How has the political role of the revolutionary forces in Sudan diminished?
In the early weeks of the war that erupted in Khartoum on April 15, controversy has raged over the causes of this devastating conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). While a large segment of the “December Revolution forces,” including RSF allies, argue that the war’s underlying cause is the former regime’s ambition to regain power, the aforementioned regime’s factions – vehemently loyal to the army – contend that the war is merely an extension of a chaotic, foreign-backed revolution. In truth, all political actors have supported and championed both sides of the war while avoiding addressing the roots of the Sudanese crisis, which run deeper than a power struggle between the army and its militia wing, the RSF.
This multi-ethnic African-Arab country, imbued with identity conflicts and plagued by wars, was presented with an opportunity in 2019. In a sweeping uprising originating from all corners of the country, the people called an end to Omar al-Bashir’s decades-long reign. This peaceful revolution was carried out by people from all social and political strata. Nevertheless, this invaluable opportunity is presently being decimated by a protracted war that has laid the country to waste.
Declared war, with a moratorium
It is clear that the causes mentioned by people on both sides of the conflict are the reasons for this outburst. However, the current state of war is undeniably the consequence of a country whose elite have shirked their political and moral duties. They are fully absorbed in a repugnant power struggle, shielded by the rifles of authority.
The formation of a substantial paramilitary force serving as a parallel army has led to a rather logical outcome: war in its present military form. Nonetheless, hostilities commenced when political action reached an impasse, leaving all parties ensnared in a state of utter impotence. Consequently, this engendered a milieu conducive to military and security-based responses. Thus, political forces would be supplanted by security and military apparatuses.
It can be shouted from the mountaintops that the war effectively began when ousted President Omar al-Bashir and his Islamist movement formed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an armed group that evolved from an infantry unit providing operational support to the army into an independent paramilitary force with economic and military autonomy.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) evolved from a border guard force into a parallel army that surpassed the state’s official military institution. When war erupted in Darfur in 2003, the RSF expanded its recruitment among Arab tribes loyal to the central government.
The armed groups that rebelled against the state initiated the war in Darfur. Composed of non-Arab ethnicities, these groups demanded an end to marginalization and advocated for the restructuring of the Sudanese state through the redistribution of power and wealth. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement also advanced these objectives and demands and led a fight in the south of the country. This fight culminated in the independence of South Sudan and the establishment of a new state in 2011.
A history of accumulated mistakes
It can be posited that the central government in Sudan has a protracted record of enlisting Arab tribes loyal to it in Darfur to stifle groups of Negroid origin. But the Islamists expanded this policy and made it worse during their 30-year rule. The ultimate result of these policies was the pursuit of Omar al-Bashir by international justice following his indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The establishment of the Rapid Support Forces merely aggravated the country’s chronic political and social crisis, which has been ignored since its independence in 1956. As war and rebellion continue to ravage the country’s various regions, people are clamoring for the restructuring of a state dominated by a certain segment of the population. Successive governments remain oblivious to radical solutions.
An invaluable opportunity is evanescing
An invaluable opportunity to resolve a lingering political crisis dating back to the country’s independence was presented by the December 2018 revolution—the largest in Sudan’s history. This peaceful revolution succeeded in uniting the armed opposition movements of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, who had been fighting al-Bashir’s government for years. The revolution’s unified demands and slogans brought everyone together, fostering a harmonious environment where all voices were heard and a shared objective was being pursued. After years of political stagnation, the revolution enabled political forces to rise from the state of political deadlock that had prevailed throughout Bashir’s rule. This deadlock had been caused by divisive policies within the political parties and the security crackdown that had rendered political and civil forces impotent. As a result, political life began flourishing.
The surge in political and civic engagement can be traced from the protests against Bashir’s government in late 2018, to the overthrow of his regime in April 2019, and even beyond October 2021, when the army and its ally, the Rapid Support Forces, deposed the first post-Bashir civilian government. During this period, civic life recovered as political parties, civic groups, and professional organizations took the initiative.
A brief overview of the ongoing war, now in its third year, reveals a clear outcome: the political and professional forces in power prior to the first shots fired in April 2023 have been rendered powerless and irrelevant. The revolutionary coalition that spearheaded significant change in 2019, ousting Omar al-Bashir and his Islamist organization, has transitioned from the realm of “militancy” to that of “treason,” as many perceive it. At best, it has entered the realm of “compromise,” as its members have chosen to align with the two warring factions: the army and the Rapid Support Forces.
Civilian engagement with military actors followed as a result of the ongoing intense polarization during the transitional period. The recurring theme of reliance on rifles in Sudanese political life is evident, but the opportunity provided by the peaceful December uprising was unparalleled, proving that civilian political action is possible despite the heavy price that is exacted. The uprising also made it possible for political parties to rebuild at minimal cost. Nonetheless, it appears that political parties have not yet abandoned their reliance on rifles for protection.
A perilous transitional period
The most salient factors that resulted in the forfeiture of the occasion presented by the December Revolution were perhaps the inadequacies in the administration of the transitional period, the absence of foresight and ambiguity, the paucity of experience among the revolutionary forces, and the unmitigated revolutionary fervor in the streets. Consequently, the civilian government faced constant pressure as it lacked full decision-making authority, which was held by a military already poised for action. Additionally, the complex relationship between the December forces and the remnants of Omar al-Bashir’s government apparatus caused a shift in the balance of power during this crucial time. Some transitional government entities followed a path guided by revolutionary legitimacy, while others opted to function within the confines of a less than ideal political agreement. As a result, both revolutionary legitimacy and the smooth progression of the political settlement were unattained.
Instead of paving the way for a democratic civilian transition, the transitional period devolved into an era of infighting and polarization. This period was arguably mishandled by political forces that rose to power with limited understanding of the intricacies they inherited from al-Bashir’s administration. The political forces involved were focused on competing for power. They were mainly concerned with appointing their own people to state institutions, similar to al-Bashir’s regime. Strategies to address the two most urgent concerns—the economy and justice—that ultimately resulted in al-Bashir’s downfall were conspicuously absent.
Meanwhile, the army was preparing to depose the transitional government. As the post-Bashir political paradigm exhibited a propensity toward modernity, owing to the composition of the professional groups and resistance committees that spearheaded the revolution, local tribal leaderships commenced disseminating animosity under the pretext of opposing the new transition. The army openly mobilized such tribal leaders to oppose the transitional government. The overt engagement of tribal leaders in working against the transitional government was under the auspices of the army.
The transitional government, which was supported by the people, faced its first major litmus test when a prominent tribal leader in eastern Sudan ordered the closure of the national highway connecting the eastern and central regions of the country. This laid the groundwork for the October 2021 coup. Traditional tribal leaders played a key role in destabilizing the transitional government when the army invoked their social influence.
The impact of war on the December revolution forces
The war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has drastically altered the position and role of the forces of the December Revolution within the Sudanese political scene. These forces, once the voice of change and civilian transition, have seen their influence decline markedly as armed conflict has escalated and alliances formed by the December movement have disintegrated.
The war resulted in major divisions within these forces. Supporters of the army are pitted against those in favor of the Rapid Support Forces. Still others have attempted to remain neutral. They have advocated for a halt to the fighting. However, the latter’s voice was barely heard amidst the din of gunfire.
The rifts in the December Revolution forces’ ranks further hindered their ability to influence the course of events. Consequently, they fell out of favor with many of their supporters, who believed that the forces had veered away from the principles of the revolution.
As the war debilitated political and civic activism and dispersed leaders among exiles and displacement sites, thereby divesting revolutionary forces of their organizational instruments and their capacity to mobilize. As the fighting continued, the tone shifted from revolutionary rhetoric to militaristic discourse, and demands for civilian governance disappeared from public discourse. Notwithstanding this reversal, a small number of groups are endeavoring to uphold the ethos of the December Revolution by petitioning for an end to the hostilities and a reestablishment of the civilian process. However, in a setting where armed forces and regional and tribal allegiances dominate, these groups’ sway remains negligible.
The position of al-Bashir’s party in the current political scene
After al-Bashir’s government was overthrown in 2019, the National Congress Party (NCP) was dissolved, its headquarters were seized, and the party largely disbanded. However, in April 2023, war broke out between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, and the National Congress Party once again found its purpose. Although the party has officially proclaimed that it is not involved in the war and does not have a military wing, the reality is completely different. Its supporters and prominent leaders have been actively backing the army through large-scale media mobilization and long-standing networks of influence within state institutions. Today, the party presents itself as a “patriotic movement” supporting the armed forces in what it terms an “existential war.”
The war united Islamic groups that fought alongside the army under banners such as the “Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion” and the “Operations Authority” of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the main coalition of the December revolution forces, have been the target of extremely hostile statements from various Islamist groups with different inclinations. Meanwhile, leaders of the National Congress Party have expressed a willingness to reconcile with leaders of the Rapid Support Forces, but they will not be as forgiving towards the Forces of Freedom and Change.
Conversely, revolutionary and civil society forces have accused the National Congress Party (NCP) of using the war as an opportunity to reenter the political scene through an alliance with the military and regain its former influence. The NCP has not completely stopped its political activities, even though it is officially banned since the ouster of al-Bashir’s regime. Its members regularly hold demonstrations to condemn the transitional government. The party has intensified its endeavors since the onset of the war, propelling its leaders into the media limelight to demonstrate their endorsement of the military and their repudiation of any peace negotiations.
The party is unequivocally striving to reposition on the political scene by espousing an anti-foreign interference discourse. Nevertheless, it is endeavoring to absolve itself of responsibility for the situation that has precipitated war, despite the fact that the genesis of the crisis is rooted in the policies it pursued during three decades of its rule, whereby it established a paramilitary force parallel to the army, authorized the security services to interfere in political life, and wrought havoc on the public sphere.
Reproducing the crisis
Despite the futility of military solutions and armed opposition previously experienced by the Sudanese people, the belief in the potency of firearms has only intensified as the efficacy of politics has waned due to political stagnation in a country where political alignments reached a crescendo with the April 15 war. The war created the perfect environment for regional and tribal armed groups to flourish, pushing politics to the side and replacing it with ethnic conflict.
Hostilities between the army and the Rapid Support Forces have given rise to armed popular resistance in army-controlled areas. In contrast, the Rapid Support Forces have bought tribal loyalty. Consequently, an arms race has become the hallmark of all regions of Sudan, whether they are already embroiled in war, such as Darfur and South Kordofan, or more recently affected by war, such as Central Sudan, and even areas that have yet to be hit by the scourge of war, such as Northern State in the northernmost part of Sudan and River Nile State, located north of the capital, Khartoum. In army-held areas, the armed popular resistance is fueled by the army’s failure to protect civilians. This has spurred young people in these areas to join military training camps and defend their communities from brutal RSF attacks. As a result, the entire country has entered a phase of “militization.”
What does fate have in store?
More than two years of wide-scale devastation, political action remains ineffective at a time when tribal and regional armed movements have expanded in a country already teeming with armed groups.
The situation in Sudan seems to have many possible outcomes. The war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces has evolved from a military conflict into a structural crisis due to the acute tribal polarization surrounding it and the proliferation of armed groups, which threatens the survival of the state.
Ongoing hostilities and growing divisions pose an existential challenge to Sudanese political forces concerning their survival and influence after the war, given their current state of vulnerability and fragmentation. Although some advocate for separating politics and rifles, the capacity of these forces to organize politically remains constrained by the current security and political climate.
Should the war persist, the country may be on the verge of further disintegration as local and ethnic conflicts intensify and the central government’s authority wanes. However, if successful mediation efforts result in a ceasefire and the initiation of a comprehensive political process, this phase could set the stage for the reconstruction of the political system on new foundations.
The future of Sudan remains contingent on the political elite’s ability to rise above parochial interests and the armed forces’ willingness to abandon the use of force in favor of a unifying national project. This war will either lead to the state’s final collapse or serve as a springboard for a new political era that restores the country’s equilibrium.
