97850.htm

[9] https://www.jstor.org/stable/45242422

[10] http://jm.chineseembassy.org/eng/xw/200512/t20051228_4270146.htm

[11] https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/why-equatorial-guinea-may-host-china-s-first-atlantic-naval-base

[12] United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Troop and Police Contributors’, https://peacekeeping.un. org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

[13] Xinhua 24 février 2011

[14] https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJCPB8

[15] China Faces New Threats Abroad – WSJ

[16] Chinese Private Military Security Companies in Contemporary Africa M.B. Van Meele

[17] https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/who-guards-the-maritime-silk-road/

[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30512185

[19] Interview with an Algerian security company manager

[20] 0Khan Raphaëlle, « Le Sri Lanka, l’Inde et le Pakistan face à la Belt and Road Initiative chinoise », Étude n°71, IRSEM, novembre 2019, Paris

[21] CHINESE PRIVATE MILITARY CORPORATIONS Valère LLOBET1 C2FR

[22] Private Security Companies Emerging Protectors of China’s Overseas Interests – Xin Tian

[23] https://medium.com/war-is-boring/erik-princes-mercenaries-are-bombing-libya-88fcb8e55292

[24] https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/actu-et-enquetes/libye-haftar-mercenaires-occidentaux-emirats-prince

[25] https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2014/11/17/1236402/0/en/Frontier-Services-Group-Sets-Up-Operations-in-Malta.html

[26] https://northafricapost.com/30417-libya-foreign-mercenaries-recruited-for-haftar-by-security-company.html

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