Visa policies and the traumas of immobility
Visa policies and the traumas of immobility
Translated by Roots prod ( translated from French to English : Borhen Hallek)
Editorial design and illustration :Yessine Ouerghemmi
Man is born free. This assertion is common not only to modern philosophies and ancient religions, but also to the political critique of our modern and contemporary condition. It is undoubtedly from this general assertion that the “naturalness” of considering mobility and movement as a fundamental right is derived, by all the international charters relating to human rights. But it’s a fact that rich countries, transformed into fortresses, ignore the subjective dimension of migration, and repress the impulse that drives human beings to relocate elsewhere. This is the “viatoric drive”, aptly defined by Gérard Haddad as the impulse that “pushes us to travel, with the call of the unknown, of the other, of spaces”, involving space as an existential stake and a vector of subjectivity[1].
Prior to the French colonization of Tunisia in 1881, Tunisians, a subject of pre-state empires, were free to travel to neighboring territories in Africa, the Mediterranean basin and as far as China. From 1881 onwards, Tunisians gradually lost this “viatoric drive” under the effect of bureaucratic, police and border complications. They became enclosed or controlled by borders established by the colonial powers. Although colonization created increasingly fixed national borders, a form of freedom was maintained by the very fact of belonging to the colonial empire which, while selecting populations and hierarchizing territories, did not go so far as to definitively prohibit movement within its space. With independence, Tunisians regained freedom of movement between their country and the former colonial metropolises. They rediscovered human impulsive nature and enjoyed mobility with fewer administrative restrictions: abroad studies, work immigration, tourism, visits to family members, healthcare travels, sports tourism, etc. It is necessary to recall these generalities when we contemplate today’s reality in light of the complexities and travel bans. The most common reasons for travelling – as mundane as ” taking part in a sporting event” or “accessing medical care” – suffer from bans.
Since 1995, when the Schengen Area was created, the mobility of Tunisians has been disrupted by the need to obtain a visa, a prerequisite for travel to the other side of the Mediterranean. The Mare nostrum (“Our Sea”) has become the great stranger repelling southern Mediterraneans. The natural frontier doubles as a political stratum that gradually becomes a mark of defilement. So, even if that rare visa can be obtained by some sort of an administrative miracle, the natural impulse to leave is definitively shattered.
The following article deals with the psychic effect that I call the “trauma of (im)mobility”, which marks former colonies at the time of the closure of political borders. The Tunisian case is an illustration of the psychic violence suffered by the whole of society confronted with the border, at the moment of politicization by the closure of the latter. I will address these traumas through the prism of family ties between individuals who have immigrated, and family members who have remained in Tunisia and are denied their right to movement. I will refer to interviews conducted as part of a new research project on the new border policy.
How does this migration policy reveal individual and collective traumas? How does the border system become an object that impacts the intimate and transforms the social order?
Stress, shock, retreat, shame, anger and protest
This article should be read as a commentary on an interview. The said interview was chosen from a dozen conducted as part of an ongoing investigation into the effects of borderization on the populations of former colonies, Tunisia in this case. It represents a Tunisian middle-class reality in their struggles with visa application procedures. This interview is representative – indeed, significant – of what our objective survey in Tunisia seeks to confirm about the processes of internalizing borderization. It outlines the five stages through which middle-class families who are denied access to visas enabling them to visit their descendants and ascendants settled in the West pass; the stress of waiting, shock at visa refusal, retreat and shame, anger and finally protest/despair. These stages can thus be referred to as the “trauma of immobility”. We will also focus on the impact of visa refusal on middle-class and wealthy families in Tunisia[2].
In our previous work, we observed how the desire to cross the Mediterranean border was driven by the rise of prohibition and the new bureaucratic arrangements governing migration[3]. Indeed, prior to the year 1995, the desire to leave with the claim of a definitive settlement in European territories is little observed. The family reunification policy initiated in the early 1980s massively introduced the great waves of settlement, just as it was about to entrench closure and selection in the face of migration within host countries. The desire for emigrants to settle permanently in Europe only emerged after the Schengenization[4] of the Mediterranean and the emergence of a Schengen culture of security[5].
From this period onwards, the EU implemented a European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) that introduced new border management, helping to transform representations in terms of hospitality and otherness. This policy, which goes hand in hand with the considerable rise of extreme right-wing parties, now players in several European governments, endorses a vision in which inhabitants of former colonies are apprehended as personae non gratae.
The five stages experienced by Tunisian middle-class people with refused visa applications is a trauma that settles on scales that our survey must measure, before considering any alternative way out of such a situation. These five phases – the stress of waiting for a visa; shock at being refused; shame; anger and protest – characterize an experience that is both collective and individual; it is collective in the sense that it is experienced by the entire community of rejected visa applicants, i.e. those who have met the selection criteria and are able to prove their innocence of the offence of harga (Translator note: Harga is a local term in Tunisia that refers to clandestine migration). It is individual in the sense that each of those with “refused” visa applications who are facing the disastrous consequences of refusal – notably families separated from their emigrant children – are experiencing the situation without the possibility of organizing themselves politically and collectively.
Before illustrating this situation with the interview conducted with the Snoussi family[6], let us recall the general situation of the “problem” before the new schengenization policy. In the past, access to visas was differentiated according to both subsidiary and socio-economic categorizations. Firstly, the right of married couples to reunite did indeed facilitate movement, despite heightened suspicion of sham marriages (marriages of convenience). Secondly, this same right will be extended to include descendants and ascendants with no apparent difficulties. What’s more, obtaining a visa was not difficult for all social categories. This was particularly the case for the middle classes, mainly comprising civil servants with institutional links to the Tunisian state, as well as for the affluent classes and businessmen and women in general. The first visa refusals primarily affected the most precarious categories, who then reacted by adopting a practice that has become increasingly dangerous thanks to progressively repressive technological and police measures, condemning them to take perilous routes. These categories have opted for clandestine departures in cargo containers, ships or handmade fishing boats to reach the northern shores of the Mediterranean.
In addition to the schengenization already underway, we should mention the singular international situation relating to the management of the Covid-19 pandemic, which began in 2020. The latter has had a considerable impact, exacerbating the sorting and the ban on movement. Generally speaking, intra-state travel is largely affected by security measures restricting freedom of movement. The 2020 spring lockdowns and the widespread adoption of telecommuting (telework), as well as the closure of several factories and production companies must be understood not only as measures of biopower in the foucaldian sense, but also as a laboratory of public policies regarding the ability to produce, apply and extend movement-restrictive measures. Long-distance travel was progressively hampered by the closure of borders and restrictions on movement. This exceptional period prompted many players to undertake in-depth reflections on our mobility system and lifestyles[7]. New individual and collective behaviors have emerged, and public policies have been put in place to anticipate post-pandemic changes, also known as “the world after”. However, it was the border issue for foreigners that emerged as the vanguard of the repressive policies that remained in force following the pandemic and public health restrictions.
In point of fact, French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin announced in this context, on September 29, 2021, a 30% reduction in the number of visas granted to Tunisian nationals compared with 2020, and a halving of that quota for Moroccans and Algerians. The reason given is the refusal of these countries to issue the consular passes required for the return of the deported immigrants from France. The French government’s aim is to “push the countries concerned to change their policy and agree to issue consular passes”[8]. Former government spokesperson Gabriel Attal asserted at the same time that “It’s a drastic decision, an unprecedented decision even, but it’s one made necessary by the fact that these countries won’t accept to take back nationals we do not want and cannot keep in France”[9].
This unprecedented situation leads us to collectively question the hypothesis of a continuous restriction of our movements, on which the migration policy has long been based. It also makes us think that visa refusal has become a trauma for people who previously had the right to travel.
[1] Antonietta Haddad, Gérard Haddad, Freud en Italie : Psychanalyse du voyage (Freud in Italy: Psychoanalysis of travel), Paris, Albin Michel. 1995.
[2] The article complements previous work dealing with the consequences of the schengenization of the Mediterranean on young Tunisians. It thus complements the study of the families of the dead and missing at sea, as well as the study of unconscious motivations for crossing the sea. See Wael Garnaoui, “Harga and Desire for the West in Time of Jihad”, the Research in Psychoanalysis journal, vol. 33, no. 1, 2022, pp. 81-95. Also: Wael Garnaoui, “European border externalization and Tunisian migration policies: A psychology of sociopolitical impacts”, the Confluences Méditerranée journal vol. 125, no. 2, 2023, pp. 107-122.
[3] Wael Garnaoui, Harga and desire for the West. Psychoanalytic study of Tunisian illegal migrants, Nirvana. Tunis. 2021
[4] Ruben Zaiotti, «La propagation de la sécurité : l’Europe et la schengenisation de la Politique de voisinage» (Spreading Security: Europe and the “Schengenization” of the Neighborhood Policy), the Cultures & Conflits journal, 66 | 2007, pp. 61-76.
[5] Ibid.
[6] The name has been changed for reasons of anonymity.
[7] Garnaoui, W & Ben Lazreg, H. 2020. “The Passport Paradox and the Advent of Immobility Justice”. Resetdoc, 8 june 2020.
[8] Le Monde. «Immigration : la France durcit “drastiquement” l’octroi de visas aux Algériens, Marocains et Tunisiens» (Immigration: France “drastically” tightens the granting of visas to Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians); 28-09-2021.
[9] Libération. «Maroc, Algérie et Tunisie : la France va durcir l’octroi des visas» (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia: France to tighten the granting of visas), 28-09-2021.