


WILL US TARIFFS SPUR PAN-ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?



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Economic research paper series, October 2025
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, North Africa Office

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Traduction, Graphic and Design : Roots Prod



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
**This publication is supported with funds from
Rosa Luxemburg stiftung, North Africa office.**

The contents of this publication de not necessarily
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As the global economic system undergoes accelerated and tumultuous changes in 2025, the US administration's imposition of draconian tariffs on Chinese imports during Donald Trump's second term in office is a stark expression of the strong-arm tactics driving US trade policy under the Trump administration. In a move that transcends mere economic gambit, such tariffs stood at 145%, marking a deliberate escalation in a trade war that not only impacts the parties directly involved, but reverberates throughout the global economy as a whole. China did not stand idly by, retaliating with tariffs of up to 125% on US goods, thus instilling a climate of uncertainty and resetting the balance of trade, costs, and logistics. It bears noting the complex and intertwined repercussions of this tension on an international level. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde cautioned that these policies may trigger a disinflationary impact across the European Union, with China shifting the focus of its exports from the US market to the European market, thus creating a low-priced commodity influx that may crowd out domestic production and disrupt the continent's monetary policies.¹

For the Arab world, however, the situation is even more convoluted. The US tariffs are not uniformly applied across the region, but rather demonstrate glaring disparities that further entrench the structural vulnerability of these countries proportional to their dependence to the global economy. While the Gulf Cooperation Council member states are subject to a 10% tariff, a number of other Arab countries are burdened with stifling tariffs: Syria faces 41%, Iraq 30%, Libya 30%, Algeria 30%, Tunisia 25% and Jordan 20%.² Such disparity is no mere statistic, but rather an expression of a fractured economic reality that requires Arab decision-makers to seriously examine the situation.



¹ Sky News Arabia. (2025). "Tariffs could have a disinflationary impact on Europe." <http://bit.ly/4nL91a>.(2025). سكاي نيوز عربية. "الرسوم الجمركية قد يكون لها تأثير انكماشى على أوروبا".

²https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/further-modifying-the-reciprocal-tariff-rates/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Within the Arab geopolitical sphere, economic integration continues to be an unresolved issue. Despite the region's considerable human and natural resources and its strategic location, an integrated regional economic model comparable to other experiences such as the European Union has yet to emerge.

It is not for lack of attempts, as evidenced by initiatives such as Resolution No.17 issued by the Council of Arab Economic Unity in 1964, establishing the four freedoms: freedom of movement of people and capital, free exchange of goods, freedom of transport and transit and freedom of residence, work and economic activities. Yet these principles remained largely on paper. Why has this vision not been actualized? Could it be due to political considerations, a lack of will, or the absence of an institutional framework? How is it that the past decades have not yielded a pan-Arab project capable of weathering global fluctuations and of competing in the international economy?

As international policies tend toward greater isolationism and differentiation, there is a resurgent need to raise this issue today, not as mere speculation, but rather as a strategic imperative to reshape the North-South relationship. History may unfold in moments of crisis, affording rare opportunities such as the chance to establish an Arab economic system that reinstates the notion of mutual dependence and lays the foundations for a long-lasting resilience. Will the Arab world capitalize on this opportunity? Or will we squander it once again, allowing the issue to remain in limbo, pending adoption not as an individual contemplation, but as a cross-generational project?

In order to provide a response, it may be valuable to step beyond impassioned rhetoric toward more realistic analytical approaches. Neo-functionalism then looms as a framework that, rather than providing definitive answers, affords opportunities to ponder the possibilities of Arab integration. This theory is quite simple and implicitly intricate: integration begins not at political summits, but on common ground, i.e., in factories, ports, markets and production lines that converge without much fanfare³. Therein, in these day-to-day economic spheres, intricate relationships are interwoven, propelling the parties — often unconsciously — toward further cooperation and greater overlap. It's referred to as “functional spillover,” a metaphor for the slow movement that shifts integration from one sector to another, from commodity to policy.

Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter have both spoken about this particular form of accumulation, whereby the state is not the sole actor on the scene, but is joined by other actors such as companies, institutions and individuals who shape the economy as they do politics. The current US protectionist measures may represent more than an imminent threat, they are powerful external pressures that forces the domestic sphere to reorganize, engage in self-reflection and build bridges, rather than rely on slogans. An opportunity, not as a salvation, but as a peaceful and promising start to a project that has long been relegated to indecision. It is a project that will have to start from the ground up, from institutions and simple daily actions that, over time, will accumulate to accomplish what slogans had failed to achieve.

³Schmitter, P. C. (1969). Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration. *International Organization*, 23(1), 161–166. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705772>

Dimensions of the prospective opportunity: A pan-Arab integration approach amidst international trade developments

Rapid shifts in the global economy, driven by recent U.S. tariff policies, bring both challenges and opportunities for Arab countries. Seizing these opportunities requires attention to three strategic dimensions:

Firstly: Redirecting trade flows

For the Arab world, however, particularly for countries encumbered by high customs tariffs such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Jordan, US markets are no longer as accessible as they once were. The shrinking of this market underlines the necessity to redirect these trade flows toward Arab neighbors.

Given the new economic balance of power, boosting intra-Arab trade has become less of a development imperative and more of a necessity. While a fraction of total Arab trade is still accounted for by intra-Arab trade, opportunities for developing effective integration networks are offered by the variation in tariff rates. Manufacturing and assembly hubs for goods and components sourced from countries with higher customs charges could be hosted by countries with low tariffs, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council member states, Lebanon, Egypt, and Morocco. The nucleus of cooperative regional value chains would be observed, with resources and capabilities being integrated and the requirements of adjusting to the emerging international trading system—where almost everything is manufactured in China, or rather in Asia—being met.

Secondly: Repurposing investment procedures to favor intra-regional flows and industrial integration

The moment is at hand to transform bureaucracy from a hindrance to a valuable asset, a conduit rather than an impediment. However, streamlining investment procedures should not be reduced to the constant, unfettered liberalization rhetoric advocated by international financial institutions, which welcomes capital irrespective of productivity considerations. On the other hand, these procedures ought to be redesigned to promote intra-Arab trade and support integrative projects, such as joint industrial value chains, agro-industrial initiatives, and cross-border renewable energy projects. Therefore, expediting licensing, harmonizing documentation requirements, and establishing unified digital platforms would be practical tools toward achieving a strategic goal, namely, creating a joint production capacity. This would not only solidify autonomous Arab economic decision-making, but also create more employment opportunities, improved services, and tangible development prospects for Arab citizens.

Thirdly: Developing joint industrial projects

This third dimension is the most relevant to building a pan-Arab production capacity. In the current situation, a strategic opportunity arises for joint Arab industrial projects, particularly in sectors either directly affected by international trade shifts or in which the region has an inherent comparative advantage. Envision a scenario in which the financial resources of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states are amalgamated with the manufacturing

capabilities and human capital of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, and the skilled labor force of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, with the objective of cultivating integrated and competitive industries. These industries would include renewable energy, pharmaceuticals, food processing, and advanced manufacturing. Such industries have the potential to serve regional markets and subsequently expand into bigger markets.

Real-world challenges and determinants of realization: An overview of limitations and potentials

Although recent global transformations have offered opportunities, a thorough examination of the existing challenges and crucial determinants is likewise required. Failure to address these issues will hinder future progress.


First: The actual economic impacts of tariffs

The impacts of escalatory US tariffs are not confined to the trade sector; rather, they extend to the very fabric of the region's economies, particularly non-oil sectors that are reliant on import and export networks, such as electronics, automobiles, construction materials, and consumer goods. Non-oil sectors are currently grappling with mounting pressures, whether it be rising costs or the complexities of global supply chains. In countries that peg their currencies to the US dollar, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the situation is even more problematic. The Federal Reserve's decision to raise interest rates to curb inflation, partly due to trade disruptions, is undermining the competitiveness of exports and depleting trade surpluses. Furthermore, tensions in shipping lanes — the lifeline of Arab oil and non-oil exports — are leading to higher transportation costs and heightened trade risks. These issues have been reflected in the financial markets of Arab countries.

Second: The current state of pan-Arab economic integration

Efforts to attain pan-Arab economic unity culminated in multiple attempts dating back to the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, as part of an early, albeit mostly theoretical, awareness of the need for economic unity to gain collective strength in an allied world. The 1950s saw the signing of a number of aspirational agreements intended to enhance trade cooperation and facilitate economic exchange, most notably the 1953 Convention for Facilitating Trade Exchange and the Regulation of Transit Trade and the establishment of the Council for Arab Economic Unity in 1957⁴, followed by the launch of the first Arab Common Market in 1964 with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq joining. These attempts were both admirable and strategically significant, yet they failed to yield the desired results. Most of them either fell short of implementation or faced resounding failure upon encountering structural obstacles, divergent national policies and prohibitively steep customs and procedural roadblocks. On the contrary, there was a dearth of political determination and functional organizational frameworks to propel the initiative beyond mere rhetoric and recurrent meetings lacking in enforceable resolutions.

⁴Kück, G. (1983). The Arab Economic Unity Agreement: Objects and Reality. In G. Barthel & L. Rathmann (Ed.), *The Arab World and Asia between Development and Change: Dedicated to the XXXIst International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa* (pp. 205-212). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783112619681-018>



In a revamped, albeit fitful, effort to surmount these challenges, leaders from 22 Arab states gathered in Kuwait in 2009 for the first Arab summit devoted to economic, developmental and social affairs amid a global financial crisis and the Gaza war. This underscores the nexus between the imperative for integration and the capricious regional and international contexts. The "Solidarity with the Palestinian People in Gaza" summit yielded numerous resolutions expressing support for stability and development. Most notably, these resolutions included the establishment of a joint development fund with an initial capitalization of \$2 billion, earmarked for the financing of Arab development initiatives.

This initiative is designed to catalyze economic growth and fortify regional cooperation⁵. The "Kuwait Declaration" stressed the importance of improving living standards in Arab countries and prioritizing joint pan-Arab investments, advocating for the involvement of the private sector and civil society in the economic and social development process, promoting intra-Arab investments and facilitating the movement of capital⁶

Pan-Arab economic integration is of paramount strategic significance. Not a luxury or an option, it is rather an imperative given its pivotal role in upholding political and social stability, which is the foundation of any sustainable development and resilience in the face of crises. Unifying Arab markets and increasing their overall size would create genuine investment opportunities and stimulate economic growth, thereby reducing unemployment and poverty rates, a fertile ground for instability and social and political unrest. This, in turn, would alleviate social and political pressures and immunize societies. The findings of development studies corroborate the notion that the advancement of regional trade and the digitalization of customs procedures engender heightened transparency and diminished income inequality. Consequently, these developments serve to foster "peace and stability" within the region.⁷

⁵ Al Jarida newspaper, (2019). "Kuwait Economic Summit 2009: Kuwait's first comprehensive humanitarian initiative to improve the lives of Arab citizens." <http://bit.ly/47QimngC> شاملمة كويتية شاملة 2009.. أول مبادرة إنسانية كويتية شاملة. "قمة الكويت الاقتصادية 2009". الجريدة. (2019). "للارتقاء بمعيشة المواطن العربي".

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Muto, A., & Rihane, A.-M. (2019). "Arab economic integration for growth, peace and stability." United Nations Development Programme. <https://www.undp.org/arab-states/blog/arab-economic-integration-growth-peace-and-stability>

This trend is consistent with certain economic and political theories arguing that higher levels of economic interdependence reduce the likelihood of conflict and maximize opportunities for inter-state cooperation. Furthermore, comparative policy models, as outlined by Seymour Martin Lipset, indicate a favorable relationship between economic growth and institutional stability, seeing that a thriving economy and an expanding middle class would rule societies more resilient to internal unrest - the tendency of those who benefit from economic stability to support the political system that delivers it is evident.⁸

Understanding the impediments to pan-Arab integration calls for an examination of the structural dimensions of dependency besetting the Arab region. As it stands, much of the region is beholden to the dollar-based global financial system and the oil-centered global capitalist economy. As explained by Ali Kadri in his book "Arab Development Denied," the Arab region has been systematically "denied" development through war, external pressures and neoliberal policies. Internal class structures and imperialism have impeded the development of an independent Arab production capacity, rendering control over oil reserves a key tool for external intervention, with short-term extraction being prized over long-term national development⁹. This intricate structure, which entraps Arab countries in a tangled web of financial, oil, and class dependency, concomitantly undergirds the challenges confronting integration. Even the reticent or self-interested positions adopted by some wealthy Arab states toward joint pan-Arab action projects are, in fact, a natural outcome of imperialist and neoliberal constraints, rendering any meaningful regional cooperation contingent upon the dismantling of such structural dependency as a prerequisite to transcending parochial nationalist visions; these positions are based on the belief that these projects may impose financial liabilities that could affect their revenues and curtail their ability to improve the welfare of their peoples. The broader pan-Arab interest—which is basically the ultimate guarantee of national interests in the long term—requires breaking the cycle of dependency and liberating the region from imperialist hegemony.

Consequently, the impetus for advancing pan-Arab economic integration is not merely an internal, social and political imperative that cannot be postponed; it is also an invaluable political and negotiating instrument in the face of alternative regional initiatives attempting to reconfigure the regional order outside the common Arab framework. These initiatives serve to undermine pan-Arab solidarity and perpetuate the fragmentation of the region and its subordination to external agendas, such as the recently resurgent "New Middle East" project.


Notwithstanding the abundance of rhetoric and summits, actual Arab achievements in the field of economic integration fall far short of the potential and pressing needs, as evidenced by previous historical endeavors. It has been more than twenty-five years since the establishment of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) in 1997—although it has had a relatively limited success in reducing a few traditional customs barriers—the overarching objective of establishing an effective Arab Customs Union remains a distant dream. Even the most advanced model in the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council, still grapples with significant structural challenges, ranging from disparities in development levels and conflicting national economic interests to divergent policies and legislations and regional competitive-

⁹ Kadri, A. (2015). "Arab development denied: Dynamics of accumulation by wars of encroachment." Anthem Press.

ness. This hinders endeavors to establish a bona fide Arab common market that eclipses the mere exchange of goods. The 2024 Arab Investment Climate Report documented 305 joint Arab projects, with investments totaling nearly \$66.3 billion in 2023¹⁰. While this represents a positive development, it is important to note that these figures are significantly influenced by the presence of chronic bureaucratic and regulatory roadblocks. These obstacles hinder the full realization of the significant potential and the fulfillment of the needs that exist within the region.

Third: Investment legislation and subordination to foreign agreements as impediments to integration

Legislative and bureaucratic complexities in Arab investment systems can hardly be explained without reference to the array of trade and investment agreements signed by Arab countries with external powers, which often impede bilateral or multilateral pan-Arab cooperation. For instance, partnership agreements signed since the 1990s between Maghreb countries and the European Union - such as the EU-Algeria Association Agreement in 2005, the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement in 1998 and the EU-Morocco Association Agreement in 2000, along with similar agreements with the United States and Canada - have imposed binding commitments that hindered these countries' ability to extend preferential trade arrangements to Arab partners. This has resulted in conflicting trade priorities¹¹. Morocco's foreign trade is, ironically, closely linked to the EU. In 2024¹², the EU accounted for approximately 62% of the country's total trade. Meanwhile, Moroccan imports from Arab countries constituted a mere 9.1% of total imports in 2023¹³. Thus, such agreements deepen Morocco's dependence on European markets to the detriment of the Arab common market.



¹⁰ The Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation. (2024). "Arab Investment Climate Report 2024" [Annual Report]. <https://www.dhaman.org/climate-reports/Climate%20E%202024.pdf>. المؤسسة العربية لضمان الاستثمار وائتمان الصادرات. (2024). "مناخ الاستثمار في الدول العربية 2024" [تقرير سنوي].

¹¹ Dadush, U., & Myachenkova, Y. (2018). Assessing the European Union's North Africa trade agreements. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 22. https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp_attachments/PC-22_2018.pdf

¹² Kasraoui, S. (2025). "Europe leads Morocco's trade despite slight drop in 2024." Morocco World News. <https://www.morocoworldnews.com/2025/07/233364/europe-leads-moroccos-trade-despite-slight-drop-in-2024>

¹³ Trading Economics. (n.d.). "Morocco merchandise imports from economies in the Arab World (% of total merchandise imports) – World Bank data." <https://tradingeconomics.com/morocco/merchandise-imports-from-economies-in-the-arab-world-percent-of-total-merchandise-imports-wb-data.html>

Fourth: Key determinants of achievement

Political will is clearly the decisive factor in achieving pan-Arab economic integration. After all, verbal declarations and meticulously devised strategies are but words in the absence of the genuine resolve of Arab leaders. Yet, history has shown that political will alone is not enough. It needs an institutional structure that can put it into action. It is insufficient to merely aspire toward integration; it must be an institutionalized objective, reinforced by a consortium of Arab entities operating with alacrity, akin to that of the European Union, predicated on the vision of Robert Schuman; a man who commenced the endeavor of European integration with a rather elementary yet pivotal notion: collaboration in pivotal sectors such as coal and steel. It signified the inaugural stride in cultivating intertwined economic relations, which transcended mere commerce, attaining such profundity that nations regarded each other as prospects rather than menaces.

It is essential that we start with humility and then methodically establish trust. Promises of great import, articulated in speeches, have the potential to be actualized, provided that we initiate with the most elementary of undertakings, such as collaborative economic initiatives that would empower Arab countries to cultivate effective and sustainable economic relations, rather than engaging in rhetorical confrontations. The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) is a case in point. It provides short- and medium-term credit facilities to member states to assist them in tackling balance of payments deficits, as well as boosting intra-Arab trade and capital flows. Since its inception in 1978 through 2019, the Fund has provided approximately 184 loans with a total value of 2.4 billion Arab accounting dinars (approximately \$10 billion¹⁴), a seemingly modest figure when compared to the size of the largest Arab economies, with a GDP exceeding \$3 trillion.

A parallel can be drawn with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which evolved from a free trade area to a customs union, subsequently inaugurating the Gulf Common Market in 2008. This engendered greater freedom of movement of goods, services, and capital among member states. Such institutions exemplify that the infrastructure for integration is already in place; however, it must be further refined and expanded to encompass the entire Arab region, as opposed to a particular geographical area.

The private sector is a key player in the economic sovereignty arena, and its role in promoting Arab integration cannot be overlooked. However, its role should not be confined to availing itself of facilities, but instead should extend to active participation in the design and implementation of projects servicing pan-Arab economic integration. Notwithstanding, the public sector shall maintain its preeminent role in the domains of strategy and major undertakings that necessitate a long-term perspective and considerable financial resources, which the private sector is often incapable of mustering. The endeavor to recalibrate the relationship between the two sectors in a manner that prioritizes national and regional interests is an integral component of a bona fide integration strategy.

As elucidated by the perspicacity of Robert Schuman, momentous accomplishments require time. It is an incremental process of laying new foundations and dismantling older roadblocks so that our accomplishments exceed expectations and ultimately culminate in undeniable achievements.

¹⁴Arab Monetary Fund. (n.d.). "Loan commitments." Arab Monetary Fund. <https://www.amf.org.ae/en/page/loan-commitments>

In sum, a genuine historic opportunity for pan-Arab economic integration is offered by the US tariffs and the fragile and complex reality they expose. However, they serve not merely as a portal to an erratic outside world; rather, they are an unrelenting internal summons for a seminal shift in the manner in which we approach and manage our economic undertakings. It is an opportunity to convert complex trade challenges and external limitations into actual opportunities to refocus Arab economies toward collaborative endeavors, fostering self-reliance, establishing joint financing mechanisms, and propelling joint ventures in strategic sectors that may become the robust foundations upon which such a desired new future is founded. It would be imprudent to reduce it to mere sloganeering, which appeals to Arab citizens' sentiments but falls short of practical implementation. As with any profound and comprehensive transformation, it requires more than just schemes or impassioned rhetoric. It calls for unprecedented political boldness to undertake difficult decisions, genuine and effective institutional capacity to bring about and sustain change, and the ability to think outside the box. Regardless of whether Washington elects to suspend tariffs for a period of 90 days, maintains their current status, or attains an equitable accord with China, this does not alter the imperative for Arab countries to chart their own course with their own instruments and for the benefit of their own populations. Numerous Arab countries, including Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria, are grappling with debilitating economic crises and are in dire need of the prospects that economic integration proffers; and it would be unwise of them to await rescue.

Will Arab countries seize the opportunity presented by Trump's policies?

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