War in Sudan: Will the state model be usurped by militias?

About ten years ago, Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein presented the Sudanese parliament with his ministry’s payroll report. However, his presentation was more than a ministerial performance statement; it reflected the performance of the state. He openly expressed concern over the low recruitment rates in the armed forces, attributing this issue to several factors: low salaries, the devaluation of the currency, and a preference among young people to seek employment in gold mining areas. His comments followed the secession of South Sudan, a move that led to the country’s loss of over 70% of its oil wealth in the southern region. The local currency’s value took a significant dip as a result, and gold mining became the primary source of wealth, surpassing oil. A considerable number of young people gravitated toward artisanal and small-scale gold mining areas, lured by the promise of employment in a nation grappling with pervasive unemployment.

Furthermore, in mid-2014, the Minister of Defense indicated that the army was addressing its manpower shortage by drawing on national service conscripts and members of the Popular Defence Forces, and that implementation of army rehabilitation projects stood at less than 50% completion.

The situation that the then Minister of Defense presented raised a fundamental question: Is the state supplanting the conventional military with militias and battalions? And how will this dynamic unfold in the future?

Shortly thereafter, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, rose to prominence as the leader of a group that backed the army in its war against rebel movements in Darfur. This group is a new offshoot of the ill-reputed “Janjaweed” forces, which the central government employed early on at the outbreak of war in Darfur in 2003.
The Janjaweed are predominantly Arab tribal groups that allied with the central government. Previously functioning as border guards, they grew into a fighting militia alongside the regular army, fighting rebel movements of African descent. In alliance with the central government, these groups waged ethnic wars in Darfur.

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo gained notoriety when he appeared in a video boasting about his militia, taunting the regular army, and defying them. “We are the government. It is only once the government has an army that we will be able to arrive at an understanding. We order the arrest or release of individuals, and those who do not fight should not be allowed to voice their opinions,” he proclaimed.

This statement, coupled with the influence Hemedti wielded in shaping the chaotic scene, was a clear indicator of the country’s dire situation and a grave warning of its future prospects.

A mere year later, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – widely known as “Hemedti” -made headlines in the military sphere when he led a decisive battle against the preeminent Darfur movement, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Jibril Ibrahim. Known as the “Goz Dango” battle, this clash marked a turning point in the crackdown on armed movements fighting Omar al-Bashir’s regime and is often cited as the effective end of the armed rebellion in Darfur. This battle is seen as the catalyst that ignited Hemedti’s and his group’s political ambitions, leading to their transformation into an independent military and economic power. Amid widespread controversy, the Sudanese parliament passed a special law in 2017 recognizing these forces’ affiliation with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The said law stipulated that these forces would operate under orders from the commander-in-chief, then-President Omar al-Bashir. The law preserved their financial autonomy and ratified the president’s prerogative to assimilate them into the SAF at his discretion. In addition to their responsibilities in supporting the SAF in border protection and national security, the law also stipulated that they would execute any directives assigned to them by the president.

A protracted history of reliance on battalions and militias

The SAF relied entirely on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to fight armed movements in Darfur. The central government allied with Arab tribes to stifle opposition movements of African descent, turning war into an ethnic conflict. Indeed, the central government had a long history of building militias, particularly by recruiting Arab tribes. However, during Omar al-Bashir’s rule (1989–2019), which was marked by widespread rebellion in Darfur, the government’s relationship with these militias shifted from mere recruitment or temporary deployment to a core alliance. In 2015, when Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) infiltrated the regular military system and built extensive regional ties. The fighting there involved both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, and large groups from both sides are still guarding Saudi Arabia’s borders. In a similar vein, the RSF participated in the fighting in Libya alongside Haftar’s forces under Emirati auspices, enabling them to forge a pivotal alliance with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

These events unfolded at the behest and with the blessing of Sudan’s leadership, which at the time was gravitating toward an alliance with the Gulf States in exchange for the severing of its ties with Iran. State institutions were quick to denounce those who warned about the potential dangers of having independent armed groups. During Omar al-Bashir’s rule, the government and its political supporters – namely the Islamic Movement – provided political and moral cover for the militias’ crimes in Darfur. There, the militias carried out ethnic cleansing, burned villages, and forcibly displaced their inhabitants, while the SAF aided and abetted the said crimes. Ultimately, the militias’ innumerable atrocities resulted in Omar al-Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his involvement in the Darfur war.

Several years later, in 2019, al-Bashir’s regime was overthrown, and the militia rose to power alongside the regular army. Having established its presence on the battlefield, effectively propped up al-Bashir’s regime, and remained neutral during the protests against the said regime, the December Revolution seemed like an opportunity for the militia to capitalize on its achievements. However, the competition for power ended in an armed standoff with the SAF, which escalated into a war that continues to plague the country.
Sudan’s current predicament is a direct result of the existence of a parallel army and the outcome of years of the regular army’s reliance on and subordination to allied militias. The Popular Defence Forces (PDF) played a significant role during the SAF’s war against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan, which culminated in South Sudan’s independence in 2011. The PDF was primarily composed of elements loyal to the Islamic movement in thought and doctrine, as well as tribal elements in the border areas of Kordofan and Darfur – regions neighboring South Sudan.

The concept of militias or paramilitary forces can arguably be found in several countries around the world. These groups typically operate under the command of regular armies. However, due to political and ethnic complexities, as well as the absence of a modern state model, the situation in Sudan is quite different.

Multiple armies: an old dilemma exacerbated by war

The collapse of Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year regime created an opening to tackle this issue head-on and permanently put an end to the armed conflict. This was particularly significant given that al-Bashir’s rule had seen the largest armed rebellion in Sudan’s history, and possibly in the region. Numerous military groups opposed al-Bashir’s government, particularly in Darfur and the eastern part of the country.
Seven armed movements signed a landmark peace agreement, the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan, with the transitional government in 2020. Two movements were excluded: the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu, which controls parts of South Kordofan; and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM-A), led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed Ahmed Al Nour, which controls parts of the Jebel Marra region in Darfur.

The agreements stipulate political participation in state bodies and include specific quotas. As for the fighters of these organizations, they are subject to the security arrangements outlined in the peace agreements regarding integration and demobilization. However, hostilities erupted in Sudan before these arrangements, which faced myriad obstacles, could be finalized.
In recent history, preceding the advent of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan has endured significant repercussions for the languid pace at which peace agreements have been executed. Following the 2005 Naivasha Agreement – also known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement- which ended the 20-year civil war between successive central governments and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM-A), led by John Garang, and resulted in the proclamation of the state of South Sudan, the Sudanese government failed to resolve the security arrangements in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions, which border South Sudan. After South Sudan’s secession, war broke out in these areas, and remnants of the SPLM-N in northern Sudan maintained their strongholds and armies.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) continues to control certain areas in southern Kordofan under the leadership of Abdulaziz al-Hilu. Al-Hilu recently entered into an alliance with the Rapid Support Forces. Despite a significant rift within the SPLM-N, the movement maintains its hold on regions within the Blue Nile state. This has led to the rise of Malik Agar, an ally of the regular army, who now controls several areas in the Blue Nile.

War: a fertile breeding ground for militias

The April 15 war revealed that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had always relied on militias to fight on its behalf. However, as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) expanded their recruitment operations, the SAF was reduced to a command structure (mainly ranking officers) while the RSF served as the army’s infantry. Consequently, when war broke out, the SAF was forced to close its ranks and prepare for battle in the wake of the infantry’s mutiny.

Indeed, the SAF ultimately prioritized protecting itself and its units over defending civilians. In the aftermath of the first shots fired, the SAF initiated preparations for war. Meanwhile, the RSF continued to massacre civilians, reaffirming its notorious reputation and criminal record. As the RSF expanded its control on the ground and cities rapidly fell into its hands, voices of armed popular resistance emerged, openly supported by elements loyal to the former regime. Press reports revealed that Islamist movements had infiltrated popular resistance groups throughout the country. Once the SAF ceased protecting civilians, people had no choice but to engage in armed resistance to protect themselves from RSF attacks before joining the regular army in combat. Regional, ethnic, and tribal groups gradually multiplied under the banner of popular resistance.
Thus, the SAF appears to have pushed the entire country into a state of “militization” to counter a single militia. There are four main military formations supporting the SAF that are further divided into smaller factions:

The Sudanese Popular Resistance Factions (PRF): Before adopting this designation, resistance operations consisted of mobilization (“Istinfar”) and recruitment. Individuals willing to fight voluntarily joined the nearest army unit. Young Islamists affiliated with the former regime were among the first to advocate for such mobilization. The SAF seemingly tried to mitigate the Islamic influence in these popular operations by broadening the scope of the popular resistance to include all factions, thus attempting to neutralize or diminish the strong Islamist momentum within the movement. Four Islamist battalions, none of which had necessarily been directly linked to the former regime’s institutions, had been involved in the Sudanese Popular Resistance Forces (PRF) since the war’s early months. There were also a number of small, regionally based factions.

The response to popular resistance exhibited significant regional variation, yet the subjugation of the Al-Jazirah state by the RSF in December 2023 signaled a genuine shift in the positioning of popular resistance on the scene. Amid growing fears of RSF threats, armed resistance increased, prompting large-scale violations by RSF forces in the Al-Jazirah region of central Sudan as the army withdrew and left citizens to fend for themselves.
The army chief is seeking to control the popular resistance by making sweeping changes to its leadership. Since its inception, the resistance has been led by prominent figures or loyalists of the former regime. However, this leadership is likely to transfer to former army officers loyal to the army chief.

The Darfur Joint Protection Force: This includes several major Darfur armed movements that fought against al-Bashir’s government. The most notable are the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Arko Minawi (SLM/A – Minawi) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) commanded by Jibril Ibrahim. These movements previously signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan in 2020, but their integration into the SAF and other state forces has not yet been finalized. During the transition period, the two sides made mutual accusations and engaged in heated verbal altercations during meetings on security arrangements. These movements accuse the SAF of stalling the integration of their fighters into the official military system.

At the start of the war, all of these groups held a neutral position. However, the RSF’s significant advances in the Darfur region prompted a shift in their position, leading them to renounce neutrality and align themselves with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), engaging in combat operations. Given the profound rifts between the SAF and the RSF, these movements, internally fractured, witnessed certain factions aligning with the RSF while others rallied behind the Sudanese Armed Forces. The joint protection force participates in all SAF operations throughout central and western Sudan and is heavily deployed in northern Sudan.
The Joint Protection Force was formed under the transitional government to protect civilians in Darfur. Due to the slow progress of integrating fighters into the regular armed forces, these movements have been actively recruiting in several areas of Sudan, thereby increasing their number of fighters.

The Sudan Shield Forces (SSF): This force is led by Abu Aqla Kikel. Until October 2024, Kikel had been allied with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). He joined the RSF in August 2023 and became commander of the Al-Jazirah sector, but later defected. His defection and subsequent enlistment in the SAF ignited a firestorm of controversy, eliciting a broad spectrum of reactions, ranging from endorsement to condemnation. The RSF’s large-scale reprisals in areas of Kikel’s community in eastern Al-Jazirah state were a response to his defection. Following his defection, Kikel rallied thousands of fighters and, in collaboration with the SAF and the Darfur Joint Protection Forces, initiated a campaign to reclaim control of Al-Jazirah state and expel the RSF forces from the region. His military forces are currently engaged in operations in the Kordofan axis in conjunction with other military formations.

The Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) share ethnic and regional similarities with the RSF and the Darfur movements. It is the first armed movement to be seen in central Sudan, a region historically unfamiliar with military formations other than the regular armed forces. After the fall of al-Bashir’s government, an ethnic and regional balance of power appears to have been sought to be established by the central government in the wake of the Darfur movements’ rise to power.
The SSF are actively engaged in large-scale recruitment operations in Al-Jazirah, White Nile, and the Butana Plain. These areas stretch along a continuous border strip connecting central, eastern, and northern Sudan. The regions of Al-Jazirah and the Nile River are currently experiencing a surge in ethnic-based recruitment efforts by the SSF and the Darfur Joint Protection Force.

The Special Support Groups (battalions): These are major formations that were established in response to mobilization and calls for popular armed resistance. The most notable of these are the Islamist-oriented “Al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion” and the “Angry Without Borders” (“Al-Ghadiboun“) group. The latter is composed of members of the resistance committees from the December Revolution. The SAF’s strategy to dismantle the distinct identities of these groups is driven by a desire to diminish their political clout. In doing so, they resort to classifying them as “special support groups,” effectively erasing their autonomy and distinctiveness. These groups are currently engaged in active operations. The “Angry Without Borders” group, which is linked to the December Revolution, had clearly been granted significant operational momentum. This was done so that the Al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion would not become the sole voice of young people in the groups supportive of the regular armed forces. While the SAF controls all these groups financially, some have maintained their autonomy, with their own identities, independent media, and spheres of influence. Furthermore, a few possess independent financial resources.

Consequently, armed groups have proliferated throughout the country. They exercise independent authority in many regions, setting up checkpoints on roads and charging travelers passing through them tolls. There are constant clashes between citizens and members of these groups, as well as between the groups and the SAF, resulting in casualties. Several factions operate with arrest powers independent of the SAF and security services. Calls for popular resistance have created opportunities for people with criminal records involved in smuggling and drug trafficking to protect their activities. In response, citizens in certain regions have resorted to armed self-defense.

The Rapid Support Forces: A Policy of Tribal Militarization

In the nascent months of the war, the RSF found themselves with an abundance of combatants. However, as their military presence expanded in central Sudan, they began to mobilize tribes loyal to them, which caused the social fabric to be exposed to unprecedented fragmentation. The RSF relied mainly on “Al-Faza’a,” a traditional Bedouin concept of rapid, unconditional mobilization and solidarity, similar to contracting, whereby large groups are prepared to carry out specific military operations. The tribes were easily persuaded to cooperate by the RSF, as native administrations had been sought to be controlled by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) since his rise to power in 2019 through lavish gifts. These native administrations leveraged their societal clout to persuade young tribesmen to fight alongside the RSF. Despite some pleas to stop enlisting tribal youth, leaders of the aforementioned administrations persist in sending their young men to fight, enticed by the high salaries offered by the RSF, as well as the looting and theft, commonly referred to as spoils of war.

In Sudan, native administrations are considered a traditional system of government. This system is presided over by a “Nazir” (paramount chief) and an “Omda” (the village headman). While this system does not supersede the official laws of the state, the authority of the native administrations in the Darfur and Kordofan regions often prevails over the official state administration. The state frequently delegates to native administrations the responsibility of overseeing their respective domains in a manner it deems appropriate, particularly with regard to matters of land disputes and intertribal conflicts.

Due to ethnic and regional considerations, most tribes in these regions are loyal to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). However, some of these tribes are deeply divided due to the intense polarization between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. In the midst of this widespread militarization, several armed movements and factions have joined the RSF in this war, including:

Factions of the Darfur Joint Protection Force: These are factions affiliated with the movements signatories to the previously mentioned Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan. They recently opted to align with the RSF, and are presently engaged in combat alongside it.

The Tamazuj (Third Front) Movement: Despite having no history of armed action against Omar al-Bashir’s government, it is one of the movements that came to the fore under the transitional government and signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan in 2020. The movement comprises remnants of the border tribes’ forces that had previously fought alongside the SAF against the SPLM under the banner of the Popular Defense Forces. Afterwards, some of its members joined the fighting in South Sudan during the 2013 war.

The Shuja’an (Braves) of Kordofan Movement: This movement has the strongest media presence and is mainly composed of members of the Misseria tribe. This tribe constitutes the second most sizable constituent of the RSF, surpassed only by the Rizeigat tribe, the tribe to which Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo belongs. The Shuja’an (Braves) of Kordofan group is comprised of remnants of elements affiliated with the Popular Defence Forces that participated in active combat in Libya. When war broke out in Sudan, the movement joined the fighting alongside the RSF. The group’s leaders have a significant social media presence. Despite its history of fierce combat, the group has tried to maintain an independent position within the RSF. However, its leader was reportedly killed in an airstrike under unclear circumstances.

Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council Factions: These groups are said to have split from the tribal leader Musa Hilal and sided with the RSF, and they are considered to be the most Arab-oriented of the RSF forces. Their leader, Musa Hilal, is regarded as the progenitor of the Janjaweed in its original form, although a profound rift developed between him and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo due to rivalry, prompting Hilal to align himself more closely with the SAF. It is noteworthy that the central government’s efforts to thwart the ambitions of Arab tribal leader Musa Hilal included providing unwavering support to his protégé Hemedti.

Several smaller factions also support the Rapid Support Forces. However, it is abundantly evident that all these groups have been incorporated into the RSF. In contrast to certain groups that support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), these groups lack an autonomous political or media presence, with the exception of the Shuja’an (Braves) of Kordofan Movement, which sought independence but has since been reduced to silence following the assassination of its leader and the capture of its prominent figures.
Such formations are improbable to adopt an autonomous position, partly due to the salaries disbursed by the RSF, which are likely to be more lucrative, but also because the primary force within the RSF appears to be the prevailing entity in terms of field operations.

This has resulted in an unparalleled surge in crime and lawlessness in RSF-held areas, where a significant portion of the population has historically been displaced. Despite the establishment of a parallel government in the city of Nyala in South Darfur by the RSF, the success of this endeavor has been consistently unattained due to the lack of discipline among its members and the rampant proliferation of arms. Furthermore, the 2003 war left wounds that the Darfur region has yet to mend.

Eastern Sudan: An exceptional situation

According to press reports, eight armed factions are active in eastern Sudan. Some of these factions were active before the war, while others emerged or expanded after the conflict began on April 15. It is important to note that eastern Sudan has a long-standing history of military formations dating back to the late 1990s. These formations signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) with the central government led by Omar al-Bashir in 2006. Some factions refused to enter into any peace agreement, preferring to maintain their presence in Eritrea. Following the outbreak of war in Khartoum, eastern Sudan remained unaffected. However, as the war escalated and hostilities expanded, armed activity escalated in this region of geopolitical importance, giving rise to a number of armed factions that had received training in Eritrea. Given the predominance of tribal leadership in the eastern regions of the country, these factions became instruments of acute ethnic polarization between the fractured eastern communities, with some offering support to the SAF while others spurned the conflict. Earlier this month, five armed factions signed the Eastern Sudan Alliance charter. In a large public speech, they announced their opposition to the war, distancing themselves from the SAF’s war against the RSF. Since then, some tribal leaders and factions in eastern Sudan have continued to voice their rejection of the central government’s relocation to Port Sudan, interpreting it as an attempt to bring the war to eastern Sudan.
The region’s importance to regional and international powers due to its ports has led to concerns that it could be a volatile situation.


Sudanese people found themselves facing a new reality that was more complex and less manageable. The war resulted in the dismantling of all traditional centers of power, paving the way for the emergence of new, predominantly regional and ethnic, armed powers. While this reality may appear to have been forged by the April 15th war, it is, in essence, the inevitable and rational culmination of a protracted sequence of missteps and inaction in confronting pressing national concerns and inherent disparities in the Sudanese state’s framework. However, the accounts of this war differ, with different political parties trying to blame it on the authoritarian tendencies of certain groups. The truth is that the Sudanese people are now facing the consequences of the government’s poor management and its inability to address crucial national issues. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and its proxy, the Rapid Support Forces, which seeks to usurp the country, reminds us that the roots of this crisis do not date back to when the RSF rose to power. Regrettably, the replication of futile solutions on a large scale is occurring despite these very solutions being responsible for the country’s current predicament.