Publications
July 2025

The Secret Warfare Techniques of the United Arab Emirates in Libya and Sudan

Article by Akram Kharief / RLS

Introduction

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, Libya emerged as a strategic battleground for regional and international powers. Among them, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has built a discreet yet consistent—and above all decisive—presence there, at the crossroads of security, economic, and ideological interests. But Abu Dhabi’s influence goes beyond Libya’s borders: it extends to Sudan, particularly in the Darfur region, and as far as the port city of Bosaso in Somalia—a key logistics pivot in a broader regional ambition.

This article analyzes this power strategy along three axes: military operations, indirect influence, and legal maneuvering. Drawing on OSINT data, expert reports, open media sources, and specialized publications, it offers an integrated understanding of Abu Dhabi’s hybrid interference dynamics in these tension zones.

Military Axis: Remote Projection, Logistical Support, and Proxy Warfare

Since 2014, the UAE has developed a multiscale military framework that allows action across various theaters without a large conventional presence. This approach relies primarily on three mechanisms: aerial logistical support, military equipment supplied to allied groups, and the use of non-state actors as extensions of its foreign policy.

Though limited in manpower, this strategy entails significant economic investment in infrastructure. In Libya, the UAE has turned al-Khadim Airbase, east of Benghazi, into the nerve center of its operations. Expanded several times and equipped with modern capabilities, it has hosted Chinese Wing Loong II drones since 2016. Operated and maintained by Emirati teams, these UAVs support the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The base has also been used for targeted strikes in southern Libya against al-Qaeda, ISIS affiliates, and Haftar’s rivals.

Meanwhile, dozens of military cargo flights from Abu Dhabi or al-Dhafra Airbase have been recorded en route to Benghazi and Tobruk. Often operated by front companies such as Reem Air or Global Aviation Logistics, these flights transport ammunition, spare parts, armored vehicles, and surveillance gear. This constant airlift allows Haftar to sustain offensive capabilities despite the UN arms embargo.

In Sudan, the UAE has provided direct support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) since the outbreak of conflict. This support includes arms shipments, intelligence sharing, and logistical assistance. Several air cargo deliveries from Abu Dhabi to Nyala in Darfur—some routed via Bosaso, Somalia—were observed between 2023 and 2025. This enabled the RSF to maintain control over parts of Darfur and Kordofan, despite resistance from the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Finally, Bosaso plays a central role as a discreet logistics entry point. This port in Puntland (a semi-autonomous Somali region), officially managed by a DP World subsidiary, serves as a logistics hub for the transshipment of military equipment to Libya and Sudan. Uninspected containers pass through here, loaded onto commercial ships heading to ports controlled by Emirati allies.

Inset – Puntland Overview

Puntland is an autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, established in 1998. Unlike Somaliland, it does not seek independence, but instead maintains its own institutions.
Strategically located along the Gulf of Aden, it houses the key port of Bosaso and serves as a forward base against piracy and terrorism. Puntland is also a zone of geopolitical rivalry, notably between the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey.
The UAE has built a military base there and trained local security units, consolidating its presence in the Horn of Africa.

Indirect Axis: Soft Power, Ideological Levers, and Economic Control

Beyond military power, the UAE’s strategy is built on indirect influence, grounded in three pillars: ideological financing, targeted economic investments, and the use of civilian or humanitarian actors as tools of influence.

In eastern Libya, the UAE actively supports Madkhalist Salafi networks, ideologically aligned with Riyadh and loyal to authority. These groups, tolerated or even encouraged by Haftar, serve as counterweights to the Muslim Brotherhood and autonomous militias. In return, they promote a version of Islam that legitimizes authority, quells public dissent, and rejects politicized religion.

Inset – The Madkhalist Movement: Loyalist Salafism in Service of Power

Named after Saudi cleric Rabee’ al-Madkhali, Madkhalism is a Salafi movement that emerged in the 1990s that promotes strict obedience to authority—even unjust rulers—and strongly opposes political Islam like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Supported by elements within the Saudi regime, Madkhalist preachers such as Rabee’ al-Madkhali, Muhammad al-Banna, and Ubayd al-Jabiri have extended their influence into North Africa, particularly Libya post-Gaddafi.
In Haftar-controlled areas, the movement became institutionalized: Madkhalist-affiliated brigades and preachers like Ashraf al-Mayyar and Jalal al-Mahdi play prominent religious and security roles, using mosques as ideological strongholds.

The UAE also invests in infrastructure and services. In Benghazi, firms close to the Emirati regime have contributed to post-war reconstruction in construction, telecommunications, and private security. This economic engagement portrays Abu Dhabi as a development partner while deepening its local influence.

In southern Libya near the Algerian border, one notable figure is Mabrouka Cherif—former protocol chief and confidante of Gaddafi—now Haftar’s representative in Ghat, who leads local development thanks to Emirati funding.

In Sudan, UAE-Hemedti ties extend to the gold sector. Emirati firms have been accused of purchasing illicitly mined gold from RSF-controlled areas via opaque routes through Dubai. This black market deprives the Sudanese state of revenue and boosts RSF’s financial autonomy, placing it outside any budgetary oversight.

In Bosaso, soft power includes community development projects, port cooperation agreements, and targeted humanitarian aid. Again, the line between economic interests, humanitarian diplomacy, and strategic goals is blurred—but effective. The port and airport provide the breakaway region with state-like features and have turned it into a thriving commercial hub.

Legal Axis: Navigating Grey Areas and Circumventing International Law

A defining feature of the UAE’s strategy is its ability to operate within legal loopholes, therefore avoiding sanctions. In both Libya and Sudan, Abu Dhabi has refined sophisticated legal evasion techniques—exploiting gaps in multilateral regulations, using private or foreign intermediaries, and disguising operations under civilian covers. Moreover, the UAE enjoys near-impunity from Western capitals, which often overlook its role in arms and gold trafficking.

Since 2011, Libya has been under a UN arms embargo (Security Council Resolution 1970). Nevertheless, multiple UN Panel of Experts reports have documented repeated Emirati arms deliveries to Haftar’s camp. Between April and July 2025, over 30 military Il-76 flights were recorded between the UAE and Benghazi, some operated by private firms contracted by Abu Dhabi, like Sky Prime Aviation and Rubystar Airways.

Inset – UN Resolution 1970: Libya Arms Embargo

Adopted on February 26, 2011, UNSC Resolution 1970 imposes a total arms embargo on Libya in response to the Gaddafi regime’s crackdown. The goal: prevent military escalation and protect civilians.
Despite the ban, the embargo has been widely violated by several states and actors, contributing to conflict prolongation.

The UAE prefers to delegate force to intermediaries: the Libyan National Army, Sudan’s RSF, or private military companies (e.g., Black Shield, Allegiance). This outsourcing provides plausible deniability from the violence while ensuring operational influence.

The case of Bosaso illustrates this hybrid model. Officially leased for commercial use by UAE firm DP World, the port also serves as a launch point for military shipments to Libya and Sudan. According to several sources, containers loaded in Bosaso were later spotted in Benghazi after transiting indirectly via maritime routes through the Suez Canal.

Finally, this legal strategy wouldn’t work without the complacency or paralysis of international institutions. The Security Council has never sanctioned the UAE directly for its role in Libya. Oversight mechanisms—such as the 1970 Committee or the UN Sudan Panel—lack resources, political will, or diplomatic consensus to act. UAE-made military equipment used by Haftar’s militias has often gone unnoticed by the international community.

Conclusion

The UAE conducts a discreet yet structured power strategy in Libya, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. Far from ad hoc interventions, this approach is rooted in three principles: military projection without territorial footprint, ideological and economic soft influence, and legal grey-zone exploitation. The goal is clear: to position Abu Dhabi as a key security player in Africa—without using traditional tools of domination.

This territorial and functional web reflects a new kind of foreign presence: mobile, modular, legally ambiguous, and deeply embedded in local geopolitical lines. It allows the UAE to adapt to shifting alliances, bypass diplomatic pressure, and cement its power in the gaps created by disorder.

Multilateral institutions now face a dilemma: tolerate such strategies as a lesser evil amid chaos, or try to reassert weakened legal and political norms. The risk today is that conflict zones may spread into previously “stable” countries—such as Chad, now entangled in Sudan’s war, or even Algeria, home to a sizable Madkhalist community. Tensions between this faction and the Muslim Brotherhood—also present in Algeria—could escalate into open conflict.

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