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June 2022

Diplomats, spies and arms dealers: Turkey’s Great Game in North Africa

Article by Akram Kharief / RLS

Tika, Müsiad, Tüsiad, Sadat, all these bizarre acronyms that are actually the hidden face of Turkey’s global strategy in Africa and North Africa especially, which has experienced a significant change in Turkey’s commitment between 2009 and 2022. It must be admitted that the primary reason for this strategic shift towards the South is due to the European exclusion policy applied by some EU countries (mainly France) against Turkey’s accession to Europe. And this despite the fact that Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan, prime minister at the time, had made great efforts to align his country ideologically with the rest of the EU countries. In 2002, he had accepted Kofi Annan’s peace plan for the reunification of Cyprus and its integration into the EU, and implemented extensive reforms to upgrade its economy. Three strategies were designed to satisfy the Turkish appetite for economic projection: A return to Pantouranism, strengthening its presence and cooperation with the Turkish-speaking nations of Central Asia, a maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, and a presence in Africa.

Africa as a reservoir

With great discretion, Turkey is expanding its presence in Africa and spreading its network of influence on the continent, hoping to play a key role in the resolution of the crises that occur on the continent. Turkey has expanded from 12 embassies on the continent in 2009 to 43 by 2021. The largest Turkish embassy in Africa is in Somalia. Bilateral trade has increased from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $25.3 billion in 2020. Direct investment in Africa has risen from $100 million in 2003 to $6.6 billion in 2021. Turkish development aid to the continent reached $8.7 billion in 2020. Since 2003 as prime minister until now as president, Erdoğan has visited Africa 27 times. 2005 was the “Year of Africa” in Turkey.

The latter was conferred observer status with the African Union (AU) in 2005, and in 2008 became the AU’s “strategic partner”, co-organising the first Turkey-Africa Summit in Istanbul. The second Turkey-Africa Summit was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in 2014. The third summit, which was supposed to take place last year in Istanbul, was postponed because of COVID-19. Turkey is following China’s lead in aid to build infrastructure such as a multi-purpose stadium, a football stadium and an airport in Senegal, an expanded port as well as its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, and a large mosque in Djibouti… Since 2015, Turkey has also become a rising power in the defence industry. According to Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Cavusoglu, “Turkey’s military base in Somalia and the training of the Somali army are signs of Turkish geopolitical efforts to make Turkey become an important political and military power in the Horn of Africa. In 2020, Turkey also signed agreements with Nigeria in the defence industry,” he says. “Turkey aims to become an economic, humanitarian and military power in sub-Saharan Africa.”

Africa has also become a proxy battleground for Turkish and European rivalries in the Middle East – and its growing presence in sub-Saharan Africa is partly intended to counter the influence of its Middle Eastern enemies, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and to a lesser extent, France. Turkey’s obsession with returning to the Red Sea and competing with the Emirati naval bases in Berbera (later Sokotra) and the French bases in Djibouti, prompted it to renegotiate the former Ottoman port of Souakine in Sudan.^[1]

To a certain extent, this may explain the strong friendship between Turkey and Ethiopia, by which it stands in its tug-of-war with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that Ethiopia is building on the Blue Nile. Out of the $6 billion already invested by Turkish companies in sub-Saharan Africa, $2.5 billion has gone to Ethiopia, according to the Financial Times. So far, Turkey’s forays into the Sahel have been mainly an expression of soft power projection. Ankara’s activities in the region are mainly focused on development support and commercial engagement. While Turkey has signed a defence agreement with Niamey, Turkish aid and business in Somalia has subsequently led to more military engagement, although for the most part Turkish engagement there has been fruitful and not in tension with Western agendas.

Turkey’s rivals often portray its growing presence in African Muslim countries, such as Somalia and Sudan, as ideologically driven – in particular, the goal of boosting the prospects of the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist groups – or as a desire to increase its geopolitical influence. This perception is not entirely inaccurate. Ankara’s strong support for Somalis facing a devastating famine in 2011 brought Turkey enormous sympathy from the international community and local populations. It then used this influence to strengthen the interests of its local allies, some of whom belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2017, Ankara opened a military base in Mogadishu, the largest of its kind outside Turkey. The country has also acquired a strong position in a seaport in Mogadishu, which is crucial to its strategy of projecting military power across the main junctions of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Turkey is now one of the most influential foreign actors in Somalia, a role that many Somalis see in a positive light. Faced with the fear of a US return to the region, Turkish forces favour a smooth relationship with the Somali security authorities. Ankara’s main objective seems to carry on its projects and investments in the Sahel that have gained public support, paving the way for Turkish exporters to a new market.

Through the opening of embassies in Bamako (2010), Ouagadougou (2012) and Niamey (2012), Ankara has sought to appeal to religious and political elites, while addressing the needs of struggling populations. In Mali, for example, Turkey has built a mosque in an upscale neighbourhood of the capital for the High Islamic Council of Mali, the country’s most powerful religious association, and another one was renovated in the hometown of former president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The same goes for the city of Agadez, in northern Niger, where the Great Mosque and the palace of the Sultan of Aïr have been renovated. This was an opportunity to recall Turkey’s historical links with the sultans of the region, the first of whom, according to oral tradition, was born in Istanbul in the 1400s. Meanwhile, Turkey provided much-needed assistance in the fields of health, water and education. The country has built hospitals in Bamako (completed in 2018) and Niamey (in 2019), and fielded mobile clinics in regional Malian cities such as Koulikoro and Sikasso. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), Turkish charities and NGOs have also worked to improve access to religious education and water for rural people.

“Mavi Vatan”

On 27 November 2019, the Turkish government signed an agreement with the Libyan Government of National Accord (Tripoli Government) to establish a common maritime border, which would close access to the western Mediterranean to countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. This risk taken by Ankara, in the middle of the Libyan civil war and in the middle of the “great game” around the North African countries, reflects Turkey’s ambition to once again become an important geopolitical player in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to acquire the maximum amount of space at the expense of the Exclusive Economic Zones of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. This doctrine has a name: “Mavi Vatan”, “the Blue Nation”, an old Kemalist doctrine that has been taken up by the ideologues of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the ruling party in Turkey since 2002.

One has to understand that this concept was born in response to the consequences of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and Turkish frustration at the failure of its EU accession process. In 2004, in an article published in the journal Marine Policy,^[2] two geographers from the University of Seville, Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero and Juan Carlos Rodríguez Mateos, attempted to map the EEZs of the EU member states and their maritime borders.

The publication of this maritime map raised the ire of the Turks, especially as the map attributed an EEZ to the entire island of Cyprus, ignoring the north of the island claimed by Turkey, and attributed almost the entire Aegean Sea to Greece, leaving very little maritime territory for Ankara.

The task of correcting the map was entrusted to Admiral Cihat Yaycı who would become the father of the Mavi vatan concept, and would result in the Turkish vision of the EEZ, which claimed a route equidistant with Greece and taking into account the Turkish status of the northern half of Cyprus. The latter would increase the size of the Turkish EEZ from 200,000 Km² to 462,000 Km², and would allow it to control a third of the Black Sea and a quarter of the eastern Mediterranean.

As a reminder, Turkey, unlike most of its neighbouring countries (Cyprus, Greece, Egypt…), has not signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has based its maritime boundaries on an alternative vision of the law of the sea, which considers that islands, inhabited or not, do not possess an exclusive economic zone if: ^[3]

– They are located closer to the mainland coast of another State than to that of the State to which they belong (on the “wrong side” of the median line);

– They prevent the coastal projection of another state;

– They cause an inequitable effect in the delimitation.

In addition to the reclaim of maritime territory, this “alternative” vision of maritime law has enabled Ankara to stand in the way of the Transmed gas pipeline between Israel and Greece. This project is opposed by Turkey, which prefers another gas pipeline passing through its territory. This reconfiguration of maritime space has also allowed Ankara to propose to Tripoli a project for a shared maritime zone, which would cut the Mediterranean in two and pave the way for a territorial union between the two countries, and for a projection of Turkish forces in Libya.

Signed on 27 November 2019 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the head of the Libyan government Faiz al-Sarraj, this maritime agreement had formalised Turkey’s military commitment in Libya at the very moment when its capital was under threat of an offensive by the Libyan National Army (LNA). A month later, the Turkish army landed hundreds of men and thousands of Syrian mercenaries in Misrata and Tripoli.

Mavi Vatan involves more than a claim to maritime territory, and this doctrine has been combined with an increasing power of the Turkish navy over the last ten years.

Despite the largeness of the claimed Exclusive Economic Zone, Turkey has no access to the oceans, though so necessary for international trade. It remains dependent on Egypt for access to the Indian Ocean, and on European countries to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. This constraint pushed the Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri (Turkish Navy) to launch the construction of an aircraft carrier (TCG Anadolu). But the project is currently suffering from the cancellation by the United States of the F-35 contract, which should transform the ship into a drone carrier and projection ship.

The Turkish Navy is in charge of patrolling four seas: the Black Sea, the straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. It is the latter that is in charge of the Turkish force projection abroad.

Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP government took power in 2002, the budget allocated to the army and the navy has increased significantly. It has risen from just over $9 billion in 2002 to over $15 billion in 2015, an increase of almost 70% in 13 years. With 2.1% of GDP allocated to defence, Turkey has joined the select club of NATO members that spend more than 2% of their GDP on national defence.

The Turkish navy has benefited greatly from this contribution and has been able to launch numerous ship programmes, such as the Milgem heavy corvettes and Milgem II frigates, in addition to the submarines built with German assistance. ^[4]

The Ottoman Past

Turkey emphasises its Ottoman past and adapts its narrative to each North African country. Algeria, for example, is considered the warrior little sister of the Sublime Porte, with whom it shared centuries of naval victories in the Mediterranean. On 20 November 2018, the Algerian Ministry of Culture and the Turkish Embassy in Algiers inaugurated a monument to the glory of Oruç Reïs (Baba Arroudj for Algerians), an Ottoman corsair who ruled Algeria in the 16th century. Present at the ceremony, which took place in Aïn Temochent in Algeria, was the frigate TCG Oruçreis (F-245), one of the most powerful of the Turkish fleet, which is part of the Barbaros class of frigates, whose names are all linked to Ottoman Algeria (Barbaros Pasha, Kemal Reis, Oruç Reis and Salah Reis). The construction and inauguration of the Great Ketchaoua Mosque in Algiers in 2018^[5] was a further symbol of this bridging through shared history. This strategy is even more acute in Libya, where a traditional Turkish-Libyan community is settled in the port city of Misrata, where two-thirds of the population of this city of 400,000 inhabitants claim Turkish heritage.

Turkish neighbourhoods (Hay al Atrak) can be found in many cities in western Libya, such as Tripoli, or even in the Awbari oasis in the desert.^[6]

Tripoli is where the tomb of Turgut Reis, the Ottoman fleet commander killed and martyred during the siege of Malta in 1565, is located and a large mosque is named after him.^[7] In the name of this historical proximity, Ankara sees Misrata and western Libya as its preserve and natural extension in North Africa, and its troops have been officially deployed there since January 2020.

Tunisia has also undergone a Turkish charm offensive, as its Ottoman past has not been ignored by Ankara, which considers Tunisia as a “Little Turkey”. The post-revolution opening of Tunisia and the rise of the political party Ennahda, very close to the AKP, have significantly contributed to this.

TOOLS FOR POLITICAL SOFT POWER

The mechanism is just as smooth on the political level. As well as Russia and China, Turkey avoids being preachy, which is not to the displeasure of certain African leaders. In the field of crisis resolution, such as in Mali, Turkey advocates the use of “African solutions” or, failing that, UN solutions. It also advocates better representation of the continent in international institutions. Where political parties close to the Muslim Brotherhood are active, Turkey finances and organises their activities through its al Karama Foundation, which brings together a hundred or so Islamist associations and parties throughout the world. The objective is to assist them in creating a solid base, by setting up schools and youth centres, in order to indoctrinate the population in the long term.

Islam “The minarets will be our bayonets, the domes our helmets, the mosques our barracks and the believers our soldiers”. It was because of these belligerent and religious verses by Ziya Gökalp, one of the fathers of Turkish nationalism, that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was convicted of incitement to hatred in 1998. Erdoğan has always used Islam as a political weapon, emphasising religious affiliation in international relations, which explains, for example, the rapprochement with distant Indonesia and the charities carried out in Africa. If a country is Muslim, Turkey provides support for the establishment of religious schools and mosques. The slightest mark of the past linked to Ottoman Islam is highlighted, as for example in Algiers with the financing of the renovation of the Ketchaoua mosque, or in Niger with the opening of an Islamic cultural centre and a cemetery where Ottoman soldiers are buried. The same goes for the construction of the Great Mosque of Bamako, which has become the headquarters of the Muslim Council, the main religious body in Mali.

The second option is to implant the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood through Koranic and public schools. The seven Yunus Emre cultural centres and the Maarif educational foundation, which is present in 31 African countries, are part of this dynamic. In the aftermath of the 15 July 2016 putsch, the latter took over several schools of excellence, formerly run by the Gülen brotherhood. All these organisations work in synergy.

Economy The employer organisations (Tüsiad, Müsiad) and the Deik (Council for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries) are constantly active. They are supported by Tika (the Turkish development agency), which runs 22 units on the African continent and finances numerous projects in the construction, agriculture and health sectors. The agency is also renovating monuments from the Ottoman era, such as the Ketchaoua mosque in Algiers.^[8] It contributes to the construction of Turkey’s brand image in the world, and benefits from the direct support of Erdoğan and his wife Emine Erdoğan, who is involved in humanitarian campaigns. Tika has provided important support to African countries in dealing with the Covid-19 crisis. Through its industry, Turkey was able to donate protection equipment and respirators to most of the African countries. This assistance enabled Turkey to become a key figure in the medical industry and to gain market share from the Chinese and Europeans, who later dropped out of the market completely. In North Africa, Tika supplied thousands of masks and hygiene equipment to combat the Covid-19 pandemic, at a time when equipment was in short supply on world markets.^[9] ^[10]

Weaponry

In the field of armaments, Turkey is using its Bayraktar drone as an ambassador in Africa.^[11] Present in Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria, the star drone paves the way for Turkish companies. Tunisia has chosen TAI’s Turkish drone for its air force. The four Turkish arms majors, Aselsan, Havelsan, Roketsan and TAI, used to focus only on large African markets, such as Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria. Since the outbreak of the war in Libya, they have expanded their business activities to most countries in West and East Africa, with equipment donations and credits. Tunisia, for example, has taken out a $200 million equipment credit. Long avoided by Turkey so as not to upset its relations with Algeria, Morocco has also become an important client since 2020, with the purchase of drones and armoured vehicles. Rabat is even considering acquiring Turkish Goturk corvettes and Atak T129 helicopters.

Military

Turkey has concluded defence agreements with Tunisia, Niger, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Ghana, Tanzania, Cameroon, Morocco and Ethiopia. These agreements differ from country to country, but all provide for military and technical cooperation with possible technology transfer. The defence agreements with Niger, Ethiopia and Somalia are the most important, as they provide for training of the militaries of these countries in Turkey and in the respective countries, with even the possibility of using these armies as a proxy military force.

The Tunisian case is revealing. For fifty years, the Tunisian army has remained a captive market for French and American military industries. The defence agreement signed in December 2017 in Tunis, under the leadership of Presidents Béji Caïd Essebsi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, includes two components: the training of Tunisian military personnel in Turkey, and above all an agreement on investments by Ankara in Tunisia. In other words: an agreement to import Turkish military equipment.

“The defence agreement between Turkey and Tunisia which was signed five years ago has literally saved the Tunisian army from bankruptcy. The loan that we are granting represents a significant contribution to their annual defence budget,” said a Turkish industrialist.^[12] This is a “win-win” situation as it allows Turkish equipment to be exported, and sometimes used in combat as part of the fight against terrorism, for the highly competitive arms market.

Until 2021, no less than 150 million dollars were offered by Turkey to Tunisia through interest-free loans for the purchase of Turkish military equipment. The Turkish export credit agency Eximbank, in particular, has financed the operation up to 80 million dollars.

The defence agreement ratified by the Tunisian Ministry of Defence and the Turkish national defence industry agency SSM (now Savunma Sanayii Baskanligi, or SSB) also includes cooperation in military industry and technology transfer, which made Tunis a privileged client of the Turkish military industry in the region.

For more than a decade, Turkey has been trying to reproduce the same pattern with Algeria with partial success, due to the uneven relationship between the two countries. The takeover of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune on 12 December 2020 allowed the Turks to re-enter the Algerian Ministry of Defence, from where they had been expelled in 2019, when the power was controlled by General Ahmed Gaïd Salah, former Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff.

The visit of Abdelmadjid Tebboune to Ankara on 15 May 2022 confirmed the improvement of military relations and cooperation between the two countries. This was stated by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during a joint press conference with his Algerian counterpart, Abdelmadjid Tebboune: “Turkey and Algeria will take firm steps to diversify Algeria’s production sector, which is one of Africa’s gateways to the world, especially in many areas such as political, military, economic, commercial, cultural and tourism. Turkey will stand by Algeria in all areas,” he said, before adding more specifically: “Turkey and Algeria, as major players in peace and stability in Africa, are committed to strengthening cooperation in the defence industry.^[13]

Morocco is an important client of Turkey’s arms industry as well. Back in 2014, Turkish diplomacy was trying to get closer to Rabat to prevent it from developing relationships with the al-Sissi regime in Egypt. At the time, the Moroccan newspaper Al Massae reported that “Turkish diplomats had revealed the decision of the Ankara authorities to intensify cooperation with Morocco in the military and defence field, in order to build a united bloc against the growing threats to the Middle East and North Africa region.^[14]

In 2021, Morocco took action and gave in to Bayraktar’s diplomacy, buying a dozen armed drones that would later revolutionise its military policy in the disputed area of Western Sahara, and even its relations with its bordering countries (Algeria and Mauritania).^[15]

Multilateral Military Cooperation

In May 2010, Turkey hosted the UN Summit on Somalia in Istanbul, where it pledged development aid and military assistance to Somalia through military training for Somali soldiers. In February 2012, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Turkey was ready to provide material and capacity-building resources. Turkey also believes itself to be a legitimate mediator in the country, given its Muslim heritage. To this end, Somalia’s interim Prime Minister Abdulweli Mohamed Ali said that “Since Turkey joined the European Union, Turkey has become a legitimate mediator.^[16] You can create peace and stability by working on the security side, but also on the development side at the same time. That is what Turkey is successful at.” The Turkish presence is also noticeable in the South. Not only did Turkey offer air support to the NATO mission in Darfur in 2005, and signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation with Sudan in 2006, but its role has increased further since South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011. After their secession, the two Sudans have engaged in frequent and deadly cross-border skirmishes. To this end, Turkey revealed that Sudan had recently approached it to mediate between the country and its former enclave. Turkey has also offered African states considerable technical and training assistance, including in the areas of capacity building and training in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism. Since 2009, Turkey has participated in the counter-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia by the US-led Combined Force 151, which it commanded from May to August 2009 and from September to December 2010. It also participates in Operation Ocean Field, NATO’s counter-piracy mission (Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 – SNMG 2). In addition to training and policing, Turkey has actually sent its own soldiers to the field, mainly engaged in peacekeeping. By the end of 2012, Turkey had participated in five UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Ivory Coast (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sudan (UNMIS), and the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Sadat: the Turkish Wagner

Sadat is a private military company created by Melih Tanriverdi and Adnan Tanriverdi, who claimed in the columns of the Turkish daily Khabar Tork that Sadat has been carrying out missions in Libya since 2013.^[17] Since the launch of the offensive on Tripoli in April 2019, the private Turkish security company has been lending a hand to the government of Fayez Al-Sarraj. This information was confirmed on Marshal Haftar’s side, where sources indicate that Turkish experts present in Tripoli are dispatched by Sadat to advise the militias or command the Bayraktar drones.^[18]

On 17 December 2020, Adnan Tanriverdi gave further details, stating in a newspaper that his country ‘needs private security companies to employ mercenaries’. He added without hesitation: “If Turkey sends mercenaries to Libya, it will be more effective than Wagner or Blackwater. “

Sadat “supervises and provides payment for some 5,000 pro-GNA Syrian fighters in Libya,” the Pentagon wrote at the time.^[19] Well known for his multiple relations with Islamist groups in Arab countries, Adnan Tanriverdi recently claimed that his company’s mission was to “identify the dangers that threaten the Islamic world”. In particular, he revealed that the company was training the Free Syrian Army, now renamed the Syrian National Army, whose members are being sent to fight in Libya. General Tanriverdi told the Turkish press that the Syrian National Army is only “the armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood”. Sadat was reportedly deployed in Libya, Chad, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Education

The failed coup against Erdoğan in July 2016 had shed light on the widespread constellation of schools and educational institutions owned by Abdulfatah Gülen’s foundation, the alleged organiser of the putsch. To uproot this network in Africa, Erdoğan called on Yunus Emre and the Maarif Educational Foundation, which operates across the continent. In the aftermath of the 15 July 2016 putsch, the latter took over several schools of excellence, once run by the Gülen brotherhood. All these organisations work in synergy and intend to shape the future African and North African elites.^[20] ^[21]

Turkish Airways

The Turkish airline operates flights to the majority of African capitals, with a total of 52 cities on the continent with direct connections to Istanbul. For 30 of these countries, it is the only air hub to Asia and the Americas. Turkish Airways has been the only airline to fly to war-torn countries such as Libya and Somalia, making it both indispensable and a perfect intelligence gathering tool.^[22]

The proximity of the Turkish national flag to the ruling AKP party has made it strategic for President Erdoğan. The construction of the new Istanbul airport is part of this strategy of competition with Qatar and especially Dubai on a global scale.

Conclusion

Turkey is attempting to create a new image for itself in international affairs, using its soft power and diplomatic influence to prove that it can be an asset to the 21st century world order. As such, the world is likely to see a more assertive Turkey in African and especially North African politics, which it considers part of its Mediterranean living space. Turkey also engages in conflict resolution, particularly in the Muslim states of the African continent. As for the African and North African states, they also seem to be open to the new Turkish presence. Without rivalry with the Chinese-led push, African states openly welcome Turkey as a military and commercial partner and, in the case of Somalia, as one of the strongest international allies they could ever have. This new friendship, combined with the US strategy of partnering with both sides, shows the benefits of the new Turkish-African engagement in the near, and long-term, future. The Russian offensive in Ukraine raises the question of Turkish presence in North Africa (Libya) and in the Sahel. Some NATO members see it as more than a fait accompli, but as a real opportunity for the Atlantic Alliance to counter Moscow’s plans on the African continent. Washington is also closely monitoring the relationship between Ankara and Moscow in Africa, and is keen to see the establishment of numerous Turkish military bases in Libya. Even though relations are not always well between Turkey and the United States, Washington appreciates Ankara’s aggressiveness in the field of arms sales, which creates a sort of “spoiling game” against China and Russia in the region, and which serves to impose technologies and doctrines identical to those of the United States.

^[1] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/17/la-turquie-de-retour-sur-la-mer-rouge_5243048_3212.html

^[2] J. R. Mateos, J. L. Suárez De Vivero, « Maritime Europe and EU Enlargement. A Geopolitical Perspective », Marine Policy, vol. 30, n° 2, mars 2006, p. 167-172

^[3] Aris Marghélis, Les délimitations maritimes Turquie-gouvernement d’entente nationale libyen et Grèce-Égypte dans leur contexte régional, Neptunus, e.revue, Université de Nantes, Vol. 27, 2021/2

^[4] https://www.geostrategia.fr/sultans-of-swing-quand-la-marine-turque-veut-tendre-vers-la-puissance-regionale/

^[5] https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/Erdoğan-aux-petits-soins-pour-l-algerie-27-05-2018-2221667_24.php.

^[6] REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN LIBYA 16 November 2015 United Nations Support Mission in Libya

^[7] http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/blog/kod-adi-sakir

^[8] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/1062328/politique/turquie-le-soft-power-savamment-distille-dErdoğan-en-afrique/

^[9] https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/pand%C3%A9mie-de-covid-19-la-turquie-continue-dapporter-son-soutien-%C3%A0-lalg%C3%A9rie/1832996

^[10] https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/la-tika-continue-%C3%A0-soutenir-le-gouvernement-tunisien-dans-sa-lutte-contre-la-covid-19-/1997986

^[11] https://ecfr.eu/article/turkeys-drone-diplomacy-lessons-for-europe/

^[12] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1122534/politique/armement-la-tunisie-porte-dentree-de-la-turquie-sur-le-continent/

^[13] https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/politique/Erdoğan-la-turquie-et-lalg%C3%A9rie-sengagent-%C3%A0-renforcer-la-coop%C3%A9ration-dans-le-domaine-de-lindustrie-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-/2589788

^[14] http://www.le360.ma/fr/politique/la-turquie-veut-intensifier-sa-cooperation-militaire-avec-le-maroc-24735

^[15] https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/maroc-dans-quel-le-royaume-cherifien-s-equipe-t-il-de-drones-405224