The North African Foreign Fighter Returnees After the Fall of al-Assad’s Regime: Risks, Challenges and Scenarios
Introduction:
On December 10, 2024, and following a lightening offensive spearheaded by Harakat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), the most powerful Syrian armed rebel group adhering to Salafi ideology , the Bashar al-Assad regime collapsed. A few days later, a certain Ahmed Mansour, an Egyptian foreign fighter and field commander of HTS, issued a post on Telegram declaring “It’s your turn, dictator” addressing the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sissi. By doing so , he was explicitly calling for the toppling of the Egyptian regime[1]. Although arrested shortly afterward by the new Syrian authorities, this incident raised the immediate concern of the North African countries about the foreign fighters of HTS and its allies still present in Syria[2].
Indeed, between 2011 and 2015, the Soufan Group estimates that among the 40,r000 foreign fighters that went to Syria and Iraq to join jihadi groups, at the very least 6000 originated from North Africa, the vast majority of whom joined the Islamic State (IS)[3]. For its part, the African Union (AU) provided a slightly higher figure of 7000 fighters[4]. Over 3000 of them came from Tunisia making them the fourth largest contingent of foreign fighters in the Levant. Many Tunisians ended up holding key leadership positions in the most radical jihadi factions especially IS[5]. The Libyan foreign fighters for their part became notorious via their own brigade, Katibat Al Battar Al Libi (KBL), an elite striking force of IS, which took part in several decisive battles of the group between 2013-early 2014[6]. More than that, and with the aim of creating an affiliate in North Africa, IS leadership sent back hundreds of KBL fighters to Libya in the mid-2014. Merging with local Libyan jihadi factions in the city of Derna, they created the Islamic State of Libya (ISL), which briefly one of the most powerful IS affiliate. Meanwhile, the Moroccan foreign fighters, supported by Algerian and Egyptian fighters created in 2013 Harakat Sham Al Islam (HSI) [7], a very powerful brigade, close to Jabhat Al Nusra (JAN), the then official affiliate of Al Qaeda (AQ) in Syria. Following the death of its founders as well as heavy casualties, HSI ceased de facto to exist by 2014. Most of its surviving members joined other jihadi organizations essentially IS. Finally, an estimated of 400 to 600 Egyptians fighters went to Syria during that same period. While most of the other north Africans had joined IS, in the case of the Egyptians, this was less clear. Indeed, historically speaking, the Egyptian jihadists had strong ties with AQ, whose leader at the time Ayman Al Zawahiri, was an Egyptian himself, as well as to other Islamist factions such as the Muslim Brothers (MB)[8]. Thus, Egyptians fighters were spread among many jihadi factions rather than exclusively IS.
However, between 2015 and 2017, bolstered by Russian and Iranian support, the troops of the Assad regime reconquered most of Syria except the province of Idleb where most the jihadi factions retreated. IS for its part, by 2019, under the pressure of Assad troop’s offensives as well as the Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had lost all the territories it had once controlled in eastern Syria, reversing to a guerilla organization. Thus between 2020 and 2024, most of the armed jihadi groups were contained in the province of Idleb. In conjunction with those events and “reversal of fortune”, starting from 2016, an important phenomenon appeared: the return of the foreign fighters to their home countries. While the figures remain uncertain, the United Nations (UN) estimated by 2018, that over 5800 foreign fighters had returned to their home countries. Among these, around 1500 were North Africans, mostly Tunisians. In term of casualties, experts assessed that about half of the North Africans Foreign Fighters (NAFF), i.e around 3000, had been killed during the fighting (2011 and 2019)[9]. This left the whereabouts of several hundreds of them very uncertain.
According to various sources, hundreds had been captured and jailed either in the Syrian-Iraqi prisons or in the SDF prisoner camps in eastern Syria. Hundreds of others who were part of the various jihadi groups, mostly HTS and to a lesser extent, Huras Al Dine (HAD) who had become AQ affiliate in Syria, were believed to be in Idleb. Finally, there were those who remained with IS, pursuing a relentless violent guerrilla in eastern Syria since 2019.
In this context, the fall of the Assad at the hands of the jihadi HTS and its allies “redistributed the cards” by bringing back to the forefront the threat of the foreign fighter’s returnees especially in North Africa. Reflecting on this, a Tunisian expert explained that in Tunis “while the authorities have remained generally silent, they are clearly reluctant to favor any return. There are legitimate fears caused by the threats caused by those potential returnees. The declarations of the Egyptian [i.e Ahmed Mansour] triggered major concerns here and understandably so”[10]. The fact that those potential returnees are very different from their 2016-2019 predecessors was an additional source of concern: they would be coming back bolstered by a decisive victory rather than a terrible defeat.
Consequently , this new configuration raises many questions: What will those foreign fighters do? Will they stay in Syria or return to their home countries? Will they try to join other zones of conflicts such as Libya or the Sahel? What will be the position of the new Syrian authorities in Damascus on this major issue? These are key critical questions, which will impact the stability of all the North African countries. While HTS is currently the most powerful faction in Syria, several other radical groups remain outside of its control—raising the risk of a resurgent Islamic State.
Accordingly, this paper aims at assessing the risks and challenges posed by a potential return of the NAFF to their home countries as well as examining potential future scenarios and outcomes regarding this issue.
I-Assessing the potential risks posed by the North African fighters returnees:
I.(1)-The foreign fighters returnees: Who are they and what risk do they pose?
Considered as extremely dangerous, the mere mentioning of foreign fighter returnees or the potential candidates for return provokes apprehension, alarm and fear. Indeed, their presence raises several security concerns regarding their level of dangerousness as well as the possibility and opportunity of reinserting them into their societies. In this regard, Walter Bruyere-Ostells[11] considers that these “returnees” have usually been subjected and accustomed to an extreme level of violence making any reinsertion at the very least difficult if not impossible. Moreover, he questions the potential for a real deradicalization of these individuals’ vs them practicing dissimulation i.e taquiya[12].
For their part, Mohamed Hafez[13] and Daniel Byman[14] consider that the foreign fighter returnees are very dangerous for several reasons including a rather high level of military training, their socialization to extremist ideas, they are highly tolerant to extreme forms of violence as well as the fact they are usually part of transnational networks of solidarity which are extremely useful for transnational terrorism. To that extent, David Malet[15] argues that foreign fighter returnees constitute a high risk for their home countries especially when these lack any rehabilitation and reinsertion program. Similarly, Richard Barett[16] points to the fact that often these returnees suffer from psychological distress and PTSD creating major difficulties to reinsert themselves in their societies. In this context, there is a high possibility of relapsing into violent extremism.
What is a foreign fighter and what is a returnee? These are two distinct complex concepts, which lie at the very heart of the concerns created by the fall of the Assad regime.
David Malet defines a foreign fighter as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts” for various ideological motivations (communists, nationalists, jihadists etc.)[17].
For his part Thomas Heghammer[18] defines a foreign fighter as an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) is unpaid. For Byman, foreign fighters are “individuals who travel to a country other than their own to join an illicit group and perpetrate or assist in terrorist attacks or armed conflicts”[19]. The major issue arises after the end of these conflicts, when they decide to return to their home countries.
In this respect , Kim Cragin’s[20] recent studies show that in most cases, foreign fighters are more likely to return to their homes countries rather than go to other areas of conflict. In fact ,based on experiences, David Malet and Rachel Hayes[21] argue that foreign fighter returnees usually follow three distinct paths/threats: (1) Those who go back to their home countries to commit attacks; (2) those who go back to create dormant cells for future attacks; (3) those who disengage from terrorism but remain radicalized. Richard Barett adds to these categories[22] those who come back and then immediately leave for other conflict zones to link up with other jihadi groups.
In this context their combat experience and their radical cognitive change, i.e. radical ideas pose a major threat to local authorities. Indeed, because of their ideological convictions, they might be prompted to challenge the established political-social order of their home countries. This was especially the case of the jihadi foreign fighters since their first emergence in the 1980’s. This threat is aggravated by what one may call the “multiplier effect” that is those returnees covered with their aura are usually able to recruit, radicalize and train local youths, starting local uprisings.
I.(2) –North Africa and Foreign Fighters Returnees: A Brief History of Violence
In the context of North Africa, foreign fighters are more than a risk. They are associated with a long-standing reality and history of violence that began in the 1980’ and the fate what was called then the “Arab Afghans”[23]. Between 1979 and 1989, thousands of young people left Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to Peshawar in Pakistan. They joined the training camps of Abdullah Azzam and Ossama Bin Laden to participate in the ‘global jihad’ against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. Upon their return in their home countries in the late 1980’s and on the very instruction of Bin Laden, they created local jihadi groups, launching extremely violent local uprisings. Among these, the notorious and extremely violent Algerian Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) ancestor of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the Jamaa Al Islamiyah in Egypt, all of which caused tens of thousands of casualties, especially in Algeria, and catastrophic material destruction[24]. In Morocco and Tunisia, the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (MIFG)[25] and the Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group (TIFG)[26] were also created. While those two were unable to provoke any uprising on the scaler of their counterparts in the other Arab countries, they nonetheless perpetrated attacks and provided some support to their fellow jihadists via their transnational networks.
More recently, the Islamic State in Libya (ISL), emerged of a merger between Khalid bin Walid Brigade KLB and local jihadi groups. At its peak in 2015-2016, ISL controlled large swaths of northern Libya, launched several assaults against Tunisia, and became a potential major source of destabilization for Egypt and Algeria while directly threatening Europe[27]. In Egypt, while no exact figures exist, several Egyptian fighters are suspected to have returned in 2014 to Egypt . Once back, there are indications that many linked up and boosted the IS local affiliate, Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis, then conducting a violent insurgency in the deserts of the Sinai Peninsula[28]. In the Sahel, and starting from 2020-21, several ,though unconfirmed, reports surfaced mentioning the potential presence of Libyan and Egyptian foreign fighter returnees among the Islamic State in Grand Sahara (ISGS)[29]. In this context, during a meeting of the African Union (A.U), the then Algerian minister of foreign affairs Abdelkader Messahel, declared: “the region is threatened by the return of DAESH (i.e., IS) foreign fighters … The information we have indicates that their return will take place in our region…”[30]. Similarly, Smail Chergui, the then A.U Commissioner for Peace and Security, stated that “the return of these elements in Africa, notably in North Africa, will pose a major threat to the national security and stability of the concerned countries”[31]. However, the threat at the time did not materialize.
In fact, for many North African foreign fighters (NAFF), the reality of the war in Syria-Iraq did not live up to their dreams. Instead of a perfect “Islamic caliphate”, they faced total defeat, extreme violence and intense fratricidal inter-jihadi conflicts between the various factions. As a result, many started to return to their home countries where they faced legal prosecution but also benefited, depending on the country, from deradicalization, rehabilitation and reinsertion programs. In the Sahel, the rumors about the presence of returnees remained unconfirmed. Reflecting on this, Serge Daniel, commented that “ while this cannot be excluded, so far, there is a sort of a fantasy on this issue of NAFF returning from Syria and linking up to the Sahelian jihadi groups via Libya”[32]. By 2019-2020, the threat of the returnees seemed to have been circumvented, if not fully resolved.
However, this analysis completely ignored and dismissed the issue of NAFF who had remained in the ranks of HTS and its allies, trapped in Idleb. The assumption was that as they were being contained, and could not leave Syria, they presented no imminent threat. This was even more the perception concerning the hundreds of former fighters who were held in the Syrian jails prisons or SDF detention camps. . In the case of the latter, their fate was to be the subject of negotiations between the Syrian government and their home countries, who in most cases were unwilling to take them back.
Therefore, the entirely y unexpected collapse of the al-Assad regime in 2024 at the hands of HTS, led to the immediate resurgence of concerns in North Africa regarding those who “never returned”. Indeed, now that the war was following a decisive victory, the NAFF could be tempted to come home and “restart local jihads” to overthrow the local regimes.
II- Mapping out the Threat of the North African Foreign Fighters (NAFF) After the Fall of the al-Assad Regime:
II.(1)-The Categories of NAFF in Syria Post-Assad:
The concerns raised by the actual NAFF present in Syria are more acute and multiple than their predecessors. The first concern is related to their numbers as these remain completely unknown or at best vague estimates. The second concern is also about their allegiances and to which group they belong to, given the presence of multiple radical jihadi factions ranging from the major ones such as HTS or HAD to extremely small ones. There is also no reliable information on their possible future motivations and intentions. All of this is aggravated by the context of post-Assad Syria where the new authorities experience difficulties in asserting their control over the territory, split under the control various factions some of which are rival or opposed to HTS. In that extremely complex context, it is possible to potentially identify four categories of NAFF who might be tempted to return to their home countries.
Thus, an expert explained that “while it is very hazardous to give an estimation, the first category of NAFF and thus of potential returnees still in Syria can reasonably argue to be those presents in Idlib at the moment of the offensive of HTS. They are estimated to be in the low hundreds. The vast majority of these are part of HTS”[33]. We may find some others in smaller allied factions and brigades of HTS such as the French- dominated Ansar Al Tawhid. However, those not affiliated with HTS are most likely found within al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate, i.e., Hurras al-Din (HAD).
Then, the second category of potential returnees is the NAFF who were taken prisoners by the al-Assad forces especially during the 2016-2019 counteroffensives. Most of them were held in the military prison of Homs until the fall of the regime in December 2024. According to this expert, their exact numbers are unknown but likely in the several hundred. He adds that while the data and information must be treated with extreme precaution, most of these now “former inmates” would be originally from Tunisia[34] and Libya[35]. As for the Algerian, Egyptian and Moroccan former detainees, several observers estimate their numbers to be no more than a few dozen.
The third group of NAFF potential returnees would be those held as prisoners by Kurdish dominated SDF in eastern Syria especially in the camp of al-Hawl. According to one observer and another knowledgeable person on those issues[36], the SDF were at the forefront of battles against IS in 2016-2017 in eastern Syria especially in Raqqa. Given that most of the NAFF were members of IS, it is within the SDF prisoner camps that most of the “imprisoned” fighters—many with their families—are now located.[37].
The fourth and final category would be regarding the potential presence of NAFF within the radical jihadi non-HTS-affiliated groups, essentially IS. Indeed, despite its defeat in 2019, IS has conducted an extremely violent guerrilla against the SDF and the al-Assad troops over the years in the Syrian desert of al-Badiya. At this point, there is no accurate information regarding the presence of foreign fighters among its ranks, especially all North African ones. However, given the history of the North African fighters within the ranks of IS, it is possible to speculate that some may have remained active, taking part in its attacks over the years.
In fact, the total absence of any exact information on how many fighters remained in Syria after 2019 or on their membership in the armed groups increases the uncertainties and the perception of potential threat to the stability of the North African countries.
II.(2)-The Threat of “Potential Returnees” from Syria:
The most potentially dangerous category of returnees is without doubt the first one, i.e. those members of HTS and its affiliated groups. The fact is that at the difference of 2017-2019 returnees whose experience was marked by total defeat and disillusion, these on the contrary participated to the ultimate “victory” against the Assad regime and his key powerful allies: (1) Hezbollah, considered as of the most powerful armed non state actor in the world, (2) Iran, a major regional power and (3) above all Russia, a world major power. Thus, and very much like their distant predecessors, the “Afghan Arabs of the 80’s” who saw themselves as sorts of missionary fighters of the jihad armed with a sense of destiny, these could as well share a similar sense. They could become a highly trained transnational force, extremely motivated and bolstered with a sense of invulnerability after this ‘unexpected’ and total victory against so powerful enemies[38]. Already, Charles Lister reported that several radical Syrian jihadi leaders have been making statements and sharing ideas of continuing a global Jihad[39]. In other instances, several fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party (Uyghurs) have been explained that “We have been waging jihad in the north in Idlib for ten years,’ With the permission of God, we prevailed over the Assad regime…. God willing, we’ll go and wage jihad against China…. We’ll end the misery of our Muslim brothers there’[40]. Thus, Syria in this case would serve as a launching basis for these “transnational jihadists” from this first category, who come from all the horizons including North Africa.
Therefore potential NAFF from this first category tempted to come back and continue the jihad, could try to do so using their transnational networks via Libya or, return directly using fake Syrian papers. Concerning Tunisia and the Maghreb, General Mokhtar Ben Nasr, the former head of the Tunisian counter terrorism commission, explains that this category is composed of a group of fighters who have been in Syria for 14 years along with their families, including children who now have become adults. For Gen. Bel Mokhtar, they present a major risk as they are likely to be a highly radicalized ideologically motivated group of people bolstered by the fall of Assad. Upon their return, the hypothesis that they could link up with local active radical groups or dormant cells in North Africa is very real[41]. This assessment on the level of danger posed by this first category of foreign fighters is shared by another a Tunisian official for whom the most dangerous returnees are “usually the last ones that come back”. For him, “they are the ones who stayed and fought until the very end undeterred by the changing circumstances”. They totally embrace the ideological orientations of their organization and benefit from very high-quality military training[42]. In this case, the collapse of the Assad regime and their perception of total victory “against such large forces” could only galvanize them. Accordingly, and via illegal migration networks or pseudo-NGOs, enter Libya or their countries of origin and then destabilize the entire North African region.[43]. For Ezz Adin Al Aquil, a Libyan expert, “in such a scenario, Libya remains the weakest link in the Maghreb with regard to the possibility of infiltration by Maghrebi extremists returning from Syria attempting to penetrate North Africa to commit attacks or seeking to link up with potential local dormant radical cells for future attacks”[44]. In fact, a regular basis, the authorities in the Maghreb region announce the dismantling of local terrorist cells which supports this hypothesis.
II.(3)-Creating Training Camps in Syria for Jihadi Groups:
Besides returning to their home countries, there is the risk posed by the foreign fighters of turning Syria into a rear base and “safe heaven” from which they launch attacks against other countries and provide training for incoming recruits. These would be outside of the control of the local post-Assad authorities. In this case, jihadists from all over the world, including from North Africa would come and train in those camps before returning their home countries or go to other areas of conflicts. This scenario would be similar to what was observed in previous cases especially Afghanistan in the 1990’s and Libya post 2011. In both cases, hundreds if not thousands of North Africans went to train in Jihadi camps in those two countries and then rallied Chechnya and Bosnia in the 1990’s, and Syria-Iraq between 2011 and 2014. These camps in Afghanistan also served as a logistical support hubs (for finance, training networks,etc.) for the local jihads ongoing at the time in Algeria, Libya and Egypt in the 1990’s. A similar pattern occurred in the Sahel, where jihadi groups used Libya as a rear base.
Could Syria, then, be turned into a new “Jihadistan”? While since its very creation in 2017, HTS has clearly rejected this option, the concern is raised by the other Salafi-jihadi groups present in the country.
In that regard, one the of most important risk comes from the powerful HAD organization, the official affiliate of AQ in Syria. HAD emerged as a result of the rejection by HTS of AQ orientations and leadership. Indeed, HTS was created in 2018as a merger of several Salafi-jihadi groups, including the powerful Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate from 2011 to 2017.. However, HTS underwent a major shift, rebranding itself as a Syrian Salafi organization that renounced transnational jihadism, under the leadership Mohamed al-Sharaa aka Abou Mohammed Al Julani, until then the leader of Al Nusra[45]. HTS’s transformation was a complete break from its ties with al-Qaeda (AQ).. In that context, the foreign fighters component of Al Nusra wishing to remain loyal to AQ decided to create their own organization HAD and pledged allegiance to Ayman Al Zawahiri, endorsing AQ goals[46]. While pursuing a cooperative strategy with all the other Salafi jihadi groups, especially HTS, HAD nonetheless followed its own global jihad objectives, aligned with those of AQ. Thus, HAD harbored a significant number of NAFF. In fact, it is worth noting that several of its key leaders were NAFF. An illustration of this, a US drone strike in 2019 in the province Idlib killed 6 of HAD top leaders including “two Algerians, two Tunisians and one Egyptian”[47]. Thus, HAD not aligned with HTS goals ,and taking advantage of post-Assad chaos, could use Syria for the global operations of AQ.
This issue of other organizations becomes even more pressing when it comes to IS. Radical and totally opposed to HTS, IS may take advantage of the situation to try to rebuild itself. Indeed, while defeated in 2019 and having lost most of its leadership, it has nonetheless been able to mount an effective guerrilla since 2020 in the eastern Syrian desert. Taking advantage of the inability of the former regime to control the territory, IS inflicted heavy losses on both the SDF and Bashar al-Assad’s army. Thus and in this context of a difficult transition and inter-factions’ conflict, IS could potentially rise one more time. This presents a major threat for the North African countries, as most of the NAFF who went to Syria-Iraq between 2011-2014 had joined IS. At this point, and while there are no figures or data on the remaining presence of NAFF among IS, this hypothesis cannot be excluded and is thus very plausible.
Against this backdrop of fragmentation among jihadi factions, and the presence of various types of foreign fighters in post-Assad Syria, it raises uncertainties about their future trajectories and intentions. Thus, what are the possible scenarios for the future?
Based on past experiences, various declarations of the new Syrian authorities and the data available, it is possible to draw three potential scenarios for the NAFF that have remained in Syria after the fall of Assad: (1) ‘The Bosnian model”: The new Syrian authorities decide to fully integrate the foreign fighters into the Syrian Society while preventing and suppressing any attempt to transform the country into a rear base for a global jihad. (2) they decide to continue jihad either in Syria itself, or in other conflict zones, including their own countries. (3) They decide to return to their home countries and reintegrate their respective societies benefiting from the various existing deradicalization-rehabilitation legal frameworks that exist.
III- What Are the Potential Future Scenarios:
III.(1)-The “Bosnian Model”: Integration of the Foreign Fighters into the Syrian Society
Within days of the fall of the Assad regime, the international community expressed its grave concern about the fate of the foreign fighters that had remained in Syria in addition to potential resurgence of IS. As a matter of fact and preempting this risk, the US and its allies conducted between December 2024 and January 2025 massive airstrikes against IS targets[48] as well as HAD killing one of its top senior operatives[49]. In this context and part of his strategy to achieve international respectability and rebuild the Syrian State, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa aka Abu Mohamed Al Joulani leader of HTS understood that this issue had to be addressed without delay.
For Omar Mousa, a Syrian journalist close to al-Sharaa: “We have to agree that the foreign volunteers have fought with us for ten years, fought battles on all fronts, ..I believe the new leadership will find a new solution for them. We won’t kick out the people who have fought with us. The leadership believes that we are in their debt….’[50]. This line of thinking reflected the position of many key leaders of HTS, including al-Sharaa himself, who concluded that the best way to prevent the foreign fighters from becoming a threat to both Syria and the international community was to directly and fully integrate them into the Syrian Society: the ‘Bosnian Model’.
Indeed, between 1992-1995, nearly 1000 Arab jihadi fighters, among whom 20% were Tunisians and many others Algerians and Egyptians, relocated from Afghanistan to Bosnia to fight on the side of the Muslims against the Serbs and Croatians militias. At the peak of the war, those jihadists formed the so-called “Mujahideen Battalion” participating in several key engagements and battles. They became known for their temerity but also their extreme violence.
Following the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which ended the war, the fate of these fighters became a major issue as it was stipulated in the accord that all of them had to leave Bosnia[51]. In order to bypass this part of the DPA and in gratitude for their commitment, as well as to prevent Bosnia from becoming a “safe haven” for these jihadists, the then-President Alija Izetbegovic decided to grant them the full Bosnian citizenship[52]. The purpose of the Bosnian authorities at the time was to prevent those “former fighters” from joining other zones of conflicts, perpetrate attacks abroad and least of all, to prevent them from turning the country into “a jihadistan”. By following this strategy, Sarajevo aimed at “softly disarming them ” and allowing them to marry local women and settle in what would become their new country of adoption. They would fully be integrated in the Bosnian society and were to be provided with full access to housing, jobs, social benefits, invalidity pensions, recognition etc. like all the other citizens. In doing so, the purpose was to stave off any of them becoming a threat to the international community and their home countries. Moreover, those fighters would not have to go back to their home countries where they would potentially be facing legal prosecution. Thus, and depending on the sources, between 400 and 700 of these Arab fighters chose this option. Those who refused left Bosnia for other areas of conflict including Chechnya and Afghanistan. Could this be a viable option for post-Assad Syria?
In January 2025, part of this strategy to integrate the foreign fighters into the Syrian State-Society, the new Syrian authorities announced that several foreign fighters who were high commanding officers of HTS were promoted major leadership positions in the newly created Syrian army[53]. Moreover, the authorities announced that they were considering granting citizenship to foreigners who have been living in Syria for a certain amount of time and who fought in the ranks of HTS[54]. This followed statements made by al-Sharaa in late December 2024 on that fact that the foreign fighters who supported the offensive against the Assad regime ‘should be celebrated’. This mirrored the position of the Bosnian leadership in 1995 prior to the decision of granting them citizenship.
Accordingly, and with regard specifically to the NAFF of HTS and affiliated brigades, a Tunisian specialist considered it is very likely that they will choose this option i.e. acquiring the Syrian citizenship, especially the Tunisians. He explains that this would be motivated by the fact that in Tunisia, being part of these organizations is a grave criminal offense severely punished by the law unlike Algeria, Morocco and Egypt, there are absolutely no programs for deradicalization and rehabilitation which provide legal-socio-economic incentives for the foreign fighters to return[55]. Moreover, he considers that “the recent political evolution in Tunisia and political restrictions” may further convince them to stay in Syria rather than returning[56]. who argues that NAFF, being Arab-Sunni Muslims, face fewer language, religious, or cultural barriers in Syria compared to other foreign fighters, if any.[57]. He underlines that in fact, they are already fully integrated in the Syrian socio-cultural environment. As he explains, most of them have been in Syria for over 12 years, settled with their families and properties. He adds that in Idlib, almost all of them were already part of HTS. They already held ,and still hold, major positions in the military-political machinery of the organization. In this context, it is highly unlikely that they will return to their home countries and will instead continue their “life trajectory”. In this context, acquiring the Syrian citizenship would be a legal formality to be fully integrated into a society they are already part of. In fact, he considers that they would not want to leave a political order (i.e. post Assad Syria) that they actually fought for and helped build. As a result, most if not all of the NAFF of HTS are to be expected to stay in Syria and to be appointed to various positions in the new army, police and bureaucracy i.e. continue to hold their offices[58]. Moreover, ideologically speaking, those fighters are highly unlikely to want to return to what they may perceive as secular states (North African ones) especially after living under Islamic law for so long in Idlib under HTS rule.
In addition to this, there are also several cases of so-called “former fighters” no longer affiliated with any faction and now settled in Syria. Several cases have been reported especially concerning former French fighters fully integrated in Idleb running small businesses such as coffee shops or restaurants. They made it very clear that they had no intention of returning to Europe[59]. Similar cases of former NAFF are very likely to exist where individuals have decided to stay and go on with their lives, living in the Islamic emirate of Idlib. They would have disengaged from violence and any activity related to armed groups while remaining radical in terms of ideological thought. These are very likely to opt for acquiring full Syrian citizenship as well.
Some of the former detainees from the Syrian military prisons are also believed to potentially accept this option of acquiring the Syrian citizenship. In that regard, an observer[60] explains that in their case, one must consider what he calls “two sub-categories of former North African detainees:: (1) the former jihadists captured during the war especially between 2017-2019 and (2) an important number of former fighters from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other non-jihadi rebel groups, mostly captured between 2012-2013, that is before the rise of the jihadi groups. Regarding the first sub-category, i.e. former jihadists, as they are not anymore part of any jihadi group, and having no attach in the Syrian society at all, they might be tempted to return to their home countries. However, according one observer and while in theory this would be possible, they would likely face the risk of long judicial procedures as former jihadists[61]. Thus, for him it is possible that some of them would prefer to stay in Syria and choose to acquire the Syrian citizenship, integrating themselves in the Syrian society. This observer cautions however that their ability to insert themselves in society would be severely hindered by the lack of any social network to help them in this process (families, friends associations etc.) aggravated by the absence of any official State strategy and program of rehabilitation. The same reasoning is applicable for the former FSA prisoners who might not have been jihadists and thus could pretend to return to their home countries. However as there are no indication of “their ideological trajectory in jail” nor possibility to really distinguish between former FSA from jihadists jihadist inmates, they could also be facing judicial procedures. Thus, some individuals belonging to this second sub-category of former detainees may as well potentially opt for acquiring the Syrian citizenship and attempt to insert themselves into the Syrian society at the risk of facing immense challenges.
III.(2)- Those Who Decide to Continue the Jihad either in Syria or in Other Conflict Zones :
This “Bosnian model” of integration into Syrian society is not without its own challenges. Indeed, back in 1995 in Bosnia, many of the Arab fighters from the “Mujahedeen Battalion” condemned the Dayton Peace Agreement and called it a surrender to the “enemies of Islam”. Many found it simply difficult if not impossible to integrate themselves into the Bosnian society which was “too westernized and secular for them”: seeing people drinking alcohol, not wearing traditional Muslim clothes etc. Refusing to integrate into a secular post-War Bosnian state, some of those former fighters chose instead to regroup in the small village of Zenica. There, they created a so-called “Youth Islamic Organization” which aimed at spreading militant Wahabism in Bosnia and to establish of an Islamic State in the country. This situation became eventually intolerable and forced the Bosnian security services to intervene to stop that in 1996[62]. In another case, some former fighters took the complete control of another village called Bočinja. They lived on the margin of the society between 1996 and 2001, in a closed environment, among themselves in a sort of emirate under the Sharia law. They rejected any integration in Bosnian society deemed as impious. They remained there until they were evicted and dispersed by the Bosnian authorities[63]. Moreover, there were many cases of supposedly integrated former jihadists who tried to use Bosnia as a launching pad for attacks abroad ,especially Europe[64].
How would post-Assad Syria deal with similar situations where foreign fighters would refuse to integrate the Syrian society and continue the Jihad instead? In fact, immediately after al-Assad’s fall, several testimonies of foreign fighters started to circulate in which these claimed that they fought for a strict Islamic State in Syria and that either one was to be established or else they will continue fighting abroad[65]. The possibility was raised that they could join other radical non-HTS affiliated groups, especially IS. The latter has already for its part, right after the fall of Assad, announced that it would continue the jihad in Syria, comparing HTS to the Taliban and calling them infidels.
However, HTS and al-Sharaa response was very clear and came shortly after the fall of Assad: Syria was not to become a Jihadi rear base under any circumstance. This posture was actually not new as HTS had taken, in Idleb between 2017 and 2024, strong actions against any individual or group who would “go out of the line”.
Thus, and specifically prior to 2024, when it came to foreign fighters who had relocated to Idleb in 2017, and as Aaron Zelin explained, they in fact had never enjoyed the kind freedom of action they had between 2013-2016, at the height of the war. According to various sources, the foreign fighters were in fact regrouped in Northern Idlib by HTS and often isolated from the rest of the population, while put under strict surveillance [66]. For those who attempted to break the law or pose a threat to the strategy and goals of HTS, several strict and measures were enforced. These would rage from being imprisonment and house arrest to physical elimination. A famous case was Omar Omssen ,a French- born foreign fighter who was arrested and severely warned for opposing HTS on some doctrinal religious views. He was released on the strict condition of never attempting to join another jihadi group nor recruiting foreign fighters. HTS also led several operations against IS group in the province of Idleb. Regarding HAD, HTS launched a campaign in 2019-20 to keep its hold over the organization and directly clashed with it .As a result, many of HAD leaders were put under house arrest. In the end, Zelin considers that HTS had decisively and “totally defanged HAD after June 2020”[67].
Therefore, in December 2024, when the first information started to circulate about foreign fighters refusing to integrate into the society, a close associate of al-Sharaa answered without hesitation: ‘We categorically reject that,’ The leadership will crush with an iron fist all those who do not obey its commands. We strictly reject any suggestion that Syria becomes a base for Jihad, or to export militants. We are working towards having zero problems in relations with neighboring countries’[68]. Thus, HTS immediately proceeded to crack down on IS and any dissenting groups. Moreover, those who refused the new regime were to be arrested as in the case of the Egyptian fighter Ahmed Mansour jailed right after making threat to al-Sissi. The close associate of al-Sharaa was very clear either integration or arrest even potential deportation to their home countries was to follow anyone who would respect the law. One of the most important signals of this strategy of refusing to allow Syria to be transformed into a rear base for the jihadists was about HAD. In a surprising twist of fate, and amid concerns about the organization’s future activities, it was forced to announce officially its dissolution and the immediate cessation of all of its activities[69].
In this context, how many NAFF remained part of IS? How many would be in a situation where they refuse the new political order and use Syria as a rear basis for attacks against North Africa? There is no clear assessment or reliable figures available. For an observer, nonetheless, the indications are that those who remained within the ranks of IS are likely in very low numbers. For him, the NAFF who were part of the other groups than HTS, especially IS had either been killed, captured ,or returned to their home countries between 2013 and 2018. Thus, if we combine the low number of potential North Africans still active within IS with the determination of HTS to prevent Syria from becoming a rear base for terrorism, this scenario of transforming Syria into a rear base to attack North Africa, while possible, remains on the short term, the least likely one to occur. However, a question remains regarding the former IS detainees released after the fall of Assad. In the chaos that followed and the mass freeing of the tens of thousands of prisoners, it is more than likely that many former IS fighters may/have tried to rejoin their former organization. At this point, it all depends on how many would be tempted to return to IS and their ability to actually link up with the organization. It also depends on the ability of HTS to dismantle and prevent IS from rebuilding their structure.
In North Africa, this possibility is considered nonetheless a potential risk given past experiences in similar conditions. In this context, Tunisia is viewed as the most exposed country given that such returnees, highly radicalized and determined, trained and galvanized by HTS or other groups would pose a direct challenge to its security and stability. The fact that most of the former Tunisian fighters were in IS is an additional element of concern. As a result, and since January 2025, Security checks have been reinforced at every entry points in Tunisia. All the flights coming from Turkey have been diverted to a different and isolated terminal in Tunis International Airport usually reserved for people coming from the Hajj. The purpose is to be able to control all the passengers and prevent any infiltration from would-be returnees. While so far none has been reported, this observer explains that it remains too early to make a definitive assessment or to exclude that such attempts occur. However, he argues that very much like the other North African countries, this scenario remains somehow the least likely except for potential individuals totally determined. For him and for most of the specialists, NAFF of IS are in fact likely to remain in Syria at least on the short- to-medium term.[70]. For one specialist, one reason for that is that assuming that IS tries to recover its territories lost in Syria and wage a war against HTS, it will need all the fighters it can gather. Thus, IS will try to both reclaim its former members released from jail and is simply unlikely to let go its highly battle-hardened experienced fighters that are still within its ranks, including foreign fighters, be it North Africans or others[71].
Then remains those willing to return to their home countries after years of war and violence.
III.(3)- The NAFF who may decide to return to their home countries:
This category is likely to be composed of the former inmates released from the Syrian military jails. Unable to adapt to the postwar Syrian society or willing to pursue any kind of violent trajectory, they are likely to be tempted to return to their home countries. In addition to these, it is possible to assume that some NAFF in former rebel brigades may consider that the fall of the Assad regime was their goal and “it is now time to go back to their home countries”. However, there are several constraints and challenges.
In the case of Tunisia, the authorities see the returnees in general as sources of threat and thus they have been generally reluctant to take them back[72]. Moreover, the state response has been exclusively a security-judiciary one. The fact is that there are no programs of reinsertion nor rehabilitation (lack of personnel, budget, political will etc.). This could be a major factor, which would lead the Tunisians tempted to return to re-evaluate their choice. On the other hand, for Algeria, Morocco and Egypt, the situation for potential returnees is totally different. While those countries have put forward very strong security and judicial responses, they have also developed extremely robust and effective strategies of behavioral and ideological deradicalization combined with policies of rehabilitation and reinsertion of former jihadists.
These strategies and programs are called “Reconciliation” programs/strategies (Moussalaha). They include in exchange for renunciation to violence and cooperation with local authorities on the part of former jihadists, an array of positive measures including judicial incentives (reduction of sentencing, amnesty etc.) in addition to socio-economic measures to facilitate their social reinsertion (jobs, housing, professional training). Those strategies also include religious deradicalization programs. In Algeria, this strategy was called the National Reconciliation and has been applied to both local and foreign jihadi fighters since 1999. Over 15,000 people benefited from it with fewer than 200 relapsing into violent extremism. Matt Herbert[73] notes that this strategy applied to the Algerian foreign fighters’ from the Sahel played an important role in convincing over 300 to return and surrender to the Algerian authorities since 2017. In Morocco as well, since the inception of the Mousslaha program in 2017, hundreds of inmates linked to jihadism including returnees from Syria-Iraq benefitted from it. After 8 years of implementation, there has been no relapse into violent extremism from those who benefited from the program upon their release from jail. To that extent, this combination of judiciary and social-economic incentives could convince potential disengaged Algerian and Moroccan former fighters to return and start a long process of rehabilitation and reinsertion into their societies[74].
However, the most likely candidates for a return to their home countries remain those detained in the SDF prisoners’ camps. This includes hundreds of former fighters and their families. An observer[75] explains that the living conditions in those camps have always been extremely difficult. However, they got worse over the past months. Indeed, since the SDF has come under attack by the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army (SNA), the fighting has directly impacted the already precarious living conditions in those camps ,especially in Al-Hawl: lack of food, medicine, shelter etc. Moreover, this observer reported that several attacks against the camps have been committed by some local Arab tribes who had suffered during IS rule. Thus, taking advantage of the weakening of SDF positions, these tribes are taking revenge on the IS prisoners at the hands of whom they had experienced terrible suffering between 2013 and 2017. This observer[76] indicates that some families of those detainees have been able to establish contact with them and inquire about their conditions. According to these families, all the detained people in the SDF camps have expressed willingness to return to their home countries[77].
On that matter, a Tunisian specialist explains that in fact, the SDF has been open to negotiations over the years to deliver those prisoners to their national authorities. However, he explains that most of the North African countries have been reluctant to take them back, especially the Tunisian authorities[78]. On that specific issue however, a specialist explains that this reluctance is not necessarily due to security concerns only but also to a legal-political barrier. Indeed, he underlines that the “recuperation” of these prisoners and their families usually must be done officially via legal governmental channels. The issue is that neither the SDF nor the Kurdish authorities are considered by the North African states as a legal government. It would be thus very difficult to negotiate an agreement on the release and return of hundreds if not thousands of inmates outside of the newly established authorities in Damascus. This would create major tensions with the new Syrian government with whom all the North African states are attempting to establish diplomatic relations. Thus for the specialist, while in the past “there has been some exfiltration” of individuals after an understanding between the SDF and foreign governments, it was only for specific cases. Therefore the fate of the NAFF who are in the SDF Kurdish camps remains extremely uncertain.
Conclusion:
Two months after the fall of al-Assad regime, the first scenario i.e. “Integration into the Syrian society” seems to be the most likely to be accepted by the majority of NAFF present in the ranks of HTS. Regarding, possible individuals returning to their home countries, the most likely to choose this option are the former inmates. However and so far, experts point out only a few rare cases of returnees, trying to come back to their home countries. In those cases, they have been immediately intercepted by the local security services and are currently going through legal procedures. The decision to return or not will likely depend on the evolution of the situation on the ground. It remains overall uncertain and dependent on the ability of HTS to assert its control over the territory and suppress all attempts by other jihadi groups including IS to return. The governments of all the North African countries are very aware of all these challenges and risks. They have already strengthening and tightening security measures at all their entry points ,especially airports and harbors. They have also established direct relations with the new authorities in Damascus to tackle the security concerns. While the situation remains fluid and uncertain, most of the specialists and observers do not expect any deterioration in the near future of the security situation due to foreign fighter returnees.
[1]– Ahmed al-Mansour, “Syria detains Egyptian fighter who called for uprising against Sisi”, Middle-East Eye (January 15th, 2025). Online : https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-detains-egyptian-fighter-ahmed-al-mansour-who-called-uprising-against-sisi
[2]-By North Africa we mean : Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.
[3]-See Richard Barett, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and The Threat of Returnees” The Soufan Center (October 2017). Online: https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf
[4]-See “Foreign Terrorist fighters in the Sahel-Sahara region of Africa: Recommendations for stemming a long-lasting threat”, Policy Paper (April 2022). Online: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/policy-paper-ftfs200522-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-the-sahel-sahara-rigion-of-africa.pdf
[5]-See Aaron Zelin, Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad (Columbia: Columbia
University Press, 2020);Aaron Zelin, “Tunisian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Note 55 (November 2018). Online: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tunisian-foreign-fighters-iraq-and-syria
[6]-See Cameron Colquhoun, « Tip of the Spear? Meet ISIS’ Special Operations Unit, Katibat al-
Battar » February 16, 2016. Online: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/02/16/tip-of-the-spear-meet-isis-special-operations-unit-katibat-al-battar/; Aymen Jawad Al-Tamimi, « Muhajireen Battalions in Syria, Part Two », (April 14, 2014) online : https://www.aymennjawad.org/14708/muhajireen-battalions-in-syria-part-two
[7]-See Mohamed Masbah, “Moroccan Foreign Fighters”, SWP Comments 46 (October 2015). Online: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2015C46_msb.pdf; Kei Nakagawa, El Mostafa Rezrazi and Shoji Matsumoto, Morrocco’s War on Terrorism: The case for security Cooperation today (Gilgamesh Publishing LTD, 2016).
[8]– See Allison Magnus, “Egypt’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Cycles Violence” in Thomas Renard (Ed.) in
“Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia” , Egemont Paper no. 107 (April 2019): 12-16.
[9]-Discussions and exchanges of author with various experts and specialists.
[10]-Interview 1 with a Tunisian specialist (January 2025).
[11]– Walter Bruyère-Ostells, “Le défi du retour des combattants de Syrie », Revue Defense Nationale 7(2019), 52-56.
[12]– The taquiya refers to individuals pretending to have been deradicalized and to have renounced to their extremist
ideas while it is not the case.
[13]– Voir Mohammed Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
32 (2009), 78-81.
[14] – Daniel Byman, « The Homecomings : What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return »,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 38, Issue 8 (2015).
[15] – David Malet, « Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context » , Terrorism and Political
Violence Vol27, issue 3 (2015).
[16] – Barrett, “Beyond The Caliphate : Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees”.
[17]-David Malet, Foreign fighters: Transnational identity in civil conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.
[18]– Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”,
International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/11),58.
[19]– Daniel Byman, Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in Armies of Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 7.
[20]– R. Kim Cragin, “The Challenge of Foreign Fighter Returnees”, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice
(2017) Vol. 33(3) 292–312.
[21]-See David Malet and Rachel Hayes, « Foreign Fighter Returnees: An Indefinite Threat ? », Terrorism and
Political Violence (July 2018), 1617-1635.
[22]– Richard Barett, “Beyond the Caliphate:”
[23]– Mohammed M. Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32,
- 2 (2009): 73–94.
[24]– See among others Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global (London: Cambridge University,
Press, 2009); Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms : The story of the Arab Jihadists (London : Saqi Books, 2011),
Mathieu Guidere, Al Qaeda a la Conquête du Maghreb: Le Terrorisme aux portes de l’Europe (Paris : Les
Editions du Rocher, 2007), Mohammed M. Hafez, « Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in
Algeria », Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, no. 4, (Autumn 2000),
[25]– Kei Nakagawa, El Mostafa Rezrazi and Shoji Matsumoto, Morrocco’s War on Terrorism: The case for
security Cooperation today (Gilgamesh Publishing LTD, 2016).
[26]– Aaron Zelin, Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad (Columbia: Columbia University
Press, 2020);
[27]-Jason Warner and Charlotte Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent”, CTC sentinel Vol. 11, Issue 7 (August 2018). Online : https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent
[28]-Informal discussion with Sahelian specialists and observers (2022).
[29]-See Magnus, “Egypt’s Foreign Terrorist Fighters” Renard (Ed.) in Egemont Paper no. 107 (April 2019).
[30]– Cited in « L’Afrique du nord menacée par l’arrivée de combattants étrangers de l’EI, prévient l’Algérie » Jeune Afrique, (Novembre 18th, 2017). https://www.jeuneafrique.com/493403/politique/lafrique-du-nord-menacee-par-larrivee-de-combattants-etrangers-de-lei-previent-lalgerie
[31]– Cited in « Afrique : Et maintenant, le retour des djihadistes » , Le Point (Décembre 11, 2017). Online :https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/afrique-et-maintenant-le-retour-des-djihadistes-11- 12-2017-2178884_3826.php
[32]-Interview 2 with Serge Daniel, journalist at Radio France Internationale (RFI) and specilaiste of Sahelian 4
jihadi grousp.
[33]– Interview 3 with a specialist (February 2025).
[34]– Interview 3 with a specialist (February 2025).
[35]-“ After the fall of Assad… What do the Maghreb countries fear”, Al Hurra (8 Decembre 2024). Online:
[36]– Interview 4 with a specialist (February 2025)
[37]-Interview 5 with a specialist (February 2025).
[38]-See the assessment on the motivations of the Arab Afghans Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global, 84.
[39]-See Charles Lister on X: https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1879552418561810513?fbclid=IwY2xjawIFj2JleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHf1UcM2AgHqaNtt35zPt34LUccoMFPMMN4IUI6jVDhDfT8kV0ddQ7Qvqlw_aem_1auOv7DUEgP47TJsVTn35A
[40]– Daniel Thorpe, “Will foreign fighters in Syria export their jihad?”, The Spectator (January 14th, 2025). Online: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-world-is-still-working-out-hts/
[41]– See Tawfik Ayachi, “Returnees from Syria: Tunisia faces extremist threat”, Al Hurra (December 24th, 2024). Online: https://www.alhurra.com/maghreb-voices/2024/12/11/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86
[42]– Interview 6 with a Tunisian official ( October 2021).
[43]-See Ayachi, “Returnees from Syria”, Al Hurra (December 24th, 2024). Online: https://www.alhurra.com/maghreb-voices/2024/12/11/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86
[44]-“After the fall of Assad… What do the Maghreb countries fear”, Al Hurra (8 Decembre 2024). Online:
[45]– On the trajectory of Abu Mohamed Al Julani, see the analysis of Cole Bunzel, “From Jihadi to Islamist: Ahmad al-Sharaa and His Critics”, Jihadica (January 3rd, 2025). Online: https://www.jihadica.com/from-jihadi-to islamist/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0nMPRV0Qw3M_UtFZG8VXWLcPkXrUZrWeVle0glUuXip4aiB2mrL-gcghc_aem_ZuNEbO6USAkSjGLydGZh1A
[46]-See Aaron Zelin, “Huras al-Din: The Overlooked al-Qaeda Group in Syria”, The Washington Institute for Near Policy, Policy Analysis (September 24th, 2019). Online: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/huras-al-din-overlooked-al-qaeda-group-syria
[47]– See “Syrie : plusieurs chefs d’un groupe lié à el-Qaëda tués dans la région d’Idleb » AFP- L’Orient le Jour (June 30th, 2019). Online : https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1177038/syrie-plusieurs-chefs-dun-groupe-lie-a-el-qaeda-tues-dans-la-region-didleb.html
[48]-See “CENTCOM Forces Kill ISIS Leader During Precision Strike in Syria” CENTCOM Press Release (December 20th, 2024): https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4014610/centcom-forces-kill-isis-leader-during-precision-strike-in-syria/
[49]– See “CENTCOM Forces Kill Senior Operative of Terror Group Hurras al-Din, an Al-Qaeda affiliate
[50]-Daniel Thorpe, “Will foreign fighters in Syria export their jihad?”, The Spectator (January 14th, 2025). Online:
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-world-is-still-working-out-hts/
[51]-Francine Friedman, Bosnia and Herzegovina A Polity on the Brink (London: Taylor and Francis, 2004), 68.
[52]-Elena Pokalova, Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters : Threats and Challenges to the West (Pagrave
McMillan, 2020), 68-69.
[53]-Farangis Najibullah, “Foreign Fighters Promoted In Syria’s New Army Have Their Governments Concerned”, Radio Free Europe (January 8th, 2025). Online: https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-military-hts-blowback-concerns/33266542.html
[54]-Id.
[55]– Interview 3 with a specialist (February 2025).
[56]– Interview 3 with a specialist (February 2025).
[57]– Id.
[58]– Id.
[59] -See Margaux Benn, “À Idlib, en Syrie, l’improbable parcours de deux ex-djihadistes français: le récit de l’envoyée spéciale du Figaro », Figaro (28 Janvier 2025). Online : https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/a-idlib-en-syrie-l-improbable-parcours-de-deux-ex-djihadistes-francais-le-recit-de-l-envoyee-speciale-du-figaro-20250128
[60]– Interview 4 with a specialist (February 2025).
[61]-Id.
[62]– Pokalova, Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters, 68-69.
[63]– Nicholas Wood, “Bosnia moving to deport foreign veterans of 1992-95 Balkan war”, The New York Times (August 1st, 2007).
[64]-Id.
[65]– Ismail Darwish and Mustafa Rustum, “Foreign Fighters in the New Syria… The Dilemma of Existence and Destiny”, The Independent (January 11th, 2025). Online: https://www.independentarabia.com/node/615336/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1
[66]-“ Integration of foreign fighters into Syrian society raises concerns”, Al Arab (December, 12th, 2024). Online: https://alarab.co.uk/%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%81
[67]– Discusion with Aaron Zelin (February 2025).
[68]– Thorpe, “Will foreign fighters in Syria export their jihad?”, The Spectator (January 14th, 2025). Online: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-world-is-still-working-out-hts/
[69]– Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Syria’s al-Qa’Ida Affiliate Dissolves Itself”, Middle-East Forum (January 28th, 2025). Online: https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/syrias-al-qaida-affiliate-dissolves-itself
[70]– Interview 1 with a Tunisian specialist (January 2025).
[71]– Interview 3 with a specialist (February 2025).
[72]– Interview 1 with a Tunisian specialist (January 2025).
[73]– Matt Herbert, “Lessons from Algeria on foreign terrorist fighters” Institute for Security Studies (2019). Online: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lessons-from-algeria-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters
[74]– See El Mostafa Rezrazi, « Réflexions sur l’approche marocaine dans la CVE/ PVE/Déradicalisation » Revista de
ciencias humanas y sociales, Al Irfan 4 (2018). En ligne :
https://cvc.cervantes.es/literatura/alirfan/pdf/alirfan4/alirfan_4_07.pdf
[75]– Interview 4 with a specialist (February 2025)
[76]– Id.
[77]-Id.
[78]– Interview 1 with a Tunisian specialist (January 2025).