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Can Impact Investing Offer an Alternative to Green Capitalism?

Article by Hatem LOUATI

A Critical Analysis of COP30 Commitments and the Tunisian Case

Introduction : The Urgent Need for Climate Finance at the Heart of COP30 and Tunisia’s NDC 3.0

The final outcome of the thirtieth Conference of the Parties (COP30)[1], held in Belém in November 2025, places climate finance at the centre of international climate negotiations. The Mutirão Decision and the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T set an exceptionally ambitious target of mobilising at least 1.3 trillion US dollars annually by 2035 to finance climate action in developing countries, drawing on all sources of public and private finance. This target builds on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), adopted at COP29 in Baku, while substantially raising the level of ambition. The previous goal of 300 billion US dollars annually by 2035 had been widely criticised by developing countries as insufficient to meet their climate-related needs.

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T is a non-binding framework intended to mobilise States, multilateral development banks and private investors. According to the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance (IHLEG)[2], approximately half of the target—described as « fully achievable »—should come from the private sector. Official texts accordingly emphasise blended finance, innovative financial instruments, including guarantees and risk-mitigation mechanisms, country-led platforms[3], and the alignment of financial flows with Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement.

This dominant institutional narrative (IHLEG, COP Presidencies and multilateral development banks) of the « necessity » of relying on private capital warrants scrutiny from the outset. Indeed, this « necessity » is by no means self-evident: it stems from a political choice that prioritises the preservation and/or reproduction of a financial architecture dominated by private actors, at the expense of the large-scale, prioritised mobilisation of public finance.

In Tunisia, one of the countries most exposed to water stress in the Mediterranean region, the World Bank estimates that, in the absence of rapid action, gross domestic product (GDP) could contract by 3.4 per cent by 2030 as a result of the combined effects of climate risks, particularly water shortages, coastal erosion and flooding.[4] In this context, Tunisia’s third Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) estimates total financing needs at approximately 55 billion US dollars for the 2026–2035 period. This amount is divided between adaptation ; water management, agricultural resilience and coastal protection (29 billion US dollars, or 53 per cent), and mitigation ; solar parks and energy efficiency (25–26 billion US dollars, or 47 per cent). Adaptation priorities focus primarily on water and sanitation (10.7 billion US dollars) and agriculture and food security (8 billion US dollars). On the mitigation side, the energy sector accounts for nearly 87 per cent of financing needs, with a substantial share allocated to renewable energy, energy efficiency and transition infrastructure. Tunisia has committed to covering only 26 per cent of these needs through domestic resources for its unconditional targets; the remaining 74 per cent depends on international support, concessional finance and private investment.

Yet adaptation projects are structurally less attractive to private investors than mitigation projects. Analyses by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI)[5] highlight a fundamental obstacle: adaptation frequently produces public goods[6]  whose benefits are diffuse and which do not generate direct revenue streams capable of remunerating private investors. As a result, public finance[7]  is particularly important for meeting the 53 per cent of Tunisia’s climate-finance needs allocated to adaptation.

The call for massive private-capital mobilisation under COP30 and Tunisia’s NDC 3.0 therefore raises fundamental questions of climate justice and effectiveness. If financing is channelled primarily towards projects that meet conventional market-based profitability criteria, who will pay for the measures that are indispensable to climate resilience but are not commercially profitable ?

Furthermore, the low share of domestic resources (26 per cent) cannot be explained solely by a lack of political will or technical capacity. Rather, it reflects a context of severe fiscal constraints associated with public indebtedness. Tunisia faces a substantial debt-service burden (approximately 23 billion Tunisian dinars in 2026, equivalent to nearly 12 per cent of GDP), which absorbs a significant share of budgetary resources  and considerably reduces the fiscal space[8]  available for climate investment.

It is important to recall at this point that a significant share of international “climate finance” takes the form of loans, including concessional loans,[9] thereby contributing to additional indebtedness. This is sometimes described as “hidden debt” when it arises from public–private partnerships or guarantees that commit the State to long-term financial obligations. This debt dimension, which is absent from the dominant framing of the COP30 and NDC 3.0 documents, is nevertheless central to understanding why Tunisia relies on external financing for 74 per cent of its needs and why the cost of capital remains high, particularly because of country risk premiums[10].

Taken together, these two documents reveal the same structural reality: the dominant narrative presents the large-scale mobilisation of private capital as an indispensable condition. Yet this mobilisation takes place within a conceptual and operational framework that warrants critical scrutiny, particularly with regard to the nature of the financing involved and the risks associated with green capitalism, especially through the mechanism of greenwashing.

Defining and Critiquing Green Capitalism

Green capitalism refers to the idea that the capitalist system can be “greened” through market mechanisms, technological innovation, private finance, carbon credits, environmental, social and governance (ESG) investments, and green bonds, without fundamentally challenging the logic of economic growth and capital accumulation. This conception has gained considerable traction since the 2010s and has since been championed by most international financial institutions, major banks and a substantial segment of the business community. It rests on the assumption that the pursuit of profit is compatible with environmental protection.

In practical terms, green capitalism is reflected in the proliferation of ESG ratings and labels, green bonds, carbon credit markets and « climate-themed » investment funds. For proponents of this model, the market is the most effective means of allocating capital to low-carbon solutions because it rewards innovation and, at least in theory, penalises polluting activities through carbon pricing or the cost of capital.

From a critical political economy perspective, this model has several structural limitations. First, it tends to turn the ecological crisis into an opportunity to develop new profitable markets, without necessarily reducing the overall material footprint. Second, green capitalism relies heavily on voluntary mechanisms and offsetting instruments whose actual effectiveness remains contested. Finally, this model can perpetuate, and even exacerbate, North–South asymmetries by turning developing countries into suppliers of carbon credits or “green solutions” that generate little local added value, thereby facilitating greenwashing.

Definitions[11] such as the one put forward by Adrienne Buller[12] emphasise that green capitalism does not challenge the power relations and inequalities that structure the global economy. Rather, it seeks to preserve existing structures while decarbonising certain activities. The risk, then, is that of a merely cosmetic or “gattopardian”[13] transition : everything appears to change so that the underlying relations of extraction and domination remain intact.

Along similar lines, Daniela Gabor[14] has notably conceptualised “de-risking” (risk reduction) as a strategy through which States and international institutions socialise risks to make projects attractive to private capital, while privatising the profits. Andreas Malm and Jason W. Moore, for their part, emphasise the structurally extractive nature of capitalism and the impossibility of “greening” it without leaving its logic of accumulation intact.[15] Daniel Tanuro, Kohei Saito and Nancy Fraser, in turn, have shown how attempts to establish “green capitalism” tend to reproduce relations of domination based on gender, class and North–South inequalities in new ecological forms.[16]

Greenwashing (environmental whitewashing)[17], defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “disinformation disseminated by an organisation so as to present an environmentally responsible public image,” is not merely an isolated malfunction but a structural mechanism of green capitalism. It helps sustain the legitimacy of the system by creating the appearance of an ecological transition while preserving extractive and productivist models. It also enables the creation of new markets (labels, certifications, ESG funds and carbon credits of varying quality) and the dilution of substantive requirements when commitments rest on declarations of intent or offsetting measures with low additionality.

Furthermore, greenwashing is therefore not merely a matter of misleading communication. It is, in particular, the product of a system that needs environmental legitimacy to continue functioning while avoiding the costs of genuinely transforming production and consumption patterns. Indeed, as long as standards remain largely voluntary and sanctions are rare, there remains a strong incentive to “green” rhetoric without changing actual practices.

Although the final outcome of COP30 barely mentions the term “greenwashing” and does not establish globally binding rules to prohibit it, it does introduce governance measures aimed at indirectly limiting the associated risks. These include recognition of “information integrity”[18] as a means of combating climate disinformation; promotion of a “Super-Taxonomy”[19] designed to improve the interoperability and comparability of green investments; and the launch of the “Veredas Dialogue”[20] on aligning financial flows, that is, ensuring that all financial flows, both public and private, domestic and international, are consistent with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. These advances nevertheless remain non-binding and reflect an approach centred on transparency and standardisation rather than structural transformation.

Mobilising the Private Sector: Necessity and Ambiguities

The COP30 documents (the Mutirão Decision, the Baku to Belém Roadmap, and the Circle of Finance Ministers’ report) repeatedly emphasise the indispensable role of private capital. Without a substantial contribution from the private sector, the target of 1.3 trillion US dollars is considered unattainable. Tunisia’s NDC 3.0 follows the same logic, highlighting the climate taxonomy,[21] efforts to attract private investment and public–private partnerships, and recourse to the mechanisms established under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

In the institutional narrative, this shift towards private capital is justified by the limited public budgets of developing countries and the insufficiency of international public finance (the Green Climate Fund, adaptation funds and bilateral aid). Yet this justification deserves to be turned on its head: insufficient public financing is not inevitable, but rather the result of political choices.[22] Thus, presenting private capital as a “quantitative necessity” amounts to naturalising an order that could be transformed. Depending on its nature, this mobilisation can profoundly skew the quality of the transition.

The shift towards green capital also raises questions of justice and effectiveness. Indeed, the climate justice paradox is that the countries that have historically contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions (developing countries, including Tunisia) are also those that suffer the most severe impacts of climate change and face the highest financing costs (higher interest rates and country risk premiums) when seeking to adapt to climate change or decarbonise their economies. The cost of capital remains considerably higher in developing countries, thereby limiting their access to private finance for projects, particularly adaptation projects, which are often less attractive to the market.

Along the same lines, the predominance of market-based instruments[23] can encourage “green” investments with low additionality, that is, investments with little real climate impact, or investments that are not sufficiently inclusive.[24] Mobilising private capital thus becomes not merely a quantitative issue, but also a question of quality and redistribution between countries in the Global North and those in the Global South.[25]

The Tunisian Cases: Who Owns, Who Benefits, and Who Bears the Costs?

Purely conceptual and legal analysis benefits from being examined in light of concrete cases. Several experiences in Tunisia illustrate the issues of ownership,[26] benefit distribution and the allocation of costs in the “green” transition.

The PROSOL programme (promotion of solar thermal energy and, more recently, photovoltaic solar energy)[27] is one of the most frequently cited success stories. Implemented by the National Agency for Energy Conservation (ANME) and the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas (STEG), it has enabled the deployment of more than one million square metres of solar thermal collectors, through a subsidy and credit mechanism repaid via electricity bills. Here, public financing (through the Energy Transition Fund) and public institutional leadership play a central role. Households benefit from lower bills, while the State reduces pressure on energy imports. The model thus demonstrates that a well-designed public support scheme can effectively steer demand without relying exclusively on private profitability.

Solar concessions[28] (five projects with a combined capacity of approximately 598 MW, representing an investment of around 1.64 billion Tunisian dinars and approved in 2026) illustrate a different approach. The power plants in Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa and Gabès are built and operated by private operators, which sell all the electricity they generate to STEG under contracts lasting 20 to 25 years. Investors benefit, among other things, from tax exemptions (of up to ten years in some cases) and guaranteed purchase prices. At the end of the contract period, the installations are transferred to STEG for a symbolic sum of one dinar or dismantled at the investor’s expense.

While this model can attract capital and reduce the cost of electricity generation compared with imported natural gas, it transfers a substantial share of the value created (and potential carbon credits) to often international actors, while limiting technology transfer and local employment. The question of who owns strategic infrastructure and how the benefits are redistributed therefore remains open.

Green Hydrogen Projects[29] (Acwa Power, H2 Notos, developed by TotalEnergies/EREN/Verbund, and the Gabès pilot project) raise even more acute concerns. The projected costs of these projects are colossal, with some analyses estimating costs in the hundreds of billions of euros by 2050[30]. Production is largely intended for export to Europe. The sites in Gabès and Tataouine are located in regions already affected by social and environmental tensions, including the phosphogypsum issue in Gabès. Critics, notably the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT),[31] have raised concerns about water consumption (for desalination), the scale of the renewable energy capacity required, financing through debt and public funds, and the risk that Tunisia could become a low-cost supplier of “green” energy to the Global North without first meeting its own needs.

Here, the logic of green capitalism becomes clear: the extraction of resources (sunlight, water and land) and the export of value added, alongside the socialisation of risks and the privatisation of profits.

Impact Investing as a Distinct Approach?

In response to the limitations of green capitalism, impact investing, defined by the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) as investments made with the intention of generating positive, measurable social or environmental impact alongside a financial return, is emerging as a distinct approach. It goes beyond merely minimising negative externalities (the logic of ESG risk avoidance or compliance) and instead aims to intentionally generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact while seeking a financial return. Its defining characteristics are as follows:

  • Intentionality of impact;
  • Measurement and management of impact;
  • Additionality (the investment must produce an outcome that would not have occurred without it);
  • A net positive contribution, rather than merely reducing harm.

From a sustainable finance perspective, impact investing differs from traditional ESG funds in its requirement for an active contribution, rather than mere negative screening (exclusionary screening)[32] or risk integration.[33] From a political economy perspective—that is, one concerned with power relations, competing interests, and social and political consequences, rather than solely with technical or financial considerations—impact investing opens up the possibility of finance that is more closely aligned with the actual needs of local communities and vulnerable populations, rather than focused exclusively on portfolio optimisation.

However, impact investing is not immune to criticism. It can itself be co-opted by green capitalism if it is confined to niche projects, high returns or superficial impact measurement. Its transformative potential therefore depends on the rigour of impact measurement standards, transparency, and its grounding in robust public policies that reject the reduction of the ecological transition to a market opportunity. Like greenwashing, impact investing can ultimately become yet another layer of legitimation for the existing system.

Tunisia’s Legal Framework for Investment : Developments and Limitations

Tunisian investment law has evolved significantly. Historically focused on “combating pollution” (Law No. 120-1993), it has gradually incorporated incentives for sustainability. Law No. 71-2016 and its implementing decrees—notably Decree No. 389-2017 and Decree No. 182-2024—which introduced a sustainable development grant, mark a shift towards supporting projects that incorporate environmental and social considerations. These legal instruments reflect an incentive-based approach rather than one founded on structural obligations.

Despite this progress, the low rate at which many “green” projects are actually implemented raises questions about the effectiveness of a purely incentive-based approach, particularly one relying on the sustainable development grant, whose amount remains relatively modest compared with the cost of major infrastructure and other large-scale projects.

Indeed, the current legal framework does more to promote investment attractiveness than to build an ecosystem conducive to impact investing. The absence of a clear legal definition of impact investing, mandatory impact measurement standards and enhanced oversight mechanisms, coupled with the lack of reference to Tunisia’s climate taxonomy and to structuring concepts such as clusters and value chains, means that the current legal framework struggles to steer private capital towards integrated, additional and territorially grounded projects that go beyond a model based on individual incentives.

From an environmental public law perspective, the interplay between NDC 3.0, the climate taxonomy and investment law remains open to improvement. NDC 3.0 makes no mention of green capitalism, greenwashing or impact investing. It remains a technical document focused on quantified targets, sectoral measures and financing needs. This conceptual neutrality is understandable in light of the requirements of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), since the use of critical concepts drawn from political economy (green capitalism, greenwashing) or concepts associated with alternative finance (impact investing) is neither required nor encouraged by the rules of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, this leaves a strategic gap regarding the quality and fairness of the finance mobilised. By limiting itself to quantifying financing needs (55 billion US dollars) and indicating the conditional share (74 per cent), NDC 3.0 does not specify how private capital should be directed, or according to what criteria of additionality, inclusiveness or territorial justice.

This strategic gap is problematic on several levels. First, it weakens the links between the NDC, the climate taxonomy and investment law: without clear qualitative guidance, the taxonomy risks remaining a classification tool rather than an instrument of transformation, while investment law may continue to prioritise investment attractiveness over impact. Second, it leaves the field open to private capital mobilisation driven by the logic of green capitalism, with the attendant risks of North–South asymmetries, a concentration of investment in profitable projects, and the low additionality already identified. Finally, in a context where Tunisia is heavily dependent on external financing, the absence of a rigorous conceptual and legal framework governing the quality of climate finance undermines the State’s ability to steer these flows towards positive, measurable and equitable impacts.

Towards COP31: What Is at Stake in Climate Finance

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T is now entering its implementation phase. The successive COP Presidencies have structured the work around five pillars (the “5 Rs”): Replenishing (replenishing concessional finance and grants), Rebalancing (rebalancing fiscal space and debt sustainability), Redirecting (redirecting private finance and reducing the cost of capital), Revamping (strengthening capacity and coordination across climate portfolios), and Reshaping (restructuring systems to ensure more equitable capital flows). An initial assessment of implementation is expected at COP31.

For developing countries, and Tunisia in particular, what is at stake at COP31 goes beyond quantifying financial flows. It concerns the quality of these flows[34], the treatment of debt (debt-for-climate swaps, debt relief and moratoriums), access to adaptation finance, which remains significantly underfunded, and, finally, the ability of States to steer private investment rather than simply having to accommodate it. The climate finance work programme and the next phase of the roadmap will constitute a decisive test: they will either reinforce the narrative of the “necessity of private capital” within the framework of green capitalism, or open up space for more redistributive and publicly funded instruments.

Synthesis and Outlook

A cross-analysis of COP30 and Tunisia’s NDC 3.0 reveals a fundamental tension. On the one hand, the quantitative imperative[35] calls for the mobilisation of massive resources. On the other, the dominant framework of green capitalism, of which greenwashing is a structural mechanism, risks producing a superficial, unequal and insufficiently transformative transition.

Impact investing, as it is generally conceived, still rests on the same fundamental assumption as green capitalism: that profit-seeking private capital should be the primary driver of the transition. At best, it can serve as a transition tool subject to strict safeguards, including robust additionality standards, public oversight and integration into territorial policies. However, it cannot be presented as a systemic alternative. Genuine alternatives lie in large-scale, targeted public financing; grants for adaptation; a reassessment of debt through conversions, relief and moratoriums; and forms of collective or public ownership of the transition’s strategic infrastructure.

For finance genuinely geared towards positive impact to emerge, several cumulative conditions must be met:

  • The development of robust, context-sensitive impact measurement standards;
  • The strengthening of national legal frameworks (definition, oversight, and targeted financial and tax incentives);
  • The alignment of public policies (NDCs, climate taxonomy and investment law) with financial instruments;
  • Particular attention to social and territorial justice, debt-related issues and infrastructure ownership, especially in developing countries.

For Tunisia, this could translate into several practical measures, including, for example, introducing a legal definition of impact investing into investment law, aligned with international standards (GIIN, Operating Principles); making certain grants or tax benefits conditional on demonstrating additionality and submitting verified impact reports; establishing an oversight or accreditation mechanism for funds and intermediaries that claim to pursue impact investing; and explicitly linking the climate taxonomy and NDC 3.0 with public finance instruments (public seed capital funds, guarantees for adaptation projects, etc.). Without these changes, the current framework will remain primarily a tool for attracting “green” investment in the broad sense, without guaranteeing the quality or fairness of the impact generated.

Thus, the evolution of Tunisian investment law towards sustainability-oriented mechanisms provides a foundation, but remains insufficient. Finance genuinely geared towards impact would require moving beyond a purely incentive-based approach to build an ecosystem that integrates intentionality, additionality, measurement and accountability.

Ultimately, Tunisia’s current legal framework does not foster the development of impact investing worthy of the name. More fundamentally, even under a stronger regulatory framework, impact investing does not constitute a systemic alternative to green capitalism: it shares its central assumption—that profit-seeking private capital should be the driving force. The real levers of transformation lie in public financing, targeted grants for adaptation, a reassessment of debt, and forms of collective ownership of transition infrastructure. The commitments made at COP30 and Tunisia’s NDC 3.0 demonstrate the scale of the financing need; COP31 and the next stages of the Baku to Belém Roadmap will reveal whether the international community is finally willing to address the quality and fairness of the finance mobilised to meet that need—or whether it will simply continue to advance the narrative of the “necessity of private capital”.


[1] The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are the highest-level international meetings organised under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. They bring together nearly 200 countries to negotiate agreements on greenhouse-gas emissions reductions and the financing of the ecological transition. See United Nations, « UN Climate Change Conferences », https://www.un.org/fr/climatechange/un-climate-conferences.

[2] The Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance (IHLEG) is an international group of experts commissioned by successive COP Presidencies since COP26.

[3] Country-led platforms are coordination mechanisms that bring together relevant stakeholders around a clearly defined national strategy.

[4] World Bank Group, Tunisia: Country Climate and Development Report (November 2023).

[5] On the limitations of making adaptation projects « bankable », see analyses by the World Economic Forum and the Climate Policy Initiative. Many adaptation projects do not generate direct revenue streams that would make them attractive to private investors.

[6] Examples include coastal protection, early-warning systems and water management.

[7] Examples include grants, concessional loans and public guarantees.

[8] The room for manoeuvre available to a government to increase public spending or reduce taxes without jeopardising the sustainability of its public finances.

[9] Concessional loans are loans offered on terms substantially more favourable than those available on the market.

[10] The country risk premium is the additional interest rate that investors demand when lending to a country they perceive as carrying a higher level of risk.

[11] Corporate Watch, an independent British research collective, defines green capitalism in its publication A–Z of Green Capitalism as “a development of capitalism that attempts formally and explicitly to incorporate nature through new policies and practices. It applies the same capitalist ideas (continuous economic growth, private property, profit and ‘free’ markets) to nature in the hope of resolving the environmental crises that the system itself has created.” See Corporate Watch, A–Z of Green Capitalism, https://corporatewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Corporate-Watch-A-Z-of-Green-Capitalism.pdf. Along similar lines, Ivan Scales defines green capitalism as “an approach that presumes a broad compatibility between capitalism and efforts to reduce human impacts on the non-human world.”

[12] Adrienne Buller, The Value of a Whale: On the Illusions of Green Capitalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022).

[13] Gattopardism is a political strategy whereby sweeping changes are proclaimed while the existing functioning of institutions is ultimately preserved.

[14] Daniela Gabor, « The Wall Street Consensus », Development and Change, 2021

[15] Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital; Jason W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life (2021).

[16] Daniel Tanuro, L’impossible capitalisme vert (2012); Kohei Saito, Marx in the Anthropocene (2023); Nancy Fraser, Cannibal Capitalism (2022).

[17] According to TerraChoice, a Canadian environmental marketing agency, greenwashing is “the act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service.” https://www.ul.com/insights/sins-greenwashing

[18] Information integrity refers to the quality, reliability and accuracy of information disseminated about climate change. It aims in particular to combat climate disinformation (fake news, manipulation and informational greenwashing) and to ensure public access to accurate, transparent and scientific information.

[19] A framework of common principles designed to make different national taxonomies comparable and interoperable.

[20] Launched under the Brazilian Presidency of COP30, the Veredas Dialogue builds on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement (alignment of financial flows).

[21] Tunisia’s climate taxonomy was established in 2025. It consists of an initial list of economic activities eligible for climate (green) finance. Link: https://www.cbf.org.tn/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Liste-activites-eligble-taxonomie.pdf

[22] Austerity, the prioritisation of debt servicing, and the rejection of innovative financing mechanisms at the global level, such as taxes on financial transactions or on the profits of fossil fuel industries.

[23] These include, in particular, blended finance, guarantees and risk-mitigation mechanisms, green bonds, and carbon credits.

[24] “Green” investments that primarily benefit actors who are already well positioned and projects that are commercially viable, while leaving adaptation, vulnerable territories and the most exposed populations behind.

[25] Ensuring that private capital mobilised for climate action does not benefit only actors who are already powerful, but also redistributes benefits (jobs, resilience, access to energy, income, etc.) to the most vulnerable populations and territories.

[26] Ownership of land and natural resources, of “green” infrastructure, and of environmental rights.

[27] https://www.anme.tn/fr/project/prosol-collectif

[28] https://www.energiemines.gov.tn/fr/themes/energies-renouvelables/projets-et-programmes/regime-des-concessions/

[29] https://energiemines.gov.tn/fileadmin/docs-u1/Re%CC%81sume%CC%81_strate%CC%81gie_nationale_MIME_Anglais.pdf

[30] National Strategy for the Development of Green Hydrogen and Its Derivatives in Tunisia: https://www.energiemines.gov.tn/fileadmin/docsu1/Re%CC%81sume%CC%81_strat%C3%A9gie_Nationale_MIME_Franc%CC%A7ais___V_11-2024_.pdf

[31] https://protunisie.com/energie-solaire/installation-photovoltaique/hydrogene-vert-tunisie-ugtt/

[32] An investment method that simply excludes certain companies or sectors from a portfolio.

[33] Also known as “ESG integration”, an approach in which environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria are taken into account solely as financial risk factors.

[34] The share of grants and the share of loans.

[35] Approximately 55 billion US dollars for 2026–2035, of which 74 per cent is conditional on international support and private investment.