

ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG

NORTH AFRICA OFFICE مكتب شمال افريقيا

FROM COLONIZATION TO SCHENGENISATION

**Socio-history
of migrations from the Maghreb to Europe**



Wael Garnaoui & Montassir Sakhi

Authors : **Wael Garnaoui** et **Montassir Sakhi**

Translated from French to English : **Borhen Hallek - Roots Prod**

Editorial design and illustration : **Yessine Ouerghemmi**

This publication is supported with funds from Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, North Africa Office. The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

This publication or parts of it can be quoted by others for free as long as they provide proper reference to the original publication.

Wael Garnaoui holds a doctorate in psychoanalysis and psychopathology from the University of Paris, and is a clinical psychologist. He is an assistant professor at the University of Sousse, and founder of a network of researchers on “Border Studies” at the Anthropology Center in Sousse, where he conducts research on migration policies, borderization processes and their impact on the political subjectivities of populations in the global South, particularly in the Tunisian context. He is the author of the book “Harga et désir d'Occident” (Harga and Desire for the West) published by Nirvana in 2022.

Montassir Sakhi holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Paris 8, is resident at the Institute for Advanced Studies (UM6P-Morocco) and an anthropologist at KU Leuven (Belgium).

His research focuses on borders, the repression of mobility and the phenomenon of revolution in the Arab world. He is the author of 'La Révolution et le djihad : Syrie, France, Belgique', published by La Découverte (2023).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

■	INTRODUCTION	5
1.	IMMIGRATION ON THE EVE OF COLONIZATION: FROM THE "INTERNAL" OTHER TO THE "EXTERNAL" OTHER	7
2.	BORDER PERMEABILITY IN THE ARAB-MUSLIM TRADITION PRIOR TO COLONIZATION	10
3.	INTERNAL REFORMS AND COLONIZATION: USHERING IN THE ERA OF BORDERIZATION	13
4.	THE COLONIAL PERIOD : THE PARADOXES OF "FREE MOVEMENT" IN THE ALGERIAN CASE	16
5.	FROM ECONOMISM TO XENOPHOBIC POLITICAL FRAMEWORK : THE IRRUPTION OF THE "CLANDESTINE" FIGURE	21
6.	THE BORDER DEBATE IN EUROPE	24
7.	THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHENGEN AREA	27
■	CONCLUSION	28

INTRODUCTION

In studying the postcolonial shift which, a few decades after the independence of the countries of the southern Mediterranean, gave rise to the emergence of the figure of the immigrant, we are not calling for the recognition of rights nor demanding the integration of former colonies into the postcolonial empire¹. The aim of this article's genealogy of the border, in its contemporary European form, is to show how what presents itself as humanitarian, regulatory and promoting integration and diversity, is in fact an inhospitable border policy conscious of the privilege accumulated since colonial times. By integrating European societies into this inhospitable post-colonial community, border policy makes the choice of relegating southern populations to the margins and to immobility - regardless of the new authoritarian post-colonial systems that govern these populations.

Intellectual figures such as Frantz Fanon and committed sociologists such as Abdelmalek Sayad have been warning since the end of the colonial era against this "Cunning of history", which characterizes the environments that have inherited this integrationist thinking, which has become a tool in the quest for recognition, further separating privileged societies from others that have been exploited. In keeping with the Fanonian tradition and political anthropology², our approach is both sociological and political. Our aim is to show how the post-colonial hegemony of former metropolises uses the border as a weapon against former colonies and their civil societies, and the resulting transformations in subjectivities.

To turn away from such a problematic by insisting on humanist dimensions such as "integration" is to forget the right to free movement and the danger of the disintegration of the immigrant from the point of view of their society of origin, and in a global way the de-subjectification and deflagration that threaten the whole of the society of origin exposed to the politics of borders. In short, it means overlooking what emigration means in terms of settlement conditions, bans on movement and, more generally, a desire for the West founded on migration

1 On the concept of Empire, we refer to the work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, who approach the emergence of "globalization" and the new Western hegemony after the fall of the Berlin Wall from the point of view of "forms of legal ordering". Questions of law, rights and legal arrangements (from exile to the problem of "undocumented" migrants) are indeed at the heart of migration policies closing borders in front of the South. See : Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Collection Essais éditions Exils, Paris, 2000.

2 In terms of method, this article follows Michel Foucault's indications concerning his work claiming to be both the archaeology of knowledge and the genealogy of powers. See Michel Foucault, *Security, territory, population*. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, Seuil, Paris, 2004.

The work envisaged in this article, which we have also initiated in previous publications as part of a research program supported by the Rosa-Luxembourg Foundation, involves reviving the method that runs through the work of critical thinkers engaged in struggles such as Frantz Fanon, Abdelmalek Sayad, Sylvain Lazarus and the psychoanalytical method as taught by Sigmund Freud. What these references have in common, and can be extended by other names from Marx to Gramsci, is undoubtedly the notion of political inquiry, which consists in taking seriously the political decision and thought that are woven into the acts and words of people who are both actors in the political facts observed and subjects of postcolonial hegemonic and state policies.

policies based on economist and legal selections. As a result, such an undertaking to unveil the neo-colonialist logics that find repressive power in border policies in no way clears the way for the internal struggles of societies in the South, struggles that are necessary if we are to emerge from our condition: indeed, it's a matter of avoiding the internal/external duality by showing the entanglement of the two logics that lead to the status quo.

Beyond the precautions of method and epistemology, the urgent need to investigate the continuums traced by border policies and devices finds its ethical *raison d'être* in the need to show responsibility for the crimes committed through this contemporary power. Death in border areas has a history that clearly begins with devices, such as the Schengen Visa, that integrate some (citizens of Europe) and disintegrate communities exposed to death and disappearance, as in the case of so-called irregular migrants. These systems have a history that prolongs an earlier domination - colonization. They have actors and representatives, activists and spaces for the building of xenophobic and racist discourse. It is in this sense that we need to understand the manifestation of the border, its outlines and its effects, in order to better pose the problem and participate in contemporary and forthcoming struggles waged by the individuals and communities who confront it.



IMMIGRATION ON THE EVE OF COLONIZATION: FROM THE "INTERNAL" OTHER TO THE "EXTERNAL" OTHER

Tunisia's history shows that the country has always been a land of immigration. The Mediterranean, which borders the country to the north and east, has, like most other countries on its shores, made a major contribution to its human and social history. A land open to diverse cultures³, Tunisia has, in modern times, welcomed several generations⁴ of Livornese, Turks, Andalusians and, before the French occupation in 1881, Maltese, and even more Sicilians: "The Italian population was estimated at 2,000 in 1866 and 10,000 in 1888, compared with 700 French people at the same date⁵".

Maltese immigration, which began as early as 1815, was primarily due to the unemployment and poverty that prevailed in Malta in the early 19th century⁶. This migratory movement intensified once the Unification of Italy was concluded in 1870. The number of Sicilian migrants in Tunisia continued to grow, due to the declining fertility of Sicilian land and the difficulties of cultivating it: "The police and gendarmerie are trying to halt the flow of stowaways, for whom Tunisia remains the Promised Land⁷", according to a daily newspaper of the time. Misery drove them to emigrate to Tunis, where work opportunities were plentiful: craftsmen, fishermen and miners all flocked there, actively contributing to the development of trade in the North African regions in general. In his article, Tayeb Khouni describes the influx of "clandestine" Sicilian migrants on the Tunisian coast, and the posture of the police of the time to contain the flow of migrants who shouted at them: "We're starving in Sicily, we'd rather die here than go back there⁸."

Kamel Jerfel showed how the Maghreb countries have always been a magnet for migrants from the northern Mediterranean. The migratory flows of southern Italians marked this North-South migration, which is reminiscent of the current South-North migration of Tunisians to Europe:

"A sky-high proportion of emigrants arrived via uncontrolled routes, since passage by boat from the

- 3 Hassène Kassar, "Changements sociaux et émigration clandestine en Tunisie" (Social change and clandestine emigration in Tunisia"), Poster session N 1405, <http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/papers/52581>
- 4 Kamel Jerfel, "Siciliens et Maltais en Tunisie aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Le cas de la ville de Sousse" (Sicilians and Maltese in Tunisia in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries. The case of the city of Sousse"), Mawarid, a review issued by the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences of Sousse, 2013. fhalshs01559672f
- 5 Henri de Montety, "Les Italiens en Tunisie" (Italians in Tunisia). In: Politique étrangère, n°5, 1937, 2^e année, pp. 409-425; doi: <https://doi.org/10.3406/polit.1937.6318>
- 6 Jerfel, Kamel, cited article.
- 7 *The La Dépêche tunisienne newspaper, August 6, 1947. This newspaper, published between 1889 and 1961, was the leading daily of the French colonial period. Digitized text available on site, BNF, Paris.*
- 8 Taieb Khouni, « Quand les Italiens débarquaient clandestinement sur les côtes tunisiennes. Tunisie, la Terre Promise » (When Italians landed illegally on the Tunisian coast. Tunisia, the Promised Land) https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/quand-les-italiens-debarquaient-clandestinement-sur-les-cotes-tunisiennes_mg_5b17eccae4b09578259de05b

Peninsula to the Regency of Tunis was too expensive for the poorest would-be emigrants. However, many crossings were carried out through non-regular channels: whole families boarded fishing boats or, free of charge, regular liner service vessels, in exchange for work to be done on board. Clandestine and indirect routes were the rule in cases of political emigration, or in the case of families accompanied by young people fleeing conscription. (R. Rainero, 1996, 146- 147). Sicily, which was the main hub, supplied almost all Italian-speaking immigrants. This island, close to the shores of Tunisia, had

remained on the fringes of the industrialization movement in the north of the Peninsula. It suffered from economic and social problems which caused “overpopulation”⁹.



With Europeans settling in Tunisia on the eve of French colonization, political reforms following the proclamation of the Tunisian Constitution in 1861, under the reign of Sadok Bey (1859-1882), seemed to make the country attractive. New legal frameworks came into being, extending the rights of migrants from the north and giving them equal access to various functions and trade in Tunisia:

“The legal status of Europeans in the regency, previously defined by Ottoman capitulations, was defined by bilateral treaties (in 1863 for the Anglo-Maltese, in 1868 for the Italians and in 1871 for the French) which effectively granted them the right to own property, freedom of worship and

⁹ Jerfel Kamel, *op. cit.*

freedom to exercise all professions. While still administered by their respective consuls, they enjoyed the same equality before the law as the Bey's Tunisian subjects¹⁰.

Throughout the duration of the French protectorate in Tunisia and right up to independence in 1956, the migratory flow of southern Europeans continued to increase, to the point where they ended up feeding hate speech labeling them “undesirable” by certain bangs of the Tunisian population hostile to immigration. They were clandestine migrants, Italians who “massively” landed on the coast of Kelibia in 1947:

“The coasts of Cap Bon have always served as a landing place for undesirables who, fleeing Sicily with the Carabinieri at their heels, or for any other reason, come to our neck of the woods in search of peace, bread and freedom”¹¹.

Relations between Tunisia and Sicily have been marked by the proximity of their coasts and the porosity of their “limits” (borders) since the Middle Ages¹². These relations are just one of many points that illustrate the process of distinction between Europe and the southern Mediterranean. They show how the annexation of Sicily by Italy and the distinction introduced between Sicilian Italians and Tunisians by the French protectorate came about. As Ilaria Giglioli has shown, Sicilians were not recognized as Italians until the French colonization of Tunisia¹³. To distinguish between Tunisian Arab workers and Sicilian migrant workers in Tunisia, the protectorate naturalized the latter, making them fully Italian and European before the law. Sicily and southern Italy historically served as an “internal other” in the Italy of the time: it was a way for the Italian government to consolidate the political presence in Tunisia of citizens who had “become” Italian, and thus its influence over Tunisian territory. This policy echoes other techniques adopted by colonial powers in the region to mark the separation between the north and south of the Mediterranean basin. The Mediterranean became the main dividing line between Europe and “the rest”, i.e. the “external other”¹⁴. The political context and colonial division strategies played an influential role in the classification and racial hierarchy of populations belonging to the north or south of the Mediterranean. Borders were the main means of demarcating and identifying this “other”.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 4.

¹¹ *The newspaper La Dépêche tunisienne, August 6, 1947, loc. cit.*

¹² Dominique Valérian, “Relationships between southern Italy, Sicily and the Maghreb in the Middle Ages: about three recent books”, the *Médiévales* review, 64, spring of 2013, posted online September 25, 2013, consulted October 25, 2018. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/medievales/7014>; DOI: 10.4000/medievales.7014

¹³ Ilaria Giglioli, « Producing Sicily as Europe. Migration, colonialism and the making of the Mediterranean border between Italy and Tunisia », *Geopolitics*, 22 (2) (2017), pp. 407-428.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.



BORDER PERMEABILITY IN THE ARAB-MUSLIM TRADITION PRIOR TO COLONIZATION

Before colonization and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, freedom of movement was guaranteed to Muslim subjects within the borders of Islam. The inhabitants of Tunisia were considered Muslim subjects when they moved or immigrated within the empire. Prior to the establishment of the French protectorate in Tunisia in 1881, this freedom of movement was guaranteed in other Muslim countries, beyond the imperial borders - fluid and different from the modern conception, as historian Rabbath Edmond points out:

“The organic and spatial uniqueness of Islam offered its nationals, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, an immense framework of activity, embracing all the territories Islam conquered. The nationality of Muslims was identified with their faith as Muslims; that of non-Muslims with their relationship to the Dhimma - or original status as Musta'min, in the case of non-Muslim foreigners - which subjected them to Muslim authority. The Muslim's homeland merged with Dar Ul Islam. A sense of home carried them wherever the soil was Muslim. Despite the many and varied dismemberments that degraded its geographical infrastructure, the notion of the Land of Islam (Dar al Islam) retained its full meaning right up to the 19th century, with a practical effectiveness that was not weakened by any legal limitations. Whomever the reigning princes were at the time, the Muslim (and, in their wake, the dhimmi and, often, the musta'min) roamed the vast spaces without hindrance. The striking moral similarity that distinguishes Muslims everywhere would be hard to explain if we were to overlook the action of this primordial factor. For centuries, the feeling of belonging to the same Ummah (nation) has favored the free circulation of believers and stirred together customs and ideas, under the sign of an extraordinarily powerful faith, in the infinite zones that Islam has inundated, where no political frontier has come to stand between its peoples. Such barriers have only been conceived and established around its united territories, encircled by the multitude of ephemeral nations, which it has traditionally pushed back, with a contempt inimical to the legal implications, into the realm of continuous warfare, the Dar al-Harb”¹⁵.

Recent historiography agrees with this description of fluid border relations when it comes to the subjects of Muslim empires pre-dating the colonization of European nation-states and the Ottoman reform phase of the 1870s. In other words, before the process of nationalization and territorialization was triggered in the Muslim world, leading to the new states we recognize today. Notions of territory, nationality and circulation were part of a broader vision that combined a range of tribal, religious and community identities, without the legal framework, border policing and identification with the nation envisioned by its mythical founders being the basis for demarcation. However, beyond the pre-modernity of this condition, the openness of borders and flexibility of space experienced by Muslims before colonization is undoubtedly

¹⁵ Rabbath Edmond, «La théorie des droits de l'homme dans le droit musulman» (Human rights theory in Islamic law), *International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 11, n°4, October-December 1959, pp. 672-693 (p. 690);

comparable to how populations in the Global North perceive their borders; in other words, free from the constraints that prohibit movement. The power of passports, providing citizens of the said Global North with unrestricted freedom of movement not only across the Western geographical and cultural area, but also across the entire world, is comparable to the empires endowing their citizens with such freedom in pre-modern times. On the other hand, the prohibition of movement and the rigidity of borders imposed on the populations of former colonies can be compared to the situation in the North when the latter was traversed by the effects of the war of nations controlling mobility, and later by the Cold War, separating citizens of the same nation by walls, as in Germany. On both sides, the border, in this political scheme, emerges as an instrument of political authority that represses bodies, circulation and communities.

Prior to colonization, when it came to mobility and immigration, the Tunisian subject was a Muslim subject. As Tunisian historian Abdelkrim Mejri points out: "Until the proclamation of the Tunisian Constitution (in 1861), the only common identity shared by these Muslim immigrants was their affiliation to the Muslim Ummah (nation). This confessional affiliation entitled them to the same rights as the Bey's subjects. We know that, in principle, all Muslims were subjects of the prince of the state in which they lived¹⁶". The political organization of the Muslim world was emancipated from fences, like a "civilization"

that it organized and subjected to the law of Allah", and that even within the countries of Islam, none of the narrow regulations that encircled the economic activity of the Western states hindered the free flourishing of trade, "a customary phenomenon in an East where, from time immemorial, the great communication routes, both land and sea, have crossed¹⁷".

Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) on the right to freedom of movement was characterized by the absence of jurisdictions restricting circulation and movement within and outside the lands of Islam. Looking beyond the Muslim subject, borders were open to the movement of other empires. Mohammed Abed al-Jabri's study of the politics of Islam in Andalusia shows how this openness marked the very future of the West and of the great Protestant religious reforms, and the triumphant entry into political modernity.

Lastly, the evolution of this tradition, which underpins the politics and vision of the empire of Islam, is largely inspired by the texts and practices that have spread since the first Muslim communities were linked to the world around them. The year of the Muslims is designated by the founding act of Islam, namely the Hijrah (emigration) of the Prophet Mohammad. This event of moving from Mecca to Medina is seen by subsequent generations, right up to the present day, as a call to emancipation from immobility and inertia, so it's hardly surprising that freedom of travel was guaranteed in the Quranic text,

16 Mejri, Abdelkrim, « Être maghrébin musulman immigré en Tunisie depuis la conquête de l'Algérie jusqu'à la veille de la deuxième guerre mondiale (1830-1937) (Being a North African Muslim immigrant in Tunisia from the conquest of Algeria until the eve of the Second World War (1830-1937)) The Mediterranean Studies Group Hitotsubashi University, Vol. 20, June 2010, pp. 69-86.

17 *Ibid.*, p 136

whether for indefinite discovery or for trade and science. In Surat al-mûlk (The Sovereignty), it says: "He is the One Who smoothed out the earth for you, so move about in its regions and eat from His provisions. And to Him is the resurrection of all"¹⁸. Images and metaphors calling on humans to initiate journeys making them acts and means of worship are numerous in Islamic texts. In Surat al-'ankabût (The Spider), we read: "Say, 'O Prophet,` "Travel throughout the land and see how He originated the creation, then Allah will bring it into being one more time. Surely Allah is Most Capable of everything"¹⁹. To ease these migrations to which the Quranic text calls, several verses quote the word "Al-fulk", which can be translated as vessel or ship - in Morocco, the same word is used today by fishermen but also by irregular migrants taking the sea - to show Allah's infinite capacity to provide tools so that His creatures can go to the ends of the earth to earn a living and discover the land"²⁰.

¹⁸ Quran, Surat al-mûlk, verse 15, Malek Chebel's translation.

¹⁹ Quran, Surat al-'ankabût, verse 20.

²⁰ It is your Lord Who steers the ships for you through the sea, so that you may seek His bounty. Surely He is ever Merciful to you". Surat al-Isra (The Night Journey), verse 66. "And He is the One Who has subjected the sea, so from it you may eat tender seafood and extract ornaments to wear. And you see the ships ploughing their way through it, so you may seek His bounty and give thanks to Him" . Quran, Surat An-Nahl (The Bees), verse 14.

3 INTERNAL REFORMS AND COLONIZATION: USHERING IN THE ERA OF BORDERIZATION

The first blow to the open borders of Muslim subjects came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which introduced the first legal and police mechanisms for territorialization and the establishment of nationality in Islamic lands. The entry of the Ottomans into the game of European powers and modernization was an important lever in changing the horizon of a universal religion neutralizing the strict closures of its territory. As we shall see, the onset of colonization, with the demarcation of borders, the division of territories by colonial powers and the installation of large-scale modern administrative machinery, marked the consolidation of the logic of borderization and laid the foundations for future nation-states. From then on, movement was a question of laws and nationality²¹. Moreover, despite the open borders between European metropolises and the colonized world, colonial policy initiated the major political and racial divisions and hierarchies that shaped the border lines

between North and South, predisposing the latter to confinement, three decades after independence, through the visa and Schengen systems.

It is thus necessary to take a closer look at the dynamics of this borderization, taking into account both the effects of colonization and the internal structuring of the Arab-Muslim countries that are of particular interest to us here, namely Tunisia and Morocco. Indeed, the Ottoman government did not promulgate the first Ottoman nationality law until March 26, 1869 – notably the first of its kind in Islamic lands – with considerable consequences for identities and the relationship to borders, despite the fluidity of Ottoman nationality acquisition during the reign of this empire²². From this date onwards, Muslim subjects became Ottoman nationals irrespective of their religion, and, as Vanessa Guéno explains, “reformist ideas undermined traditional Ottoman categories

21 Aujourd’hui, plusieurs pays musulmans imposent des visas dont certains sont difficiles d’accès par des musulmans et des non-musulmans. Les effets destructeurs des frontières sur les communautés dans la région sont très peu étudiés. La menace de la guerre est permanente comme en témoigne le conflit du Sahara occidental entre le Maroc, l’Algérie et le Front Polisario. Quand ce n’est pas la guerre nue comme au Soudan et au Yémen et en Palestine, c’est la frontière qui s’impose, séparant tribus, familles et communautés.

22 Rabbath Edmond mentionne qu’« il a fallu au gouvernement ottoman beaucoup d’efforts pour vaincre l’hostilité des Ulémas [les savants de l’islam], avant de promulguer la Loi du 26 mars 1869 sur la nationalité ottomane, la première loi de ce genre en Islam. (Voir le texte, précédé d’une notice, dans Georges Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, t. II, p. 225 et suiv., Oxford, 1905). Jusqu’à cette date – et même postérieurement, grâce à l’aisance avec laquelle tout musulman du dehors pouvait acquérir la nationalité ottomane – le musulman, pour peu qu’il s’installât en territoire turc, était automatiquement considéré comme sujet du sultan. », Rabbath Edmond, « La théorie des droits de l’homme dans le droit musulman », op. cit. p. 690.



(Muslims, dhimmis, non-Muslim foreigners). The reforms introduced a new category of foreigners (ajânib) based on territorial affiliation and without regard to religion (Hanio lu, 2008: 74). All nationals were qualified as Ottoman, whereas being “Ottoman” had previously been reserved for the ruling dynasty (Karpát, 2001: 315-316). Ottoman identity is now defined by territory²³”.

The interplay of new identities and nationality laws adopted by the Ottoman Empire as it

neared its end is part of the global history - or, more precisely, the European history - of political modernity. In other words, the empowerment of states, the formation of nations, the growing identification of subjects with national bureaucracies and state institutions. In short, a process of centralization unprecedented in the history of the peoples of this region. It is in this sense that we need to understand the transition from free movement in the Muslim world to a

23 Vanessa Guéno, “S’identifier à l’aube de l’état civil (nufûs). Les justiciables devant le tribunal civil de Homs (Syrie centrale) à la fin du XIXe siècle” (Personal identification at the dawn of the Ottoman Registry (nufûs): litigants before the civil court of Homs (central Syria) in late nineteenth century), the *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* [Online], 127, July 2010, online June 15, 2013, accessed December 07, 2019.: <http://journals.openedition.org/remmm/6733> ; DOI : 10.4000/remmm.6733

situation where “mobility is most often forbidden, always controlled and directed to serve the needs of colonization, but without being drained for all that.”²⁴

Meanwhile, following the annexation of Algeria by France, Algerian immigrants living in Tunisia changed their status from subjects of the Bey of Tunis to “French nationals” residing abroad. Similarly, Tripolitans who settled in Tunisia after 1912 became Italian subjects²⁵. Moreover, the Maghrebi community in Tunisia underwent considerable legal fragmentation following the French colonization of Algeria (1830), and especially after the establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia (1881). From then on, Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans were grouped together in the legal-bureaucratic category of “North Africans” within the French colonial administration, and envisaged as an object of state government separating territories and dividing populations (northern and southern Morocco were colonized by Spain; Algeria was departmentalized and came under the French Ministry of the Interior, while the rest of Morocco and Tunisia were under protectorate and affiliated to management by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs). New border regulations, such as travel permits signed by colonial authorities, were created within the colonized world. Thus, “the sénatus-consulte of July 14, 1865, by decreeing that Muslim Algerians would no longer be part of the ra’aya (subjects) of the bey of Tunis, had put an end to the old conceptions of the ‘Muslim nation’”²⁶.

24 Zeghib, Hocine. « À l’ombre des circulations verticales subsahariennes, des circulations horizontales intra-maghrébines? » (“In the shadow of sub-Saharan vertical circulations, intra-Maghrebi horizontal circulations?”), *the Migrations Société* review, vol. 179, no. 1, 2020, pp. 131-148.

25 Mejri, Abdelkrim, « Être maghrébin musulman immigré en Tunisie... » (Being a North African Muslim immigrant in Tunisia...), *op. cit.* p. 75.

26 Mejri, Abdelkrim, « Être maghrébin musulman immigré en Tunisie... » (Being a North African Muslim immigrant in Tunisia...), *op. cit.* p. 74.

4

THE COLONIAL PERIOD: THE PARADOXES OF "FREE MOVEMENT" IN THE ALGERIAN CASE

*"Us, Arabs and Blacks
We are not here by chance
Every arrival has its departure!
You wished for immigration
Thanks to it, you've gorged yourselves to the point of indigestion
I think France never was charitable
Immigrants are just cheap labor"²⁷*

Before delving deeper into the characteristics of post-colonial immigration, marked by the ultimate policy of closing borders with the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, let's briefly look back at the previous sequence to understand the features of colonial management of immigration and borders. Our hypothesis at this stage is as follows: while borders were open in the sense that visas were not required, as in the era of "selective immigration", migratory flows remained controlled by management at the service of colonial projects. In other words, migration policy has been a public policy since colonial times. It may well have been the most important policy of the colonial project, but it has received little critical or scholarly attention. This policy put in place a set of measures, decrees, laws and administrations that moved between the selection of migrant bodies and the overall organization of colonial and post-colonial society on both shores of the Mediterranean, always at the service of the Metropole. At one point, this selection followed the slope of recruitment maximization, with a discourse focused on "civilization" and "work". At another, from the 1980s onwards, it will opt for "regulation" and the strict prohibition of territories as a strategy for controlling and increasing both the desire for the West²⁸ and the extraction of elites from former colonies.

During colonization, the problem of the border did not arise in the same way as it does today. Since the discovery of colonization, the colonial empire has not conceptualized migration in terms of the national/extra-national dichotomy. From the colonies to Metropolitan France, the migrant population came under several types of statuses set by the colonial administration, such as "indigenous", "North African", "Israelite" and so on. These populations were treated in different ways, but they were considered as coming from "French" territories to metropolitan France²⁹. This does not mean that the administrative treatment of these immigrants put them on an equal footing with citizens of Metropolitan France. From a legal point of view, people from the Algerian colony were not considered to have the right to free movement until the constitu-

²⁷ [Kery James, Letter to the Republic \(Lettre à La République\)](#)

²⁸ Montassir Sakhi & Wael Garnaoui, « La fabrique du désir de l'Occident frontaliérisé », Revue De l'Institut Des Belles Lettres Arabes, 86(232), 189-209., 2023

²⁹ On this subject, see the article by Mailys Kydjian, "Penser l'immigration maghrébine avec l'histoire coloniale" (Considering the Immigration from the Maghreb through Colonial History), the Les Cahiers de Framespa review, 19 | 2015.

tional reform of the 4th Republic in 1946. Up until that date, the management of “indigenous” migration to France was the responsibility of the colonial administration, with its own systems distinct from the laws controlled by the legislative power - the National Assembly - and the judiciary. Several types of immigration were subject to arbitrary and repressive measures, while practices of refoulement and mass displacement were common practice:

“It was colonial power that forced the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of men, both workers and soldiers, between 1914 and 1918, then manu militari expelled those who, after the victory, had become undesirable. It drew and expelled workers according to the economic situation. Free movement between Algeria and France was only established in 1946, just as the foundations were cracking. The colonial management of human resources transposed the methods of indigenous administration to France itself, with the creation of ad hoc bodies from the 1920s onwards. Inscribed, registered and monitored by specialized services, this population is subject to close surveillance, much tighter and all-powerful than that of foreigners from Europe in the same period³⁰.”

These two policies of enforced migration on the one hand, and forbidden migration on the other, were juxtaposed under the colonial empire, according to the law of demand and the needs

of the said empire. Resembling an army and a reserve workforce, the indigenous population fulfilled functions as programmed by the colonial administration, legislative institutions and the government³¹. During this period, the proliferation of statutes and laws governing migration and the management of colonized populations went hand in hand with the rise of racist discourses separating a Europe on the road to integration following two devastating wars, and the colonized world. Beyond the psychiatric discourse of a scientific society such as the “Ecole d’Alger”³² and, more broadly, the discourse of justifying colonization³³, biologizing and racist thinking warning against immigration was at the forefront of official academic institutions. In 1947, after the abolition of the Vichy regime in France, historian Louis Chevalier warned of the risk of North African immigration:

“Physically speaking, the question is whether this immigration risks upsetting the physical components observed in France and expressed by a certain distribution of characteristics as obvious as stature, pigmentation and cephalic index. Ethnically speaking, the question is whether the North African ethnicity, affirmed by a certain civilization, i.e. a language, set of customs, religion, general behavior and even a mentality, opposes an absolute refusal, a total antagonism to what can be considered as the French ethnicity (...). In the years to come, we

30 Claude Liauzu, « Immigration, colonisation et racismisme : pour une histoire liée » (Immigration, colonization and racism: a linked history), *the Hommes et Migrations review*, n°1228, November-December 2000; « L’héritage colonial, un trou de mémoire » (“The colonial heritage, a memory gap”), pp. 5-14.

31 For instance, the colonial authorities called on Tunisian workers to replace the French mobilized for military operations during the First World War: “18,200 Tunisians were officially introduced into France”. See Simon Gildas, « L’espace des travailleurs tunisiens en France, structure et fonctionnement d’un champs migratoire international » (The space of Tunisian workers in France, structure and functioning of an international migratory field), Poitiers [editor?], 1979, p. 4.

32 See: Frantz Fanon, « Considérations ethnopsychiatriques » (“Ethnopsychiatric considerations”), in, Frantz Fanon, « Écrits sur l’aliénation et la liberté » (Writings on alienation and freedom), La Découverte, 2018, pp. 422-425.

33 Immanuel Wallerstein, L’universalisme européen : de la colonisation au droit d’ingérence (European universalism: from colonization to the right of intervention), Demopolis, 2008.



***run the risk of creating a dangerous minority in France that is utterly unassimilable because it is deliberately unassimilated, and comparable in all respects to the ethnic and racial minorities that can be observed in other parts of the world.*³⁴**

Colonial management of immigration had contradictions as profound as the very nature of colonization itself. This was reflected in the nationalist rhetoric espoused right to the heart of the French Gaullist presidency, which considered all Algerians to be French by law. This reality lasted from 1946 to Algeria's independence in 1962.

In the aftermath of independence, France's reception of immigrants was governed by colonial administrative structures: all repatriates from French Algeria were separated along denominational and ethnic lines, such as the categories of "the pieds-noirs" for repatriated "French Europeans" and "Harkis" for repatriated "French Muslims", who were also repatriated after much hesitation³⁵.

But it would be overly conceding to the powers of colonial administration not to take note of the capacity of "indigenous" society to "conserve" itself and draw on its own collective resources, such as honor, to protect itself against the disintegration programmed by the colonial power. The nature of immigration under colonial rule in Algerian society bears witness to this. The "first age of immigration" observed by Abdelmalek Sayad is one in which immigration is

"ordered" and controlled by the community that provides migrants - in other words, the society of emigration (in this case, Algeria). This is the age when, in the former colonies of emigration, peasants reluctantly part with their land on a temporary (and seasonal) basis to supplement incomes weakened by the disintegration of peasant society, increasingly enslaved by the city and colonial centralization. In this context, emigrating to France from Algeria "had the primary function of providing peasant communities, unable to support themselves through their agricultural activities, with the means to perpetuate themselves as such". The peasant-emigrant of the time "was mandated by their family and, more broadly, by peasant society for a very precise mission, limited in time because its objectives were limited."³⁶ Accordingly, this emigration, under the control of communities and villages, testifies to the age when colonized society could relatively neutralize the effects of borders, and thus divide the work of its peasant communities between those who worked inside (in the field or in the house) and those who worked outside (the emigrant in France, sent to bring financial and other resources back into the community), but always with a view to keeping the house, the community and the family in the country/village. Sayad shows how these strategies of the first age of immigration serve the integration of community members - such as the period of emigration restricted to winter for a return in summer, harvest time, when "social relations

34 Louis Chevalier, « Le problème démographique nord-africain » ("The North African demographic problem"), Cahier de l'Ined, 1947, p. 184 et 213.

35 Aderahmen Moumen, « De l'Algérie à la France. Les conditions de départ et d'accueil des rapatriés, pieds-noirs et harkis en 1962 » (From Algeria to France. The conditions of departure and reception of repatriates, pieds-noirs and harkis in 1962), the Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps review, 2010/3, n° 99, p. 60-68.

36 Abdelmalek SAYAD, La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré, Paris, Seuil, 1999. p. 68.

are at their most intense”³⁷. Consequently, “neither the emigrants nor their group liked to make their stays in France last too long”³⁸. Still in this first of the three ages of immigration, the sociologist of immigration emphasizes that emigrants who had to make regular visits to France distanced themselves from immigration by creating a microcosm and a community of refuge “the little country” (le petit pays), thus prolonging “the big native country”³⁹, a sign of loyalty and real attachment to the family and values of a country, their country, which they never left.

Here, to return to our problematic, a major condition prefigures Sayad's observation: the opening of borders and the relative freedom of movement between the colonies and the metropolises made it possible for the family, the village and the “country” to control emigration (departure), return and immigration (settlement and the nature of this settlement). Obviously, this control also obeyed the speed with which the modernization of the colonies and the transformations leading to the disintegration of the peasant world - de-peasantization, to use Sayad's and Bourdieu's term ⁴⁰ - took place. Nonetheless, the opening and closing of borders was a decisive factor in the ability of communities to direct and regulate their members from the colonized countries. Over and above peasant society, borders became the keystone in the disorganization of cities and the “middle classes” during colonization, and later, after independence under the banner of “labor immigration” - since labor was more available in industrialized, colonizing countries than in colonized ones. The relative opening of borders before family reunification policies and the Schengen Agreement came into force, however, enabled immigration from southern countries and communities to continue to be controlled. It was after the closure and introduction of compulsory visa systems that this control was eroded to the point where, as we shall see, communities were unable to protect their young people from perishing on the paths of irregular immigration.

37 Ibid, 70.

38 Ibid

39 Ibid, 72

40 P. Bourdieu et A. Sayad, Uprooting: The crisis of traditional agriculture in Algeria, Minuit, 1996 [1964].

5

FROM ECONOMISM TO XENOPHOBIC
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK:

THE IRRUPTION OF THE “CLANDESTINE” FIGURE

At the end of the “Trente Glorieuses” (the Glorious Thirty), the 1970s marked a decisive turning point for immigration in Europe - France being a prime example of how the new approach to migration was implemented across the continent. In 1972, faced with rising unemployment, the French government took measures to promote employment. Migration emerged as a way out and a framework for analyzing the labor crisis. The Marcellin-Fontanet⁴¹ circulars (January and February 1972) aimed to reduce the entry of foreign workers into France. One of the consequences of these circulars was to institutionalize a new administrative category, that of the “clandestine”. The figure of the “irregular (immigrant)”, likely to benefit from permanent regularization, was now replaced by that of the “clandestine”, designating both those on the bangs of the law and those engaged in hidden, even secret and criminal activities. The shift from a system of permanent regularization to one of “exceptional regularization” also contributes to the institutionalization of the “clandestine” as an ambiguous administrative category: through a semantic sleight of hand, it allows us to lump together those who have entered the country illegally, those who remain there through dissimulated work, and those who represent “a threat to public order”⁴². This criminalization of the clandestine immigrant,

justifying a broader and more arbitrary use of deportation, clearly reveals the unspoken aspect of political discourse on immigration: the restoration of the old myth of the dangerous classes and the “vagrant” (vagabond)⁴³. Political decision-makers are replacing it with a new, distinctly more negative image, with an ever more obvious socio-political purpose.


The upsurge of the first partisan discourses of the new extreme right, focusing on “the migration problem”, has led to the emergence of the figure of the immigration specialist in the fields of expertise and political consultancy in Europe. This position now gives us access to state knowledge on changes in the way immigration is handled. Experts were already pointing out the discrepancy between political discourse and the reality of work, without being able to intervene in the course of a history that would see the re-establishment of increasingly firm borders with the south.

An expert like Claude-Valentin Marie saw how private companies continued to recruit through their own means, smuggling migrants onto national soil. Shunning policies that were beginning to restrict immigration meant “in effect [encouraging] clandestine immigration and even organizing it through private agencies or specialized

41 Danièle Lochak, « Les circulaires Marcellin-Fontanet » (“The Marcellin-Fontanet circulars”), the *Hommes & migrations* review, 1330 | 2020.

42 Alexis Spire, *Étrangers à la carte, L'administration de l'immigration en France (1945-1975)* (Strangers à la carte: The administration of immigration in France (1945-1975)), Grasset, Paris, 2005. p. 246.

43 Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*, Seuil, Paris, 2004.



agents recruiting workers directly in their country of origin⁴⁴". The same author recalls how times were changing in the 1980s, when at a press conference in 1966, the Minister of Labour even defended the right to clandestine immigration: "Clandestine immigration is not useless because, if we stuck to the strict application of international agreements, we might be short of manpower⁴⁵".

"It was only after 1974 that this argumentation was reversed, leading in the early 1980s to the "clandestine immigrant" becoming the norm of a negative discourse on all immigration realities⁴⁶. [...] It is this logic that underpins and gives substance to the plan to reform the nationality law, which symbolically refers the collective imagination to the fantasy of a transgression of norms, of an abusive crossing of dividing lines, of a violation of borders⁴⁷".

The cessation of immigration in 1974 unsettled the atmosphere and sparked resentment and misunderstanding. In retrospect, it provided the legitimization sought by xenophobic movements⁴⁸. During this period, family emigration (family reunification) replaced labor emigration, in line with the standards set by the host countries - new policies were introduced by these countries, notably immigrant integration policies⁴⁹. Henceforth, political decision-makers, social actors and scientists accepted the permanence of what had been considered temporary and treated as such.



- 44 Claude-Valentin Marie « Entre économie et politique: le «clandestin», une figure sociale à géométrie variable» (“Between economy and politics: the “clandestine”, a social figure with variable geometry”), the Pouvoirs review n°47 - Immigration - November 1988 - p.75-92. In this article, the author describes the climate of the time, quoting a passage from conservative journalist Alain Griotteray’s book *Les immigrés : le choc* (Immigrants: the shock), Paris, Plon, p.32: “It was a time when trucks and buses filled with Portuguese crossed the Pyrenees, while Citroën and Simca recruiting sergeants transplanted entire villages of Moroccans from their “Douar” of origin to the chains of Poissy, Javel or Aulnay. The phenomenon is reminiscent of the 15th century slave trade. In fact, such comparison is often made.
- 45 Claude-Valentin Marie « Entre économie et politique: le «clandestin», une figure sociale à géométrie variable» (“Between economy and politics: the “clandestine”, a social figure with variable geometry”), op. cit.
- 46 Marie-Claude Valentin, « La fonction idéologique de la notion de « clandestin » (“The ideological function of the notion of “clandestine”), in the *Hommes et Migrations* review, n°1114, July-August-September 1988, pp. 133-138.
- 47 Ibid., p. 89.
- 48 Chater , Khalifa, «Les mouvements migratoires entre la France et la Tunisie aux XIXe et XXe siècles : la dichotomie du langage» (“Migratory movements between France and Tunisia in the 19th and 20th centuries: the dichotomy of language”), the *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* review, 54, 1997. pp. 37-54.
- 49 Catherine Rhein, “Social integration, spatial integration”, *L’Espacegraphique*, 2002/3 (volume 31), p. 193-207.

6

THE BORDER DEBATE IN EUROPE

In tandem with the multi-faceted social and political crisis stemming in part from the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1980s, which hit young post-colonial states such as Tunisia and Morocco⁵⁰, a number of political contexts in the North have renewed the old value of closure, protectionism and borderization. These policies have been pursued within nation-states since the 1980s, even before the meteoric rise of the extreme right. To begin with, the anti-terrorism laws provide an opportunity to put this plan into practice. Several European countries, notably France, have experienced numerous terrorist attacks, some 120 in metropolitan France between 1970 and 1990⁵¹. The 1986 attacks and the change of government in France enabled immigration and border officials to jump on the security rhetoric bandwagon. The denunciation of an attack on state sovereignty, the emphatic justification unsuccessfully put forward by customs officers at the start of the conflict, took on a new significance in the globalized

fight against terrorism⁵². On September 9, 1986, Law N° 86-1020 on the fight against terrorism and attacks on State security was passed, eight days before the Rue de Rennes attack, which left seven dead and fifty-five wounded. This was the latest and deadliest of the fourteen attacks claimed by the “the Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners (CSPPA)”.

As such, terrorism has become an important lever for public immigration policies. It has played the role of a booster, justifying, in public debate and within representative institutions, the recourse to measures to segregate citizens even within the same “nation”⁵³.

From the early 1980s, France initiated a gradual return to visa requirements for foreign nationals, progressively cancelling exemption agreements. In 1986, under the Chirac government, this policy was formalized by the reintroduction of visas for all

50 On this point, see Sadri Khiari's analysis. “3. disengagement de l'État et désocialisation”, in Sadri Khiari (ed.) *Tunisie : le délitement de la cité. Coercition, consentement, résistance (Disengagement of the State and desocialization)*, in, Sadri Khiari (dir) *Tunisia: the disintegration of the city. Coercion, consent, resistance*, Karthala, 2003, pp. 75-100.

51 Yvan Gastaut, « La flambée raciste de 1973 en France » (The 1973 racist outbreak in France), in the revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 9, n° 2, 1993, pp. 61-75.

52 Fabien Jobard, « Schengen ou le désordre des causes » (“Schengen or the disorder of causes”), the *Vacarme* review, vol. 8, n° 2, 1999, pp. 20-22.

53 A decade later, in response to the terrorist attacks, a new, reformed nationality law (July 22, 1996) was promulgated, permitting French citizens with dual nationality - including those born in France to foreign parents - to be stripped of their nationality. Following the 2015 attacks, this law made it possible to massively expel people born in France and convicted of terrorist acts. In France, both disqualifications and expulsions are governed by administrative law (without the need for a trial), which is applied in conjunction with the law on foreign nationals. See Montassir Sakhi and Caroline Guibet Lafaye, “La déchéance de la nationalité comme ‘marchepied’ pour l'expulsion : radicalisation des pratiques institutionnelles antiterroristes en France” (“Forfeiture of nationality as a “stepping stone” for expulsion: radicalization of anti-terrorist institutional practices in France”), to be published.



countries, with a few exceptions in Western Europe in addition to the European community. The pretext of security, particularly in relation to terrorism, was put forward to justify this tightening of borders, limiting freedom of movement, particularly for migrants and asylum seekers⁵⁴.

A second factor amplifying this novel borderization is undoubtedly the geopolitical transformations accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989. Two major political trends have since emerged in Western Europe. On the one hand, relations between European countries generally became more fluid, with a trend towards the removal of systematic border controls, in favor of people and goods. On the other, borders with southern countries were being fortified.

The new international context (the collapse of the Soviet bloc) has paved the way for new channels of negotiation, particularly with countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. And yet, there were illusions: With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world seemed to have accomplished a great change in favor of international peace. All of Europe seemed to be converging on the Berlin checkpoints. With a reunified Germany, the peoples of the world, freed from the tensions of the Cold War, seemed to be marching towards a new power that would at last allow them to decide for themselves. The 1990s opened with the idea of a lasting, global peace, where individuals would prevail over states, where sover-

eignty would become obsolete and borders outmoded. But the fall of the Berlin Wall only reshuffled the cards, and the first brick of a new wall across the Mediterranean was laid. In this setting, we've returned to the pattern drawn by colonization - that of north and south - but with a decided new reconfiguration. It is no longer the desire for unilateral annexation, accompanied by a racist (and humanitarian) discourse on greatness and civilization, that drives the new politics, as represented by the hegemonic North. Instead, it's the discourse of fear, the defense of sovereign interests and the imposition of a framework put forward by unilateral public policies. These new borders are now a way for states to deal with new threats, which find in the discourse on "Islamism", "radicalization", "separatism" and "foreigners" the new discursive motor for setting borders. The return of borders with the creation of the Schengen area will call into question a precarious balance, accentuate asymmetries and introduce dysfunctions.

⁵⁴ Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés Gisti, «Des visas aux frontières» ("Visas at the borders"), Plein droit, the Gisti review, n° 13.



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHENGEN AREA

The Schengen Area was born of an agreement dated June 14, 1984, originally involving the governments of the Benelux Economic Union states, Germany and France. The agreement was named after a small village on the border between these states, in Luxembourg. Article 7 of the said agreement requires the signatory states to harmonize their visa policies. The procedures for issuing visas and for admission to their territories are therefore to take account of "the need to ensure the protection of all the territories of the five States against illegal immigration and activities which could undermine security⁵⁵". These agreements have been in force since March 1995.

Schengen is touted as an area of freedom of movement. As vaunted in the speeches made at its establishment in Europe, it would facilitate the travel of European citizens and the movement of goods, without the need for customs officers to intervene systematically, and without European national borders becoming compulsory checkpoints. In short,

it is presented as proof of the fulfillment of the ancient dream called "Europe" right out of the Middle Ages. Indeed, in many respects, this area was established to allow the free movement of individuals within the territories of member states. This freedom of movement led to the abolition of internal border controls. But as soon as the Schengen area was actually established, it became clear that the ultimate Schengen act - in other words, its defining feature and most obvious invention - would be the visa. The Schengen Visa is the quintessential feature of the Schengen agreement. That is, the new policy adopted by the countries of the Schengen community (absorbing the majority of European countries over time) which imposes visas on emigrants mainly from former colonies and countries of the global South in general.

⁵⁵ Farida Souiah, «Algérie : des visas au compte-gouttes» ("Algeria: visas in trickles"), *Plein droit*, 2012/2 (n° 93), p. 25-28.

CONCLUSION

We have made a detailed study of the long path taken by the power constituted by the borders of European states towards the South. Firstly, during the period of colonization, the ambiguity of annexation and protectorate was grafted onto the demand for assimilation and submission to colonial power. All these colonial discourses and practices never erased the unequal treatment of subjects from the southern Mediterranean, compared with citizens of the empire and the metropolises. For the colonized and their descendants alike, movement has always been a matter captured by the most sophisticated devices of power. From checkpoints in colonized territories to contemporary Schengen visa systems, movement has always been an issue of government and the domestication of colonial and post-colonial populations.

We then take a brief look at this long process, which has led to a major inflexion and reinforcement of the border by military and legal means, aimed at the formation of Fortress Europe and the emergence of former margins and colonial populations subject to mobility bans. Schengen thus heralds the new politics of enmity and inhospitality. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, European integration has accentuated a policy of disintegration of the global South. The border plays a key role, both economically, by limiting the transfer of knowledge from the North while preserving a vast market for raw materials and migrant labor, and socially, by serving as a mechanism for selecting and capturing the elites of the South. This process of domestication is carried out through the law, by sorting out the granting of visas, residence permits and naturalizations, thus consolidating the status quo.

The responsibility inherent in new border routes is now manifested in public policies designed in the North. Conscious of their historical and organizational superiority, these policies homogenize government efforts, transforming migration management into a unified strategy centered on control, banning and expulsion. They reinforce perilous dichotomies, which reduce migrants to other absolutes, fuelling their marginalization. These government policies legitimize the rise of radical right-wing and fascist ideologies, which present migrants as a threat to be eradicated. This process reinforces a vicious circle in which intensifying hostility towards migrants in turn legitimizes increasingly repressive and lethal border policies. This global policy takes the form of the externalization of borders, marking a return to the methods used to control and manage populations on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. It manifests itself at border points and in negotiations on Europe's "migration dossiers", in line with the colonial continuum.