There is war in Europe – Africa is looking for its position
On 2 March 2022, during a United Nations General Assembly vote, the large majority of UN member states condemned Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Only Belarus, North Korea and Syria, along with one African country, Eritrea, voted with Russia against the resolution. Thirty-five countries abstained, including a conspicuous number of African states, such as Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Madagascar, Mali, Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the Central African Republic. In addition, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Eswatini, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Morocco and Togo did not even turn up to the vote.
This means that 28 out of 54 African states that voted, i.e. 51.85%, condemned Russia’s aggression. The Kenyan UN Security Council ambassador gave a remarkable speech in a UN-Security Council meeting in which he spoke about how Kenya had learned to peacefully resolve territorial claims and ethnic differences following the demise of the colonial empires and recognise the diversity resulting from the past instead of dwelling on dangerous nostalgia like Russia.[1]
The African Union (AU) also condemned the Russian aggression but the International Organisation of Francophonie, the organisation of French-speaking countries including many African member states, acted differently. The Secretary-General of the Francophonie, Louise Mushikiwabo, explained her organisation’s reticence on the issue of the Russian attack with the lack of consensus among the 88-member states. Mushikiwabo, a Rwandan, personally condemned Russia’s war of aggression. She stated that, based on her experience, she was all too aware of what it was like to be abandoned by the international community, as happened in the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[2]
There are very different reasons why individual African governments find it difficult to condemn Russia. As far as the Central African Republic and Mali are concerned, the reasons are obvious. Both governments got politically closer to Moscow. In both countries mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group operate, whose owner is the oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has close ties to Putin.[3] Given the proximity of the Russian mercenaries to Putin and their brutal approach in Africa and elsewhere,[4] it cannot be ignored that the rulers in Mali and the Central African Republic may even fear personal retribution should they openly oppose Russia.
Against interference
Some African governments did not abstain because of a particular dependence on Russia, even though Russia became the main arms supplier in many of these countries.[5] Foreign interference in internal affairs is generally frowned upon in several African states. After all, they have all repeatedly felt the brunt of political and military interference in the past. Many Africans believe that the West interferes too much on the continent whether in matters of economic reform or human rights. The fact that the People’s Republic of China insists on non-interference in the internal affairs of states further strengthens their stance. This is also true in the case of Ukraine, where China, like many African countries, abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly.
In practice, China is increasingly acting not too differently from the West, as evidenced by the growing use of private Chinese security firms to safeguard the economic interests of Chinese corporations against rebels, terrorists and activists. Over the past two decades, the People’s Republic of China has become the most important economic partner in almost all African states. This has reduced the financial and economic dependence of many African states on the USA, the EU and the major international finance organisations IMF and World Bank. The growing influence of China and other actors, such as Russia and, beyond that, Turkey, Brazil and India, allowed African states the opportunity to distance themselves from the West in matters of international policy or voting behaviour in international organisations.
Distance from the West
The distancing of African governments from the West is supported by large by the African population. National sovereignty is seen by many as an important goal. This is not surprising since many Africans experience their economic and social situation as foreign-determined. This has to do with the influence of western countries, often former colonial powers, and western NGOs on the economy and society.
In francophone Africa, where the old colonial power also intervened militarily time and again, hatred of France has even intensified because of Paris’ actions. In the context of violence and disinformation, as in the Sahel, a blocked military convoy incited an angry crowd in Burkina Faso that feared the French army was supplying weapons to the jihadists,[6] conspiracy myths prevail. Paris has become a scapegoat.[7]
Africa’s anger at the West also has to do with its military intervention on the continent. And, of course, with its failure to protect the population militarily, as in Rwanda in 1994 or the Congo. Africa has also become alienated because of the duplicity of the West where politicians and diplomats talk about democracy and the rule of law. When it comes to their hard interests, such as fighting terrorism or keeping migrants out, Western leaders, as always, are not afraid to make common cause with Africa’s autocrats. Germany too likes to talk about its value-oriented foreign policy. In the case of Senegal, which is often mistakenly considered a democratic model in Africa but where democracy has been under threat for years, Germany’s Africa policy lacks a clear compass. For Angela Merkel, Senegalese President Macky Sall had, as she said, become a friend.[8] For the bereaved families of the victims of the March 2021 police violence in Senegal, who protested against the arrest of opposition politician Ousmane Sonko, and who continue to wait for the Senegalese authorities to charge them, this must sound like mockery.
Africa’s autocrats are justified in their anger at the West. They promote anti-Western protests to the best of their ability as this helps to divert attention from their responsibilities. Like the ruler in the Kremlin, many African autocrats act in an extremely cynical manner – as Wole Soyinka recently criticised.[9] Like Putin, they don’t care about the exhortations and reminders of democracy and human rights.[10]
Far away – and possible new fault lines
In parts of the continent, however, there is simply the feeling that the war in Europe is none of their business. After all, the West does not really care about Africa. And when African refugees from Ukraine are discriminated against at the EU’s external border, as has happened, this reinforces the disinterest in dealing with the “white man’s war”.
But in the case of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, whose governments all abstained at the UN General Assembly, history may have played a role, as South African author Zakes Mda suggests. As elsewhere, many in the former liberation movements in southern Africa that were once supported by the Soviet Union have not yet fully adjusted to the idea that the man in the Kremlin is no longer a comrade.
Those African states that voted to condemn Russia in the UN General Assembly include many countries that continue to maintain very close relations with the West, such as Benin, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger and Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, Seychelles and Tunisia. But hybrid, illiberal and autocratic regimes also voted against Russia, such as Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Mauritania, Rwanda and Somalia. All these countries, although not democracies, maintain close ties to the West, for example, through military aid, as in the case of Egypt.
If the war in Ukraine leads to a new world order in which the West faces an alliance of Russia and China, this is likely to have an impact on Africa. Perhaps the vote in the UN General Assembly is an indication that the political map of Africa is being rearranged. In the future, democratic and Western-oriented states could face illiberal countries in Africa. [11]
Dr Armin Osmanovic is currently the Regional Director for RLS in North Africa (Tunis)
[1] Geoffrey Lutta, “Kenya’s Powerful Speech on Ukraine-Russia Crisis at UN Event Goes Viral [VIDEO]”, Kenyans.co.ke, 22 February 2022, https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/73274-kenyan-ambassador-makes-powerful-speech-ukraine-russia-crisis-global-event-video, accessed 14 March 2022.
[2] Louise Mushikiwabo, “Exclusif – Guerre en Ukraine: « Pourquoi l’OIF est restée silencieuse »”, jeune afrique,
4 March 2022, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1323210/politique/exclusif-guerre-en-ukraine-pourquoi-loif-est-restee-silencieuse-par-louise-mushikiwabo/, accessed 14 March 2022.
[3] Akram Kharief, “Wagner in Libya – combat and influence”, RLS North Africa, January 2022, https://rosaluxna.org/publications/wagner-in-libya-combat-and-influence/, accessed, 14 March 2022.
[4] Luke Harding and Jason Burke, The Guardian, “Russian mercenaries behind human rights abuses in CAR, say UN experts”, 30 March 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/russian-mercenaries-accused-of-human-rights-abuses-in-car-un-group-experts-wagner-group-violence-election, accessed 14 March 2022.
[5] Tatiana Kondratenko, “Russian arms exports to Africa: Moscow’s long-term strategy”, DW, 29 May 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/russian-arms-exports-to-africa-moscows-long-term-strategy/a-53596471, accessed 14 March 2022.
[6] Ouagadougou, Agnès Faivre, “Burkina: ce que dit le blocage du convoi militaire français à Kaya”, Le Point Afrique, 23 November 2021, https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/burkina-ce-que-dit-le-blocage-du-convoi-militaire-francais-a-kaya-23-11-2021-2453271_3826.php, accessed 14 March 2022.
[7] Rahmane Idrissa, “Du sentiment antifrançais au Sahel”, La Gazette Perpendiculaire, 22 Nov. 2021, https://rahmane.substack.com/p/du-sentiment-antifrancais-au-sahel?r=4rub&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&utm_source=twitter&s=r, accessed 14 March 2022.
[8] Der Bundeskanzler, “Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und Präsident Sall”, 27 Jan. 2020, https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/aktuelles/pressestatements-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-praesident-sall-1716288, accessed 14 March 2022.
[9] Kidi Bebey, “Wole Soyinka: « L’Afrique est pleine de ces caricatures d’hommes de pouvoir qui, comme Poutine, veulent en remontrer au monde », Le Monde, 1 Mar. 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/03/01/wole-soyinka-l-afrique-est-pleine-de-ces-caricatures-d-hommes-de-pouvoir-qui-comme-poutine-veulent-en-remontrer-au-monde_6115696_3212.html, accessed 14 March 2022.
[10] Mark Galeotti (2019): “We need to talk about Putin: How the West gets him wrong”, Ebury Press, London.
[11] Mahama Tawat, “Russia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN”, The Conversation,
8 Mar. 2022, https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663, accessed 14 March 2022.
Photo credit: picture alliance / Pacific Press | Lev Radin
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