Sisi’s Weakness Makes Him More Brutal
Sisi’s Weakness Makes Him More Brutal
Robert Springborg on how the Egyptian dictator secures his violent rule
Since taking power in 2013, Egyptian president and military dictator Abd el-Fattah el-Sisi has presided over a massive expansion of the security state, exercising a level of control over the population that his predecessors could only dream of, while, at the same time, the country’s economic and geopolitical clout has declined precipitously. Sisi may still be one of the West’s most loyal lapdogs in the region, but the West, it seems, appear increasingly uninterested in what he has to offer.
How to explain this apparent paradox? To better understand the dynamics of Sisi’s rule, and how he fits into regional and global power dynamics, journalist and activist Hossam el-Hamalawy spoke with leading Egypt expert Robert Springborg about the current regime, how it differs to previous Egyptian dictatorships, and what a second Trump Administration could mean for the country and the wider region.
In what way is repression under the Sisi regime different from that of the previous Egyptian rulers, such as Hosni Mubarak?
It is far more thorough and brutal and unconstrained by civilian institutions, whether the legal judicial system, the media, civil society, or even foreign influences. Mubarak always had to look over his shoulder to see how Washington would react to his crackdowns. Sisi, by contrast, learned in 2013 that Washington — and indeed all Western powers — would not prevent him from literally ordering the killing of peaceful demonstrators and imprisoning tens of thousands of political dissidents under horrific conditions.
Convinced that he has a mandate from Allah to rule the country as he sees fit without a foreign patron to call him to account nor him seeing any other domestic voice having legitimacy to speak on any political matters, Sisi is analogous to fascist leaders in other systems, most especially to Italy’s Mussolini, whose beliefs and practices were very similar. Mubarak was an authoritarian but not a fascist. He did not believe that he had any special messages to implement or that he needed to create a cadre of indoctrinated loyalists to run the country, as Sisi is currently doing.
Last summer, Sisi reshuffled his senior military brass, and just last month he did the same to the leadership of the General Intelligence Directorate (GIS). How do you read such moves?
The regime has no political counterbalance to the military and security services, so it depends entirely on personnel manipulation within both to ensure its incumbency. This, in turn, necessitates frequent turnovers, unlike in the [Gamal Abdel] Nasser or Mubarak regimes, when key figures in both the military and security bodies remained in position for extensive periods, especially under the latter.
Both Nasser and Mubarak encouraged at least semi-civilian political counterbalances, which assisted in coup-proofing their rule. [Anwar] Sadat sought to downgrade the political centrality of the two coercive institutions, so he reshuffled the leaderships in both throughout his time in office, while elevating the importance of parliament, political parties, the courts, and so on.
By contrast, Sisi depends entirely on the military and General Intelligence not only to underpin his rule, but to actually govern and manage the economy. His dependence on both, therefore, is far greater than that of any predecessor, so the relative power of key officers in both the military and intelligence services is correspondingly greater. Given that, he cannot permit individual officers to hold their command positions for extensive periods, lest they build patronage networks loyal to themselves and thereby become potential alternative power centres that could replace Sisi.
The recent reshuffles are part of this pattern, although in this case, there is disagreement among analysts over the implications of Abbas Kamel’s transfer from head of General Intelligence to presidential advisor. While it is impossible to determine exactly the reasons for this move, since the regime faces no immediate threat and has managed to thwart negative reactions against its Gaza policy, it seems unlikely that Kamel was removed for poor performance or for disloyalty, he being Sisi’s longest and closest associate. Instead, it would suggest consolidation of the security services — an objective of the regime for several years, for which Kamel bore primary responsibility and which he seems to have accomplished.
If there were to be a spontaneous social explosion in Egypt today due to economic or political conditions, do you see the military responding differently than it did during the Arab Spring?
Yes, because history will not repeat itself in the form of another middle-class protest movement disavowing violence and appealing to the military to assist it in overthrowing the president. The middle class has been hit hard by the regime’s economic policies, and its attempts to protest or even complain have been met by ruthless intimidation. So, if there are to be large-scale protests, they will not be driven only by middle-class reformers, but will involve more radical elements and positions, hence opening the door to a much broader coalition that includes the urban and even rural poor.
Moreover, since the military is now unabashedly in control, the idea that civilians and it could form “one hand”, as in 2011, is risible. Any large-scale protest will be directly against the military, so it will respond with yet more brutal repression, more as in Raba’ al-Adawiya than in Midan al-Tahrir. The use of unbridled repression would not only stimulate more intensive attacks against it, but also divide the military, with the willingness of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men to kill fellow citizens put to the test. Whether the military could pass that test if protests were to be substantial and durable is an open question.
The US, IMF, EU, and other backers have rushed to bail out the Sisi regime on several occasions, committing more than 57 billion dollars this year alone, and muting criticism of its human rights record. Egypt is regarded as “too big to fail”. Do you see this Western policy firing back at any point in the future?
The potential for political destabilization is high. Were it to occur, it would render the vast investments in Egypt’s failed stability fruitless and embarrassing for those who made them. But even if the regime manages to contain the threats to its continuity, it cannot turn around its steady economic decline — hence its ongoing need for infusions of foreign financial and other support.
Western and regional actors are now having to deal with other demands that have intensified as a result of the regional war raging for over a year, and those come on top of the as yet unmet demands for rebuilding Syria, to say nothing of the impending rebuilding of Sudan when and if the civil war there ends. Vast amounts of capital will be needed for Gaza and Lebanon in addition to those for other war-torn Arab countries. Egypt’s needs, by comparison, will increasingly be viewed as secondary, especially as the EU bolsters its capacities to control illegal migration, making it less dependent on Egypt and other Mediterranean states to act as its offshore border guards.
The expensive bailout of Egypt in 2024 will, in retrospect, appear to have been good money being thrown after bad in that it will fail to kick-start much-needed reforms, just as previous bailouts did. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, well aware of the recalcitrance of the Sisi government to reform, now provide funds almost exclusively to purchase hard Egyptian assets, especially land.
In the West, it is taxpaying voters who will seek accountability over their money being given to Sisi and Egypt when there are far more pressing demands in the region itself and, in the views of some, at home as well. With this outcome in mind, most Western leaders will lose interest in supporting Egypt directly and maybe even indirectly, such as through the IMF, World Bank, and the European Union. In other words, the 2024 bailout will probably, in retrospect, seem like the twilight of an era of foreign assistance baling out regimes in Cairo.
How have different US presidents related to Sisi? How does the country fit into the US’s regional and global dominance strategy? Moreover, what will Trump bring to the table?
Consistent with the notion that Trump admires or at least respects the strong and ignores or deplores the weak, Egypt will not be of central concern to his Middle East policies. That dubious distinction will go to Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and, to lesser extents, Turkey and Iran. Trump will delegate the “Egypt problem”, meaning essentially financial and diplomatic support, to one or more of them, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He will also seek to induce Europe to assume the primary burden of rescuing Egypt from itself financially.
As for Egypt’s current power projections into Libya, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa, he will neither oppose nor support them, as in no case are they truly decisive nor likely to become so. He might seek to reduce US military assistance to Cairo, especially were Cairo to render more difficult a deal over Gaza, in which Israel would take the lead.
Unlike Obama and Biden, Trump has no problem with Sisi’s dictatorial methods and nature. But also unlike them, he perceives less need to support Egypt, so he has greater freedom of action — whether positive or negative — in dealing with Sisi. The contradiction is that Obama and Biden didn’t really like supporting Sisi, but saw they had no alternative, whereas Trump doesn’t mind Sisi but just considers him and his country too weak for the US to spend much political and actual capital on.
To what extent is Sisi willing to entertain other benefactors, like China or Russia, as US hegemony continues to decline relatively?
Sisi is willing to sup with any devil, so his preferences are no constraint. The constraint lies with the devils, who, like Trump, don’t see great benefit from making heavy political, economic, or other investments in Egypt. China and Russia will not provide the magnitude of assistance that the US has in Egypt since the Sadat era, whatever the future is for American hegemony. Instead, they will engage with Sisi and Egypt on a transactional basis, cutting deals here and there but not fundamentally underwriting the regime.
The alliance between Egypt and Israel was firmly cemented under Sisi’s rule. Why? And how did that play into the current Gaza war?
Israel rightly perceived Egypt’s and Sisi’s weakness and need for external support, and was happy to provide it in return for being given carte blanche regarding its treatment of Palestinians and its projection of power into the region. All Israel has had to do is lobby for Sisi and Egypt in Washington and provide gas from its Leviathan field, although the latter is strictly a financial transaction in any case.
Israel bought Egypt cheaply, reflecting the power imbalance between the two countries. Once it was clear Egypt had sold its political soul to Israel, Netanyahu could do as he liked in Gaza, as he has done.
Is Cairo still a regional hegemon?
Cairo has sunken to the second tier of Middle Eastern states below the regional hegemons of Israel, Turkey, Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, and which includes Iraq, Algeria, and Morocco. Although each of those second-tier states are less powerful than Egypt, none are of decisive importance regionally.
What is behind this decline?
Egypt’s decline is due primarily to its parlous economic condition, which in turn results largely from the military’s control of the formal political economy. Its nominal military strength, as exemplified by having the largest Arab army, navy, and air force, is not matched by its actual capacities because the officer corps is distracted from its military tasks by its engagement in the political economy. As a result, basic military functions — whether training, maintenance, force integration, skill upgrading, and so on — are neglected.
That problem is further exacerbated by proliferation of sources of weapons acquisition. The air force, for example, now has to integrate planes from the US, France, Russia, and China, which poses Herculean problems of training, maintenance, and interoperability.
In sum, Egypt’s military is impressive on paper, not in reality, a fact of which the true regional hegemons are all aware. Unable to project economic or military power, even Egypt’s one-time dominance of human resource capacities has been eroded by the deterioration of its educational system, the decline of its manufacturing sector, and by the expansion and improvement of human resources elsewhere in the region.
How will Trump handle the Middle East and the current regional wars in the coming four years?
A similar question arose in the wake of his 2016 electoral victory. As now, the answers ranged widely, from him turning his back on the region, to unleashing the dogs of war, to inducing peace agreements among the various warring parties. What is amazing is that eight years later, “Trumpism” remains as ambiguous as it originally was. Is it basically transactional in nature, reflecting his deal-making proclivities learned as a businessman? Or is it ideological, reflecting his populist, right-wing views as reflected in the MAGA slogan?
The best guide for answering that question will be who he appoints to key foreign policy roles, but even that indicator in his case is less than perfect, as was demonstrated in his first term. Both pragmatists and ideologues occupied vital positions, yet none put a visible stamp on foreign policy in general and the Middle East in particular. While he has staunchly pro-Israeli advisers, so too does he have strong personal connections to Arabs and those supportive of pro-Arab policies.
In sum, predicting Donald Trump’s behaviour in any area is a mug’s game, especially when it comes to foreign policy and; within it, the Middle East. But let me go out on a limb and say that what he respects most is power and its exercise, which leads one to think that he will be even more pro-Israel than he was in his first term. By that, I mean he will have taken on board Israel’s crushing of Hamas, its serious blow to Hezbollah and Iran, and Netanyahu’s rising from the political dead yet again. Trump is more likely to try to capitalize on those victories than to try to repair the damage they have caused at both human and political levels.
To do that, he need not necessarily support or even greenlight further Israeli aggressions. Instead, he can, as the good cop in a “good cop, bad cop” routine, simply point to the potential damage of further Israeli action to, say, Iran, unless Iran listens to Trump, who will then prevent bad cop Israel from, say, striking the nuclear facilities. This approach would be more consistent with his clear desire to disentangle the US from the Middle East than would a boots-and-all US engagement along with Israel.
In sum, one suspects it will be more words than actions as, in general, it was in his first term as well, with the purpose being to back the strong, intimidate the weak, and underscore his centrality to the relevant processes, which he shall try to ensure are of a deal-making rather than war- or peace-making nature. He is a wheeler-dealer, not a seeker of a Noble Prize.
Robert Springborg is a leading scholar on Egypt’s military and security establishments. His publications include Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order (Routledge, 1989), Family Power and Politics in Egypt (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), and Egypt (Hot Spots in Global Politics) (Polity, 2017).